


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
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
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A.



FIVE BOOKES,
O F
PHILOSOPHIC ALL
COMFORT, FVLL
Of Christian consolation, writ-
ten a 1000. yeeres
since.

By *Anitius, Manlius, Torquatus, Seuerinus,*
Boetius; a Christian Consul
of ROME.

Newly Translated out of Latine; together
with Marginall Notes, explaining the
obscurest places.



L O N D O N
Printed by John Windet, for M A T H E W
L O V V N E S. 1609.

Tr.R.
878.9
B673F



TO THE MOST
Vertuous LADY, the
Countesse of DORSET
DOVAGER.



His excellent Booke, prouing tho shortly, yet surely, the vanitie of all other goods; the veritie of mans onely good to consist in soleyly setling his soule on God the soueraigne, yea sole Good; hauing proued profitable to all almost neighbour Nations, as turned into their tongues; I presume to present vnto our Countrie also for our common good. Now for that it is a common vse, in communicating to all a priuate Inuention or Translation, to appro-

THE EPISTLE


priate the protection thereof to some one particular Person: in the designing of that Person, vnto me none occurs more proper then your vertuous selfe, not so much for my priuate obligations vnto you (which yet be manifold, I must needes publikely acknowledge), as for a peculiar interest, (as I may say) it seems you haue vnto this booke. This Booke (I say) so much esteemed by your late most worthy Lord and Husband, as had his leisure beeene answerable to his learning and will, it had beeene ennobled by a more noble Translatour. This Booke (I say) which though perhaps as Philosophicall for the speculatiue points, may be aboue your understanding, yet as truely Theological for the practicall partes, the principall ende of such speculations, it is I am perswaded according, and vnder your will. And yet also (Madame, for I had rather you should wisely feare, then I foolishly flatter) looke into it as a glasse, not so much to see if most parts be much, as if any bee lesse beautifull. Weigh if in all things and at all times, you haue truly preferred the veritie of goodnessse of God, afore the vanitie of vice of the world: if you haue, continue therin, so
much

DEDICATORIE.

much more carefully, as remaines for you a
lesse time of this combersome carefulnesse.
If you haue not, bee carefull now in your
last times at the least in the principall points
to begin your iourney with such alacritie, as
with much speed to make perhaps a long
way in a short time. This is the greatest
good I your poore Client can wish you,
this is the powerfulest patronage and high-
est commendation you can procure to this
Booke ; that your selfe doe vertuously no
lesse effect in will and worke, then your late
loued Lord did affect it in word and vnder-
standing. With the which wish to
the richest seruice my pouer-
tie can reach vnto,
I remaine.

*Your most meane but not least
devoted seruant*

I. T.



To the Reader.

IT is an old saying, and not so old as true, that vi-
no vendibili non est
opus hædora: I would
it were as true, that the
best thinges are alway most esteemed,
then I would not doubt but that this
golden booke of Boethius would be in
great request; for I cannot imagine,
what fault any man can find with it,
that is delighted with Vertue. The
subject of this Discourse is true Felici-
tie, the way to it, and the remouing of
all impediments. All this is expla-
ned

To the Reader.

ned by Rhetoricall & Philosophicall discourses. And least any thing should bee wanting, the Poetical Muses are not excluded; Thus are all dispositions satisfied, and profitte ioyned with delight. Wherefore well we may say of this worthy Authour: Omne tulit punctum,
qui miscuit vtile dulci. And yet this I will adde more; that the noble, learned and pyous wits and minds, will take most benefite and pleasure in Boethius. The reason is, for that similis simili gaudet; Who more noble then Anitius Manlius Torquatus Seuerinus; since fewe of that family deserved not to be Consuls. And they were worthy of the golden chayne, since their Champion wonne it in the field. Titus Manlius Inteane, who tooke it from his French Challengers necke, and put it about his owne, whereby he purchased to himselfe and his posteritie, the syrname of Torquatus.

To the Reader.

quatus. And by another no lesse admirable act of iustice, came to bee called Seuerinus, not sparing his owne conque-ring sonne, because he gaue the battell against his fathers commaund. What should I speake of our Boethius his learning? Let these his faine Bookes giue sufficient testimonie thereof. Or if this will not suffice, peruse who list his other monumens, fraught with varietie of all Sciences, both humane and diuine. His pietie appeareth in his whole life, but most of all at his death; bee both wrote and dyed for defence of Christ and his faith against the Arians and other hereticks. Finally he was truly Boethius, that is, an helper and relieuer of all innocent and distressed people. And least his Benefite should liue no longer then himselfe, he committed it to writing, and sendeth it to thee, in this his noble, learned, and pyous worke. W bich that our

Coun-

To the Reader.

Country may the better enjoy , is now,
(as thou seest) both in English verse and
prose. Which how hard it was to effect,
thou mayest guesse in part : since our
prince of Poets, Chaucer turned it on-
ly into prose. Which will be a sufficient
motiuē to take this labour in good part;
and to beare with such faults as cannot
easily be amended. Though thus much
also I doe assure thee, that it will be more
pleasing to the Translatour , to see his
labour rather amended then commended.

As likewise bee will take it more in
patience, to haue it carped
at , then corrupted.

Vale & fruere.

(. . .)

T O



TO THE YONG

Gentlemen Readers, concerning the Title of this Booke of Philoso- phicall Comfort.

Whoeast those ioyes which fading pleasure yeelds,
His age will rue the follies of his youth:
But if you trauell in the spacious fields
Of learned Arts, there seeking pretious truth,
The sacred Treasure, which you thence haue gained,
In wants and troubles shall your succour proue;
And though your bodies be in dungeons chained,
By wisedomes ayd your minds shall be aboue.
Then since you may be wretched, poore and old,
Let not such infants starue for lacke of care,
Who shall like thankefull chi. dren you uphold,
When they more strong, when you more feeble are.
Whereof you by this worke the proose may see
In him, whose comforts your instructions bee.

Another



Another of the Authour.

IN thee (Boetius) that true rule appeares,
That wise men gaine most fame by suffering paines.
Of all the actions of thy prosperous yeeres
To after-times small memorie remaines:
But when the cloudes of sorrow stroue t' obscure
Thy vertues light, then it did clearer shine.
Calamity makes studious minds more pure,
Their gloric growth, as their states decline.
Thou couldst not in thy ioyes haue please d vs so,
As with this worke, which to thy grieve we owe.

To



To the friendly Reader.

Sonnet.

VVhat need my lines to recommend these leaves,
So frequently by learned hands perus'd,
As that I feare they'll seeme to be abus'd,
Since customarie praise suspition weaves.

For I mistrust a gorgeous Frontispice,
Of mercenary pens. If thou doest so,
And art unlearn'd, to better counsell goe.
I, thou, nor any can thinke that amisse.

And lettered though thou bee'st, here mayst thou find,
What other volumes haue not, for thy good :
Some passages explained of that kind
As are, at first, not easily understood.

Friend, let with thankes our Author be rewarded,
Who gaines, nor fame, but thy good hath regarded.


G. G.

Volume 11 Number 3

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1. *Leucanthemum vulgare* L. (Fig. 1) is a common species throughout the country, especially in the northern states. It is a low-growing annual, 1-2 ft. tall, with numerous branched stems bearing numerous small, white, daisy-like flowers.

1. *Constitutive genes* are those which are expressed in all cells of the body.



THE
FIRST BOOKE
OF BOETIVS.

Containing his Complaint
and Miseries.

THE I. VERSE.

Wherein Boetius bewaileth his estate.

IThat with youthfull heate did verses write,
Must now my woes in dolefull tunes endite,
My worke is fram'd by Muses borne and rude,
And my sad cheeks are wih true teares bedewid
For these alone no terrorre could affray,
From being partners of my weary way,

B

My

Boetius his

My happy and a lightfull ages glory,
Is my sole comfort, being old and sory,
Old age through griefe makes unexpected hast,
And sorrow in my yeares her signes hath plac't,
Untimely hearey haire cou'r my head,
And my loose skin quakes on my fleshe halfe dead,
O happy death, that spareth sweetest yeares,
And comes in sorrow often call'd with teares.
Alas how deafe is he to wretches cries;
And i' th' he is to close up weeping eyes;
While tristnes chance me with vain fauour crowned,
That saddest houre my life had almost drown'd:
Now the bark clouded her deceutfull face,
My spacefull daves prolong their weary race,
My frens, why did you count me fortunate?
He that is full n're stood in settled state.

THE I. PROSE.

Containing the description of
Philosophy.



Hile I ruminated these
things with my selfe,
and determined to set
forth my woful com
plaint in writing; me
thought

(line 2 broken)

Muses standing about my bed, and suggesting wordes to my teares, being moued for a little space, and inflamed with angry lookes; who (sayth snee) hath permitted these Tragical harlots to haue aceesse to this sicke man? which will not onely not comfort his grieves with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them with sugred poyson; for these be they, which with the fruitlesse thornes of ^u affections doe kill the fruitful crop of reason, and doe accustome mens minds to sicknesse, and not free them. But if your flattery did deprive vs of some prophane fellow, as commonly it happeneth, I should thinke, that it were not so grieuously to be taken, for in him our labors shuld receiue no harme. But now you haue laid hand of him, who

^u This is
the com-
mon fault
of Poets, to
cede and
nourish
passion a-
gainst
reason.

Boetius his

* Eleaticis
of Elea, the
City wher-
~~Aristotele~~
studied.

^y Note the
force of a
grave re-
prehension

^z Griefe so
temporal
losses dark
neth and
dulceth th
understan-
ding.

^a The way
to be com-
forted is to
give eare to
good coun-
sell.

hath beene brought vp in * Peripa-
teticall , and Academicall stu-
dies: but rather get you gone,
you Syrens pleasant euen to de-
struction , and leave him to my
Muses to be cured and healed. That
company being thus checked, o-
uercome with griefe, calling their
eyes vpon the ground, and bewray-
ing their bashfulnesse with blush-
ing, went sadly away. And I, whose

sight was dimmed with teares, so
that I could not discerne what this
woman might be, so imperious,
and of such authority, was astoni-
shed, and fixing my countenance v-
pon the earth, began to expect with
^a silence what shee would doe af-
terward. Then shee comming
nigher, sate downe at my beds feet,
and beholding my countenance sad
with mourning, and cast vpon the
ground

ground with griefe, complained of
the perturbation of my mind with
these verses.

T H E I I . V E R S E .

Philosophy bewayleth the pertur-
bation of Boetius his mind.

A las, how thy dull mind is headlong cast
In deppes of moe, where all her light once lost,
She doth so walke in utter darkenes hast,
While cares grow great wth earthly tempests test.
He that through ih' opned heau'ns did freely runne,
And vs'd to traualle ike celestiall wayes,
Marking the rosie splendor of the sunne,
And noting Cyntiaes cold and watry rayes.
He that did brauely comprehend in verse,
The different spheres, and wandering course of stars.
He that was wont the causes to rehearse,
Why sounding winds doe wth the seas make wars,
What spirit moves the world's well settled frame,
And why the Sunne, whence forth the East doth bring
In westerne waues doth hide his falling flame,
Searching what power tempers the pleasing spring,
Which mak's the earth her rosie flowers to beare.
Whose gift it is, that Autumnes fruitfull season,

Boetius his

^a The fore-
said specu-
lation.

^b Affection
to earthly
things and
the passions which ensue thereof.

^c To thinke vpon earthly things.

Should with full grapes flow in a plenteous yeare,
Telling of secret Nature everyreason,
Now hauing lost the ^a beauty of his mind.
Lies with his necke compast in pond'rous ^b chaines,
His countenance with heauy waight declin'd,
Him to ^c behold the sullen earth constraines.

THE II. PROSE.

*Phylosophy enquireth of Boetius
his disease.*



Vt it is rather time
(saith she) to apply
remedies, then to
make complaintes:
And then looking
wifly vpon me; Art thou he (saith
she) which being long since nur-
sed with our milke, and brought
vp with our nourishments, wert
come to mans estate? but we had
giuen thee such ^a weapons, as if
thou haddeſt not cast them away,
would

^a The intel-
lectual and
Cardinall,
or morall
vertues.

would haue made thee invincible:
Doest thou not know me? why
doest thou not speake? Is it ^b shame-
fastnesse or vnſensiblenesse that
makes thee silent? I had rather it
were shamefastnesse, but I perceiue
thou art become vnſensible. And
ſeeing me not onely ſilent, but al-
together mute and dumbe; fayre
and eaſily ſlie laid her hand vpon
my breasts ſaying, ^c there is no dan-
ger, he is in a ^d Lethargie, the com-
mon disease of deceiued minds: he
hath a little forgot himſelfe, but he
will eaſily remember himſelfe a-
gaine, if he be brought to know vs
firſt. To which end, let vs a little
wipe his eyes, dimmed with the
cloud of mortall things. And ha-
uing ſaid thus, with a ^e corner of
her garment ſhee dried my eyes
which were wet with teares,

^b Shame-
fastneſſe
cauſeth on-
ly ſilence,
vnſenſible-
neſſe takeith
away both
peech and
memory:

^c He is an
ill Phyſiti-
on who de-
ſpayreth o
his cure.

*Sen. I. de.
Clem.*

^d Forget-
fulneſſe.

^e Some
vulgar ten-
tence:
which
he could
not altoge-
ther forget.

Boetius his

THE III. VERSE.

How Boetius began to recover his
knowledge and memory.

Then fled the night and darkenes did me leane,
Mine eyes their wondēd strenght receiue:
As when the starres withdraw their basly band,
If heau' n ore ast with cloudes doe stand,
The Sunne doth lurke, the earth receiueth night,
Before the time of starry light.
But if fierce Boreas sent from Ithrace make way
For the restoring of the day,
Phabus with fresh and sodaine beames doth rise,
Striking with light our wondring eyes.

THE III. PROSE.

How the persecution of Wisemen is no
new or strange thing.



Nlike manner the
mists of sadness dissolved I came to my
selfe, and recovered
my iudgement, so
that

that I knew my Physitions face : wherefore casting mine eyes vpon her somewhat stedfastly, I beheld my nurse *Philosophy*, in wholt house I had remained from my youth, and I said : O Mistresse of all vertues, for what cause art thou come from ^a heauen into this our solitary banishment ? art thou come to beare me company in being fal- fly accused ? Should I (saith she) forsake thee my Disciple, and not deuide the burthen, which thou bearest for enuy to my name, by partaking of thy labouri ? But *Philosophy* thought it not lawfull to for- sake the innocent in his trouble. Should I feare any accusation ? as though this were any new matter ? for doest thou thinke, that this is the first time, that Wisedome hath been exposed to danger by wicked men ?

^a Philoso-
phy by the
gift of God.

^b He was
put to death
at Athens
by ~~citizens~~,
for ac-
knowled-
ging one
God and
the immor-
tality of the
soule.

^c False opi-
nions ar-
ledge some
sentences
of Philoso-
phie in a
wrogn
sense.

men? Haue we not in ancient times before our *Platoes* age, had often-times great conflicts with the rashnesse of folly? and while he liued, had not his Master ^b *Socrates* the victory of an vnjust death in my presence, whose inheritance, when afterward the *Epicures*, *Stoikes*, and others, (euery one for his own sect) endeuoured to usurpe, and as it were in part of their pray, sought to draw me to them, exclaiming and striuing against them; they tore the garment which I had wouen with my owne hands, and having gotten some little peeces of it, thinking me to be wholy in their possession, departed. Amongst whom, because ^c certaine signes of my apparel appeared, indiscretion supposing that they were my familiar friendes, hath peruerted and drawn many

many into the errors of those profane multitudes. But if thou hast not heard of the flight of ^d Anaxagoras, the poyson of Socrates, nor the torments of ^e Zeno, because they are forraine examples; yet thou maiest haue heard of *Cannius* of *Seneca*, of ^h *Soranus*, whose memory is both fresh and famous, whome nothing else brought to their ouerthrow; but that they had been instructed in our schoole, and were altogether disliking to the humors of wicked men; wherefore thou hast no cause to maruaile, if in the sea of this life we be tossed with boisterous stormes, whose chiefest purpose is to displease the wicked: Of which though there be an huge armie, yet it is to be despised, because it is not gouerned by any ^k Captaine, but is carried vp and downe

d He was constrainyd to flie for denying the sonne to his God.

e He was pounded in a morter by a tyrant whome he impugned.

f A Poet put to death by *Catulus* the Emperour.

g *Neroes* Schoole-master, who caused him to bleed to death.

h A famou Poet acknowledging God, was crucified by some wicked men.

i The displeasure of the wicked is rather to be desired then feared.

k Because they follow not reason.

downe by phantasticall Errour
without any order at all. And if at
any time they assaile vs with grea-
ter force,ⁱ our Captaine retireth
^m her bands into ⁿa Castle, leauing
them occupied in sacking ^ovnpro-
fitable baggage. And from aboue
welaugh them to scorn for seeking
so greedily after most vile things
being safe from all their furious
assault, and fortified with that de-
fence, which aspiring Folly canaot
preuaile aga nst.

THE IIII. VERSE.

*How we may resist the persecution of
the wicked.*

Who mildly can his age dispose,
And at his feet proud destiny thrones:
Who stoutly doth each chance behold,
Keeping his countenance uncontroll'd:
Not hem the Oceans rage, and threat,

Sturring

Stirring the wanes with angry heate,
 Nor boaste ^a Veseuus when he casts
 From broken hilles enflamed blasts;
 Nor fierie thunder can dismay,
 Which takes the tops of towers away.
 Why doe force tyrants vs affright,
 Whose rage is farre beyond their wight?
 For nothing hope nor feare thou harme,
 So their weake wrath thou shalt disarm:
 But he whome hope or terror takes,
 Being a slane his shield forsakes,
 And leaves his place, and doth provide
 A chaine, wherewith his hands are tie.

^a A mountaine by Naples.

THE IIII. PROSE.

Boetius discouereth the causes of
 his griefe.

Understandest thou these things (saith she) and doe they make impression in thy mind? Art thou ὄνος τὸς νίπερ; why weepest thou? why sheddest thou so many teares? Εἰνδιαμένειος: If thou expectest to be cured, thou must

Aminus ad
Lyram.

Eloquere, ne
occulere in-
tellectus.

must discouer thy wound. Then
I collecting the forces of my mind
together , made her answe in
these woids. Doth the cruelty of
fortunes rage neede further decla-
ration, or doth it not sufficiently
appeare of it selfe? doth not the ve-
ry countenance of this ^a place moue
thee? Is this the Library , which
thou thy selfe hadst chosen to sit
in at my house? in which thou hast
oftentimes discoursed with me of
the knowledge of diuine and hu-
maine things? Had I this attire or
countenance, when I searched the
secrets of Nature with thee, when
thou describedst vnto me the
course of the staires with thy Geo-
metricall rod, when thou diddest
frame my conuersation, and the
maner of my whole life according
to the patterne of the cælestiall or-
der.

^a The first
cause of
Boetius his
griele was
his banish-
ment and
mistray.

der. Are these the^b rewardes, which thy obedient seruants haue? But thou diddest decree that sentence by the mouth of *Plato*; that common wealthes should be happy, if either the Students of wisedom did gouerne them, or those which were appointed to gouerne them, would giue themselues to the study of wisedome. Thou by the same Philosopher diddest admonish vs, that it is a sufficient cause for wise-men to take vpon themselues the gouernement of the commonwealth, lest if the rule of Cities were left in the hands of lewd and wicked Citizens, they should work the subuersion and ouerthrow of the good. Wherfore following this authority, I desired to practise that by publike administration which I had learned of thee in priuate con-

^b the seconde
cause,beca-
use he
had not
deserued
them,ha-
ving a
good inten-
tion in a
mitting
progreſſion

ference. Thou and God himselfe
who hath inserted thee in the
minds of the wise, are my witnessses,
that nothing but the common de-
sire of all good men, brought me to
be a Magistrate. This hath beene
the^c cause of my grieuous and ir-
reconcileable d. disagreements with
wicked men, and that which free-
dom of conscience carrieth with it,
of contemning the indignation of
Potentates for the defence of iu-
stice. How often haue I encoun-
tered with^d *Conigastus*, violently pos-
sessing himselfe with poore mens
goods? How often haue I put
backe^e *Triguilla Prouost* of the
Kings house from iniurie which
he had begunne, yea and finished
also? How often haue I protected
by putting my authority in dan-
ger, such poore wretches, as the
vnpu-

^c Thirdly,
he deserued
the contra-
ry.

^a One of
king Theo-
doricus his
chiefest fa-
vorites:

^b Another

vnpunished couetousnesse of the
f barbarous did vexe with infinite
reproches? Neuer did any man
draw me from right to wrong. It
grieued me no lesse then them
which suffered it, to see the wealth
of our Subjects wasted, partly with
priuate pillage, and partly by pub-
like tributes. When in the time of
a great dearth things were set at so
excessive and vndeasonable a rate,
that the Prouince of *Campania* was
like to bee altogether impoueri-
shed for the common good, I
stucke not to contend with the
chiefe *Prætor* himselfe, and the
matter was discussed before the
king, and I preuailed so farre, that
it went not forward. I drew *Pauli-
nus*, who had been Consull, out of
the very mouth of the gaping
Courtiers, wholike rauenous curs,

f The
Gothes.

had already in hope and ambition
deuoured his riches. That *Albinus*
who had likewise beeene Consul,
might not be punished vpon pre-
sumptions and false accusation, I
exposed my selfe to the hatred of
Cyprian his accuser. May I seeme
to haue prouoked enmity enough
against my selfe? But others should
so much the more haue procured
my safety, since that for the loue I
bare to iustice, I left my selfe no way
by the meanes of Courtiers to be
safe. § But by whose accusations
did I receiue this blow? by theirs,
who, long since hauing put *Basil*
out of the kings seruice, compelled
him now to accuse me, by the ne-
cessity which he was driuen to by
debt. *Opilio* likewise and *Gaudenti-
us* being banished by the kings de-
cree, for the iniuries and manifold
deceites,

¶ The
fourth
caute of his
griete, the
basenes of
his accusers
and the o-
pen iniu-
stice of his
accusation.

deceites, which they had committed, because they would not obey, defended themselues by taking Sanctuary, of which the king hearing, gaue sentence, that vntlesse they departed out of the City of Rauenna within certaine daies, they should be branded in the foreheads, and put out by force. What could be added to this seuerity? And yet that very day, their accusation against me went for currant. What might be the reason of this? did my dealing deserue it? or did their condemnation which went before, make them iust accusers? was not fortune ashamed? if not that innocency was accused, yet at least, that it had so vile and base accusers? But what crime was laid to my charge? wilt thou haue it in one word? I am said to haue desi-

^h Fifty.
His chiefe
offence
was venus.

red the Senates safety. Wilt thou know the maner how? I am blamed for hauing hindred their accuser to bring forth euidence , by which he shoulde proue the Senate guilty of treason. What thinkest thou O Mistresse? Shall I deny this fault, that I may not shame thee ? But it is true, I desired it, neither will I euer cease from hauing that desire. Shall I confesse it? but then I must leaue hindering their accuser. Shall I call it an offence to haue wished the safety of that order? Indeed the Senate with their decrees concerning me, had made it an offence. But Folly alway deceiuing her selfe, cannot change the deserts of things, neither doe I thinke it lawfull for me by the decree of Socrates, either to haue concealed the truth, or granted a lie. But how

how this may be, I leauue to thine,
and wisemens censure. And that
the posterity may not be ignorant
of the course and truth of the mat-
ter, I haue put it downe in wri-
ting: for what should I speake of
those fainedⁱ letters, in which I am
charged to haue hoped for the Ro-
mane liberty? The deceit of which
would manifestly haue appeared, if
it might haue been lawfull for me
to haue vsed the confession of my
very accusers, which in all busines
is of greatest force: for what liber-
ty remaineth there to be hoped for?
I would to God there were any? I
would haue answered as *Canius*
did, who being charged by *Caius*
Caesar, sonne to *Germanicus*, that he
was priuy to the conspiracy made
against him, answered: If I had been
made acquainted with it, thou

ⁱ Sixtly He
was falsely
accused &
not permit-
ted to vse
the testimo-
ny of his
very accu-
sers.

^k Seuenthly
He grieueth
that wicked
men are a-
ble to pre-
uaile a-
gainst the
good.

shouldest never haue knowne of it.
Neither hath sorrow so dulled my
wits, that I complaine of the wic-
ked endeouours of sinnefull men a-
gainst vertue, but I exceedingly
maruaile at those things, which
they hoped to bring to passe: for
the desire of doing euill may be at-
tributed to our weakenesse, but
that in the sight of ^k God, the wic-
ked should be able to compasse
whatsoeuer they contrive against
the innocent, is altogether mon-
strous; vpon which occasion not
without cause, one of thy fa-
miliar friends demanded, (if faith
he)there be a God, from whence
proceed so many euils? and if there
be no God, from whence com-
meth any good? But let that passe,
that wicked men, which seeke the
bloud of all good men, and of the
whole

whole Senate, would also haue ouerthrowne me, whome they saw to stand in defence of good men, and of the Senate: ¹ But did I deserue the same of the Senators themselues? I suppose thou remembrest, how thou being present, diddest alway direct me, when I went about to say or doe any thing. Thou remembrest I say, when at *Verona*, the king being desirous of a common ouerthrow, endeauoured to lay the treason, whereof one'y *Albinus* was accused, vpon the whole order of the Senate, with how great securitie of my owne danger, I defended the innocency of the whole Senate. Thou knowest that these thinges which I say are true, and that I was neuer delighted in my own praise, for the secret of a good conscience

¹ Eightly, The Senators them selues of whome hee had deserued so well, were his enemies.

science is in some sort diminished, when by declaring what he hath done, a man receiueth the reward offame. But thou seest to what passe my innocency is come : instead of the rewards of true vertue, I vndergo the punishment of wickednesse, wherewith I am falsly charged. ^m Was it euer yet seene, that the manifest confession of any crime, made the Judges so to conforme themselues to seuerity , that either the error of mans iudgement, or the condition of Fortune, which is certaine to none, did not incline some of them to fauour? If I had beene accused, that I would haue burnt the Churches, or wickedly haue killed the Priestes, or haue sought the death of all good men, yet sentenee should haue been pronounced against me present, ha-
uing

^m Ninthly,
all conspi-
red again
him, no
man had
compassi-
on of him.

uing confessed, and being conuicted.ⁿ Now being conuained fие hundred miles of, not suffered to make any defence, I am condemned to death and proscription, for bearing the Senate too much good will. O Senate, which deserues that neuer any may be conuicted of the like crime. The dignity of which guilt, euen the very accusers them-selues saw, which that they might obscure by adding some kind of fault, they belyed me, that I had defiled my conscience with ^o sacriledge, for an ambitious desire of preferment. But thou, which haddest seated thy selfe in me, diddest repell from the seat of my mind all desire of mortall things, and within thy sight there was no place for sacriledge to harbour; for thou diddest instill into my eares and thoughts

ⁿ 10. He
was con-
demned
being gab-
sent.

^o 11: He
was falsly
accused of
sorcery.

*Sequere
Deum.*

thoughts dayly that saying of Pythagoras; ἐπειδὴ: Neither was it fitting for me, to vse the aide of most vile sptridges, whome thou haddest framed to that excellency, that I might become like to God. Besides the innocency which appeared in the most retired roomes of my house, the assembly of my most honourable friends, my holy and worthily renowmed father in Law *Symmachus*, doe cleare mee from all suspition of this crime But O detestable wickednesse. They the rather giue credite to so great a crime, and thinke me the nigher to such mischieuous dealing, because I am endewed with thy knowledge, and adorned with thy vertues, so that it is not inough that I reape no commodity for thy respect, vnlesse thou beest also dishonoured

P. 12 Philosophy and Learning dishonoured for his respect.

honoured for the hatred conceiued
against me. And that my miseries
may increase the more, the greatest
part doe not so much respect the va-
lue of things, as the euent of for-
tune, and they esteeme onely that to
be prouidently done, which the
happy successe commends. By
which means it commeth to passe,
that the first losse which miserable
men haue is their ^q estimation, and
the good opinion which was had
of them. What rumors goe now a-
mong the people, what dissônant
& diuers opinions? I cannot abide
to thinke of them: onely this I will
say, the last burthen of aduersity is,
that when they which are in mis-
ery, are accused of any crime, they
are thought to deserue whatso-
ever they suffer. And I spoiled of
all my goodes, bereaued of my
dig-

q i. The
losse of es-
timation
with the
greatest
part.

14. The
wicked en-
couraged
and the
good dis-
mayed by
his fall.

dignities, blemished in my good name, for benefites receiue punishments. And me thinks I see the cursed crues of the wicked abounding with ioy and gladnesse, and euery lost companion deuising with himselfe how to accuse others falsly, good men lie prostrate with the terror of my danger, and euery lewd fellow is prouoked by impunitie to attempt any wickednesse, and by rewards to bring it to effect; but the innocent are not onely depriued of all security, but also of any maner of defence. Wherefore I may well exclaime.

THE

THE V. VERSE.

Boetius complaineth, that all things are
gouerned by Gods prouidence, beside
the actions and affayres of men.

C reator of the skie,
Who sittest on thine eternall throne on hie,
Who doest quicke motion cause,
In all the heau'ns, and giest the starres their lawes.
That the pale Queene of night,
Sometimes receiuing all her brothers light,
Should shine in her full pride,
And with her beames the lesser stars should hide;
Sometimes she wants her grace,
When the sunnes rayes are in lesse distant place.
And^a Hesperus that flies
As Messenger before the night doth rise,
And oft with sodaine change
Before the Sunne, as^a Lucifer doth range.
Thou shott the dayes doest make,
When Winter from the trees the leaues doth take:
Thou when the fiery Sunne,
Doth summer cause, mak'st the nights swifly run.
Thy might doth rule the yeare,
As Northerne winds the leaues away doe beare,
So Zephyrus from West,
The plants in all their glory doth reuest;
And^b Syrius burnes that corne,

^a The same starre hath two contrary names, because it appeares both in the euening and morning.

Boetius his

b Diuerse
startes
which ap-
peare by
the sunne
in diuers
seasons.

With which b Arcturus did the earth adorne.
None from thy lawes are free,
Nor can forsake their place ordain'd by thee.
Thou that to certaine end
Gouern'st all things; denyst thou to intend
The Acts of men alone,
Directing them in measure from thy throne?
For why should slipp'ry chance
Rule all things with such doubifull gouernance?
Or why should punishments,
Due to the guilty light on innocents?
But now the highest place,
Giveth to naughty maners greatest grace,
And wicked people vexe
Good men, and tread vniuely on their necks,
Vertue in darknesse lurkes,
And righteous soules are charg'd with impious works.
Deceues nor Periuries,
Disgrace neithose, who colour them with lies,
For, when it doth them p-ease,
To shew their force, they to their will with ease,
The hearts of kings canstare,
To whome so many crouch with trembling feare,
O thou that soyn'st with loue
All worldly things, looke from thy seat above
On the earthes wretched state,
We men, not the least worke thou didst create,
With fortunes blasts doeshake,
Thou carefull ruler, these fierce tempests slake,
And for the earth prouide,
Those lawes by which thou heau'n in peace dost guide.

T H E

THE V. PROSE.

Philosophy sheweth that Boetius is the cause of his owne misery.

When I had vttered these speeches with continued griefe, shee with an amiable countenance, and nothing moued with my complainys, said; when I first saw thee sad and weeeping, I forthwith knew thee to be in misery and banishment. But I had not knowne how farre off, thou wert banished, if thy speech had not bewrayed it. O how farre art thou gone from thy ^a Country, not being driuen away, but wan- dring of thine owne accord, Or if thou haddest rather be thought to haue been driuen out, it hath been onely by thy selfe; for neuer could any other but thy selfe haue done

D it;

^a Mans Country is wisedome, Senec de remed. Fortun. Si sapiens est non peregrinatur, si stultus est, exultat.

Boetius his

Sed & tu
Rex est, & tu
Dominus.

it; for if thou remembrest, of what Country thou art, it is not governed as *Athens* was wont to be, by the multitude *και εἰς βασιλεὺς ἐσίν, εἰς κοι-
πεύος*, It is desirous to haue abundance of Citizens, and not to haue them driuen away. To be governed by whose authority, and to be subiect to her lawes, is the greatest freedome that can be. Art thou ignorant of that most ancient law of thy City, bywhich it is decreed, that he may not be banished, that hath made choice of it for his dwelling place : for he that is within her fort or hold, needs not feare, lest he deserue to be banished. But whosoever ceaseth to desire to dwell in it, ceaseth likewise to deserue so great a benefite. Wherefore the countenance of this place moueth me not so much as thy countenance

nance doth. Neither dol so much require thy Library adorned with yuory feelings, and christall windowes, as the seat of thy mind, in which I haue not placed bookeſ, but that which makes bookeſ to be esteemed of, I meane the ſenten- cies of my bookes, which were writ- ten long ſince. And that which thou haſt ſaid of thy deſerts to the common good, is true indeed, but little in reſpeſt of the many things which thou haſt done. That which thou haſt reported, either of the ho- nesty, or of the falſenesſe of thoſe things, which are obieceted aga'nt thee, is knowne to all men. Thou diſdeſt well to touch but briefly the wickednesſe and deceit of thy accuſers, for that the common people to whose notice they are come, doe more fitly and largely

speake of them. Thou hast also sharply rebuked the vniust Senates deed. Thou hast also grieued at our accusation, and hast bewailed the losse or diminishing of our good name: and lastly, thy sorrow raged against fortune, and thou complaynedst, that deserts were not equally rewarded. In the end of thy bitter verse, thou desiredst, that the earth might be gouerned by that peace, which heauen enjoyeth. But because thou art turmoiled with the multitude of affections, grieve and anger drawing thee to diuerse partes, in the plight thou art now, the more forcible remedies cannot be applyed vnto thee; wherefore, for a while, we will vse the more easie, that thy affections, which are as it were hardened and swolne with per-

perturbations; may by gentle handling be mollified and disposed to receiue the force of sharper medicines.

T H E VI. V E R S E.

Philosophy proueth that order is necessary in all things.

V V Hen boate with Phæbus beams,
The Crab casts fiery gleames,
He, that doth then with seede,
The fruitleſſe furrowes feede,
Deceiued of his bread,
Must be with akornes fed.
Seeke not the flowry woods,
For Violets sweet buddes,
When fields are ouercast
With the fierce Northerne blast,
Nor hope then home to bring,
The branches of the spring.

Boetius his

If thou in grapes delight,
In Autumne Bacchus might
With them doth decke our clime.
God eu'ry sev'rall time,
With proper grace hath crown'd,
Nor will those lawes confound,
Which he once settled hath.
He, that with headlong path
This certaine order leaues,
An haplessē end receaues.

THE VI. PROSE.

Philosophy discouereth the inward cau-
ses of Boetius his grieve.

First therefore wilt thou let me touch and trie the state of thy mind by asking thee a few questions, that I may understand how thou art to be cured. To which I answered, aske me what

what questions thou wilt, and I will answere thee. And then shee said, Thinkest thou that this world is gouerned by happe hazard and chance? or rather doest thou belieue that it is ruled by reason? I can (quoth I) in no manner imagine, that such certaine motions are caused by rash chance. And I know that God the Creator doth gouern his worke, neither will I euer thinke otherwise. It is so, saith shee, for so thou saidest in thy verse a little before, and bewayledst, that onely men were void of Gods care; for as for the rest, thou diddest not doubt, but that they were gouerned by reason. And surely I cannot chuse, but exceedingly admire, how thou canst be ill affected, holding so wholesome an opinion. But let vs search further, I gesse thou wan-

test something, but I know not what. Tell mee, since thou doubtest not, that the world is gouerned by God, canst thou tell me also by what meanes it is gouerned? I doe scarsely (quoth I) vnderstand what thou askest, and much lesse am I able to make thee a sufficient answere. Was I (quoth shee) deceived in thinking that thou wantedst something, by which as by the breath of a fortresse, the sicknesse of perturbations hath entred into thy mind? But tell me, doest thou remember, what is the end of things? or to what the whole intention of nature tendeth? I haue heard it (quoth I) but grieve hath dulled my memory. But knowest thou from whence all things had their beginning? I know (quoth I) and answered, that from God.

And

And how can it be, that knowing
the beginning, thou canst be ignorant of the end? But this is the condition and force of perturbations,
that they may alter a man; but
wholly destroy, and as it were roote
him out of himselfe, they cannot.
But I woulde haue thee answere me
to this also; doest thou remember,
that thou art a man? why should I
not remember it. (quoth I?) Well
then, canst thou explicate what
man is? Do st thou aske me, if I
know that I am a reasonable and
mortall liuing creature? I knowe
and confesse my selfe to bee so. To
which shée replyed, doest thou not
know thy selfe to bee any thing
else? Not any thing. Now I know
(quoth shée) another, and that
perhaps the greatest cause of thy
licknesse, thou hast forgotten
what

^a The cause
and remedy
of excessiuie
grieue.

what thou art. Wherefore I haue
fully found out, both the^a ma-
ner of thy disease, and the meanes
of thy recouery : for the confusion
which thou art in, by the forget-
fulness of thy selfe, is the cause,
why thou art so much grieved at
thy exile , and the losse of thy
goods. And because, thou art
ignorant, what is the end of
things, thou thinkest, that lewd
and wicked men be powerfull
and happy; likewise, becausethou
hast forgotten, by what meanes
the world is gouerned, thou ima-
ginest, that these alterations of
fortunes doe fall out without any
guide. Sufficient causes not one-
ly of sicknesse, but also of death
it selfe. But thanks be to the au-
thor of thy health, that Nature
hath not altogether forsaken thee.

We

We haue the greatest nourisher of thy health, the true cpinion of the gouernement of the world, in that thou belieuest that it is not subiect to the euents of chance, but to diuine reason: Wherefore feare nothing, out of this little sparkle will be inkindled thy vitall heat. But because it is not yet^b time to vse more solide remedies; and it is manifest, that the nature of minds is such, that as often as they cast away true opinions, they are possessed with false, out of which the darkenesse of perturbations arising doth make them, that they cannot discerne things aright: I will endeuour to dissolve this cloude with gentle and moderate fomentations; that having remoued the obscurity of deceitfull affections, thou mayest behold the splendor of true light.

^bDiscretion
to be vied
in comfort-
ing the
afflicted.

THE

THE VII. VERSE.

Philosophy declareth how the perturbations of our mind doe hinder vs from the knowledge of truth.

W Hen starres are shrowded
With duskie night,
They yeeld no lighe
Being so clowded.
When the wind moueth,
And waues doth reare,
The Sea late cleare,
Foule and darke proueth.
And riuers creeping
Downe a high hill,
Stand often still,
Rocks them backe keping,
If thou wouldest brightly,
See truthes cleare rayes,
Or walke these wayes,
Whiche lead most rightly,
All ioy forsaking,
Feare thou must flee,
And hopes desye,
No sorrow taking.
For where these terrorys
Raigne in the mind,
They it doe bind,
Incloudy errors.

THE




THE
SECOND BOOKE
OF BOETIVS.

In which Philosophy apply-
eth the more easie remedies to
Boetius his grieve.

THE I. PROSE.

Of the deceites and inconstancy of
Fortune.



After this shee remai-
ned silent for a while;
and hauing by that
her modesty made
me attentiuue, began
in

in this wile: If I be rightly enformed of the causes and condition of thy disease, thou languișhest with the affection and desire of thy former fortune, and the change of that alone, as thou imaginest, hath ouerthrowne the state of thy mind. I know the manifold ^a illusions of that monſter, exerciſing most alluring familiarity with them, whome ſhee meaneth to deceiue, to the end ſhee may confound them with intolerable grieſe, by forſaking them vpon the ſodain, whose nature, cuſtomes and deſert, if thou rememb'reſt, thou ſhalt know, that thou neither diſdeſteſſe, nor haſt loſt any thing of estimation in it; and as I hope, I ſhall not need to labour much to bring theſe things to thy remembrance, for thou wert wont, when ſhee

^a The deceites of fortune.

she was present, and flattered thee most, to assayle her with manfull words, and pursue her with sentences taken forth of our most hidden knowledge. But euery sodaine change of thinges happeneth not without a certaine wauering and disquietnesse of mind. And this is the cause, that thou also for a while hast lost thy former tranquility and peace. But it is time for thee to take and taste some gentle and pleasant thing, which being receiued may prepare thee for stronger potions ; Wherfore let vs vse the sweetnesse of^b Rhetoricall persuasions, which then onely is well employed, when it forsaketh not our ordinances; and with this, let Musick a little slauē belonging to our house, chaunt sometime lighter and sometime sadder notes. Wherfore O man,

what

^b The true
use of Rhei-
toricke and
Poetry, or
Musick.

what is it , that hath cast thee into sorrow and grieve? If thou thinkest that fortune hath altered her maner of proceeding toward thee , thou art in an errour. This was alway her fashion, this is her nature. Shee hath kept that ^c constancie in thy affaires, which is proper to her , in being mutable , such was her condition when she fawned vpon thee and allured thee with entisements of sained happiness. Thou hast discouered the doubtfull lookes of this blind Goddessē. Shee , which concealeth her selfe from others , is wholly knownen to thee. If thou likest her, framethy selfe to her condicions , and make no complaint. If thou detestest her treacherie, despise and cast her off,with her pernicious flatterie. For that, which hath caused thee so much sorow, shoulde haue brought

^c Fortune
onely con-
stant in be-
ing muta-
ble.

brought thee to great tranquilitie. For shee hath forsaken thee, of whom no man can be secure. Doest thou esteeme that happinesse precious, which thou art to loose? And is the present fortune deare vnto thee, of whose stay thou art not sute, and whose departure will breede thy griefe. And if shee can neither be kept at our will; and maketh them miserable, whom shee leaueth, what else is fickle fortune, but a token off future calamitie? For it is not sufficient to behold that, which wee haue before our eyes; wisedome pondereth the euent of things, & this mutabilitie on both sides maketh the threates of fortune not to be feared, nor her flatterings to be desired. Finaly, thou must take in good part, whatsoeuer happeneth vnto thee within the reach of
E fortune,

fortune , when once thou hast submitted thy necke to her yoke. And if to her , whom of thine owne accord, thou hast chosen for thy Mistresse , thou wouldest prescribe a Law, how long sene were to stay; and when to depart, shouldest thou not doe her mightie wrong , and with thy impatiencie make thy e- state more intollerable, which thou canst not better? If thou settest vp thy sayles to the wind , thou shalt be caried not whether thy will desireth , but whether the Gale dri- ueth. If thou lowest thy seed, thou considerest , that there are as well barren, as fertile yeeres. Thou hast yeelded thy selfe to fortunes sway, thou must bee content with the conditions of thy mistresse . Endeourest thou to stay the force of the turning wheele? But thou foolish-

foolishest man, that euer was, if
it beginneth to stay, it ceaseth to
be fortune.

THE I. VERSE.

Philosophy discribeth the conditions of
fortune.

THe pride of fickle fortune spareth none,
But like the floods off swift^a Euripus borne,
Oft casteth mightie Princes from their throne,
And oft the abject Captive doeth adorne.
Shee cares not for the wretches teares and mone,
And the sad grones, which shee hath caus'd, doth skorne
Thus doth shee play, to make her power more knownen,
Shewing great wonders, when mans fickle state
One houre, haplesse doeth see, and fortunate.

THE II. PROSE.

Fortune sheweth, that shee hath taken
nothing from Boetius, that was his.



Vt I would vrge thee a lit-
tle with Fortunes owne
speeches. Wherefore con-

^a An arme of
the Sea be-
twixt Pho-
cides in Bæ-
otia, and the
Ile Eubæa,
which ebs
and flowers
so swiftly 7.
times in a
day, that it
carrieth ships
against the
wind, yea
the very
wind it selfe
Plin. lib. 2.

sider thou, if shee asketh not reason.
For what cause, O man , chargest
thou mee with daily complaints ?
What iniurie haue I done thee ?
What goods of thine haue I taken
from thee ? Contend with mee be-
fore any Iudge, about the possession
of riches and dignities : and if thou
canst shew, that the proprietie of a-
ny of these things belong to any
mortall wight , I will foorthwith
willingly graunt, that those things,
which thou demandest, were thine.
When nature produced thee out of
thy mothers wombe , I receiued
thee naked and poore in all respects,
cherished thee with my wealth,
and (which maketh thee now to
fall out with me) being forward to
fauour thee, I had most tender care
for thy education, and adorned thee
with the abundance & splendour
of

of all things, which are in my power. Now it pleaseth mee to withdraw my hand , yeeld thankes , as one that hath had the vse , of that which was not his owne. Thou hast no iust cause to complaine , as though thou hadst lost that, which was fully thine owne. VVherefore lamentest thou? I haue offered thee no violence. Riches, honours, and the rest of that sort belong to mee. They acknowledge mee for their Mistresse , and themselues for my seruants, they come with me ; and when I goe away , they likewise depart. I may boldly affirme, if those things which thou complainest to betaken from thee, had beeene thine owne , thou shouldest never haue left them. Must I onely be forbidden to vse my right ? It is lawful for the heauen to bring soorth faire
E 3 dayes,

dayes , and to hide them againe in
darkesome nights . It is lawfull for
the yeere sometime to compasse the
face of the earth with flowers and
fruites , and sometime to couer it
with clouds & cold . The Sea hath
right sometime to fawne with
calmes , and sometime to frown
with stormes and waues . And shal
the vnsatiable desire of men tie me
to constancie, so contrarie to my
custome ? This is my force , this is
the sport , which I continually vse .
I turn about my wheele with speed ,
and take a pleasure to turne thins
vpside downe ; Ascend , if thou wilt ,
but with this condition , that thou
thinkest it not an iniurie to descend ,
when the course of my sport sore
quireth . Diddest thou not know
my fashion ? VVert thou ignorant
how Creasus King of the Lydians ,
not

not long before a terroure to ^a Cyrus,
within a while after came to such
miserie, that hee shoulde haue beeene
burnt, had hee not beeene sauued by a
shower sent from heauen. Hast
thou forgotten how ^b Paul piouslē
bewailed the calamities of King
^c Persus his prisoner? What other
thing doeth the out-crie of Trage-
dies lament, but that fortune ha-
uing no respect, overturneth hap-
pie states? Diddest thou not learne
in thy youth, that there lay two
^d Barrels, th'one of good things, and
the other of bad, at Iupiter's thre-
shold? But what if thou hast tasted
more abundantly of the good?
What if I be not wholly gone from
thee? What if this mutabilitie of
mine be a iust cause for thee to hope
for better? Notwithstanding loole
not thy courage, and living in a

^a King of
Persia.

^b Paulus
Acemilus,
Centurio
of
Rome.

^c Or Perses
King of Ma-
cedonia.

^d This is
taken out
of Homer.
Iliad. l. 6.

Boetius his

kingdome which is common to all
men, desire not to bee gouerned by
peculiar Lawes, proper onely to
thy selfe.

THE II. VERSE. Fortune complaineth of the vnsatiable desire of men.

IF plentie as much wealth shoulde giue, ne're holding back her hand,
As the fierce winds in troubled Seas doe tosse up heapes of sand,
Or as the Starres, that Heauenly Orbes in lightsome nights doe grace:
Yet wretched men would still accuse their miserable case.
Should God too liberal of his gifts their greedie nishes beare,
And with bright louours them adorne: yet all that nothing were,
Since rauisched minds devouring all for more are ready still,
What bridle can contrarie in bounds this their contemnable will?
When fill'd with riches they retaine the thirst of having more?
He is not rich, that feares, and grieues, and counts hymselfe but poore.

THE III. PROSE. Philosophy proueth, that fortune had beene more fauourable, then contrarie to Boetius.

VHerefore if fortune should
plead with thee thus in her
owne defense, doubtlesse
thou wouldest not haue a word to
answere

answere her. But if there bee any thing, which thou canst alleadge in thy owne defence, thou must utter it, wee will giue thee full libertie to speake. Then I said, these things make a faire shew, and being set out with pleasant Rhetoricke and Musick, delight onely so long as they are heard. But those, which are miserable haue a deeper feeling of their miseries. Therfore, when the sound of these things is past, hidden sorrow oppresseth the mind. It is so indeed, quoth she; for these be not the remedies of thy disease, but certaine fomentations to asswage thy grieve, which as yet resisteth all cure. But when it shall bee time, I will apply that, which shall pierce to the quicke. And yet there is no cause, why thou shouldest thinke thy selfe miserable; Hast thou forgotten, how

how many wayes, and in what degree thou art happie? I passe ouer with silence, that hauing lost thy Father, thou wert prouided for by men of the best sort, and being chosen to haue affinitie with the chiefest of the Citie, thou begannest sooner to be deare vnto them, then to be akinne, which is the most excellent kind of kindred. Who esteeemed thee not most happie, hauing so Noble a Father in law, so chaste a Wife, and so many Sonnes? I say nothing (for I will not speake of ordinarie matters) of the dignities denied to others in their age, and graunted to thee in thy youth. I desire to come to the top of thy felicitie. If any fruit of mortall things hath any weight of happiness, can the remembrance of that light bee darkned with any cloud of miseries
that

that can ouercast thee? VVhen thou lawest thy two Sonnes being both Consuls together caried from their house, the Senatours accompaning them, & the people rejoycing with them, when they sitting in the Senate in their Chaires of estate, thou making an Oration in the kings praise, deseruedst the glory of witte and eloquence. When in publike assembly thou hauing beene Consul thy selfe, standing betwixt thy two Sonnes, diddest satisfie with thy triumphant liberalitie, the expectation of the multitudes gathered together. I suppose thou flatteredst fortune, while shee fawned thus vpon thee, and vsed thee, as her dearest friend. Thou obtainedst more at her hands, then euer priuate man had before thee. VVilt thou reckon with fortune? This is the first

first time, that euer shée frowned vpon thee. If thou considerest the number and measure of thy ioyfull and sad accidents, thou canst not chuse but thinke thy selfe happie still. And if thou esteemest not thy selfe fortunate, because those things which seemed ioyfull are past, there is no cause, why thou shouldest thinke thy selfe miserable, since those things which thou takest to be sorrowfull, doe passe. Comnest thou now first as a Pilgrime and stranger into the Theater of this life? Supposest thou to find any constancie in humane affaires? Since that man himselfe is soone gone: for although things subiect to fortune seldome keepe touch in stayng, yet the end of life is a certaine death, euē of that fortune, which remaineth. Wherefore what matter

ter is it, whether thou by dying
leauest it, or it forsaketh thee by
flying?

THE III. VERSE.

Philosophy declareth, how all worldly
things decay and fade away.

When Phæbus with his Rose teame
Sheweth his lightsome beame,
The dull and darkened Starres retire
Reelding to greater fire.
When Zephyrus his war mish doth bring,
Sweete Roses decke the spring
Let noysome Auster blow apace,
Plantes soone will loose their grace.
The Sea hath often quiet stood,
With an unmoued flood;
And often is turmoyl'd with waues,
When boystrouss Boreas raues.
If thus the world never long tarie
The same, but often varie:
On fading fortunes then reliе,
Trust to those goods that flic.
An everlastinge law is made,
That all things borne shall fade.

THE

THE IIII. PROSE.

Philosophy proueth, that Boetius is still fortunate, and that no man hath complete happinesse in this life.

 O which I answered, the things, which thou reportest are true, O nurse of all vertues, and I cannot denie the most speedy course of my prosperitie, but this is that, which vexeth me most, when I remember it. For in all aduersitie off fortune, it is the most unhappie kind of misfortune, to haue beene happy. But, quoth shee, thou canst not iustly impute to the things themselues, that thou art punished for thy false opinion. For if this vaine name of casuall felicitie moueth thee, let vs make accompt with how many, and how great things thou aboundest. VVherefore

fore if that , which in all thy reue-newes of fortune , thou esteemedst most precious , doeth still by Gods prouidence remaine safe and vntouched , canst thou , retaining the best , iustly complaine of misfortune ? But thy Father in-law Symmachus (that most excellent ornament of mankind) liueth in safetie , and for the obtaining of which thou wouldest willingly spend thy life , that man wholly framed to wisedome and vertues , being secure of his owne , mourneth for thy iniuries . Thy wife liueth , modest in disposition , eminent in chasitie , and to rehearse briefly all her excellent gifts , like her Father . Shee liueth , I say , and wearie of her life , reserueth her breath onely for thee . In which alone I must also graunt , that thy felicitie is diminished , she consumeth her

her selfe with teares and griefe for
thy sake. VVhat should I speake of
thy children, which haue beene
Consuls, in whome already, as in
Children of that age, their Fathers,
or Grand-fathers good disposition
appeareth? wherefore since the grea-
test care, that mortall men haue, is
to sauē their liues, O happie man
that thou art, if thou knowest thy
ownewelth, who still hast remai-
ning those things, which no man
doubteth to bee dearer then life it
selfe? And therefore cease weeping.
Fortune hath not hitherto shewed
her hatred against you all; neither
art thou assailed with too boylstous
a storne, since those Ankers hold
fast, which permit neither the com-
fort of the time present, nor the
hope of the time to come, to bee
wanting. And I pray God (quoth
I)

I) that they may hold fast, for so long as they remaine, howsoeuer the world goeth, wee shall escape drowning. But thou seest, how great a part of our ornaments is lost. Wee haue gotten a little ground, (quoth shee) if thy whole estate be not irkesome vnto thee. But I can-not suffer thy daintinesse, who with such lamentation & anxietie complainest, that something is wanting to thy happiness: For who hath so ^ entire happiness, that he is not in some part offended with the condition of his estate. The nature of humane felicitie is doubtfull and vncertaine, and is neither euer wholly obtained, or neuer lasteth alwayes. One man hath great reuenewes, but is contemned for his base linage. Anotheres Nobilitie maketh him knowen, but oppressed with penury,

^a No man
hath entire
happiness.

F tie,

rie, had rather be vnu knownen. Some abounding with both, bewaile their vnsuitnesse for mariage. Some other well married, but wanting children, prouideth riches for strangers to inherite. Others finally, hauing children, mournes fully bewaile the vices, which their sonnes or daughters are giuen to. So that scarce any man is pleased with the condition of his fortune. For there is something in euery estate, which without experience is not knownen, and being experienced doth molest and trouble. Besides that, those, which are^b most happie are most sensible, and vnlesse all things fall out to their liking, vnpatient of all aduersitie, euery little crosse ouerthrowes them, so small are the occasions, which take from the most fortunate the height of their happiness.

How

^b The most
happie are
most sensi-
ble of affi-
ction.

How many are there thinkest thou, which would thinke them selues almost in heauen, if they had but the least part of the remnants of thy fortune? This very place, which thou callest banishment, is the Countrey of the inhabitants. So true it is, that nothing is miserable, but when it is thought so; and contrariwise, euery estate is happie, if he that beares it, bee content. Who is there so happie, that if he yeeldeth to discontent, desireth not to change his estate? How much bitternesse is mingled with the sweetenesse of mans felicitie, which though it seemeth never so pleasant, while it is enjoyed, yet can it not be retained from going away, when it will. And by this it appeareth how miserable the blessednesse of mortall things is, which neither endureth

c He that is
best con-
tent, is
most hap-
pie.

alway with the contented, nor
wholly delighteth the pensiue.
Wherfore O mortall men, why
seeke you for your felicitie abroad,
which is placed within your selues?
Errour and ignorance do confound
you. I will briefly shew thee the
^d Center of thy chiefest happiness.
Is there any thing more precious to
thee then thy selfe. I am sure thou
wilt say nothing. Wherfore, if
thou enjoyest thy selfe, thou shalt
possesse that, which neither thou
wilt euer loose, nor fortune can
take away; and that thou mayest
acknowlede, that blessednesse can-
not consist in these casuall things,
gather it thus: If blessednesse be the
chiefest good of nature endewed
with reason, and that is not the
chiefest good, which may by any
meanes bee taken away, because
that,

^a The Cen-
ter of hap-
piness.

that, which cannot bee taken away, is better; it is manifest, that the instabilitie of fortune cannot aspire to the obtaining of blessednesse.

^e Temporal things
cannot make men
happie.

Moreover, hee that nowe enjoyeth this brittle felicitie, either knoweth it to bee mutable, or no; if not, what estate can bee blessed by ignorant blindnesse? And if hee knoweth it, hee must needes feare, least hee loose that, which hee doubteth not, may bee lost, wherefore continuall feare permitteth him not to bee happie. Or doeth hee thinke, that it were to bee neglected, though hee should loose it? But so it were a very small good, which hee would bee content to loose. And because thou art one, whom I know to be fully perswaded, that the soules

of men are in no wise mortall ; and
since it is cleare , that casuall felici-
tie is ended by the bodies death,
there is no doubt , if this can cause
blessednesse , but that all mankind
falleth into miserie by death . But
if we know many who haue sought
to reapre the fruit of blessednesse,
not onely by death , but also by af-
flictions and tormentes ; how can
this present life make men happy,
the losse of which causeth not mi-
serie ?

T H E I II I. V E R S E.
Philosophy commendeth a meane estate.

VV Howith an heedfull care
Will an eternall seat prepare,
Which cannot be donne east
By any force of windie blast.
And will the floods despise,
When threatening billowes doe arise.
He neit on hills must stand,

Ner

Nor on the dang'rous sinking sand.
For there the winds will threate,
And him with furious tempest beate,
And here the ground too weake
Will with the heauie burthen breake.
Flie then the dangerous case
Of an untry'd delightfull place,
And thy poore house bestow
In stonie places firme and low.
For though the winds doe sound,
And waues of troubled Seas confound.
Yet thou to rest disposed
In thy safelowy vale inclosed,
Mayst live a quiet age,
Skorning the Ayres distemp'red rage.

THE V. PROSE.

How riches are neither precious, nor
our owne.

But since my reson beginto
sinke into thy mind; I will
use those, which are some-
what more forcible. Goe to then,
if the gifts of fortune were not brit-
tle and momentanie, what is there

* Money.

in them , which can either euer bee
made your owne, or swell weighed
and considered seemeth not vile
and of no accompt? Are riches ei-
ther yours , or precious in them-
selues? What part of them can bee
so esteemed of, Gold, or ^a heapes of
mony? But these make a fairer shew,
when they are spent , then when
they are kept. For couetousnesse al-
way maketh men odious , as libe-
ralitie famous. And if a man can-
not haue that , which is giuen to
another , then money is precious,
when bestowed vpon others ; it is
not possessed any longer. But if all
the money in the whole world
were in one mans custodie , al-
other men should bee poore. The
voice at the same time wholly fil-
leth the eares of many , but your
riches cannot passe to many , ex-
cept

cept they bee diminished. Which being done, they must needes make them poore, whome they leaue. O skant and poore riches, which neither can bee wholly possessed of many, and come to none without the impouerishment of others.

Doeth the glittering of ^bJewels drawe thy eyes after them? But, if there bee any great matter in this shewe, not men but the Jewels shine, which I exceedingly maruaile, that men admire. For what is there wanting life and members, that may justly seeme beautifull to a nature not onely endewed with life, but also with reason? Which, though by their makers worke-manshippe, and their owne vauctie they haue some part of basest beautie, yet it is so farre inferiour to your excellencie, that it did in

^bJewels.

c Pleasant
fields.

in no sort deserue your admiration.
Doeth the pleasant prospect of the
fields delight you? Why not? For
it is a faire portion of the fairest
worke. So wee are delighted with
a calme Sea, so wee admire the skie,
the Starres ; the Sunne , and the
Moone. Doth any of these belong
to thee? Darest thou boast of the
beautie , which any of them haue?
Art thou adorned with May-flow-
ers? Or doeth thy fertilitie bring
forth the fruits of Summer? VVhy
reioycest thou vainely? VVhy em-
bracest thou outward goods , as if
they were thine owne? Fortune wil
neuer make those things thine,
which by the appointment of na-
ture belong not to thee. The fruits
of the earth are appointed for the
sustenance of liuing creatures. But
if thou wilt onely satisfie want ,
which

which suffiseth nature, there is no cause to require the superfluities of fortune. For nature is contented with little, and if being satisfied, thou wilt ouerlay it with more then needes, that which thou addest, will either become vnpleasant, or hurtfull. But perhaps thou thinkest it a fine thing, to goe decked in gay^d apparell, which if they make a faire shew, I will admire either the goodnesse of the stuffe, or the iuention of the workman. Or doth the multitude of ^e seruants make thee happie? VVho if they bee vicious, they are a pernicious burthen to thy house, and exceeding troublesome to their Master: and if they bee honest, what shalt thou bee the better for other mens honestie? By all which it is manifestly proued, that none of these goods, which thou accoun-

^d Apparell.^e Seruants.

accountest thine are thine indeede. And if there be nothing in thē worthy to be desired, why art thou either glad, when thou hast them, or sorie, when thou looseſt them? Or what is it to thee, if they bee precious by nature? For in this respect, they would haue pleased thee, though they had belonged to others. For they are not precious, becauſe they are come to bee thine, but because they seemed precious, thou wert desirous to haue them. Now, what desire you with ſo much adoe? Perhaps you ſeeke to driue away penurie with plentie. But this falleth out quite contrarie, for you stand in neede of many ſupplies, to furnish your ſelues with varietye of precious ornaments. And it is true, that they which haue ^f much neede much, and contrariwise, that they

^f They
which haue
much, need
much.

they neede little, which measure not their wealth by the superfluitie of ambition , but by the necessitie of nature. Haue you no proper & inward good, that you seeke so much after those things which are outward and separated from you? Is the condition of things so changed, that man , who is deseruedly accounted divine for the gift of reson, seemeth to haue no other excellency then the possession of a litle houſhold ſtuffe? All other creatures are content with that they haue of their owne , and you , who in your minds carie the likenesſe of God, are content to take the ornamentes of your excellent nature from moſt base and vile things , neither vnderſtand you , what iniurie you doe to your creatour . Hee woulde haue mankinde to excell all earthly things , you

^g Man de-
iceth him-
selfe by le-
uing world-
ly things.

^h Hee is
worse then
beasts,
when hee
knoweth
not him-
selfe.

ⁱ Nothing
can be ad-
orned
with the
ornaments
of another.

you debase your dignitie vnder euer-
y meanest creature. For if it be ma-
nifest, that the good of euerie thing
is more precious then that, whose
good it is , since you iudge the vi-
lest things that can be , to bee your
goods , you ^g deiect your selues vnder
them in your owne estimation,
which questionlesse commeth not
vndeseruedly to passe; for this is the
condition of mans nature, that then
only it surpasseth other things, when
it knoweth it selfe ; and it is ^h worse
then beasts, when it is without that
knowledge. For in other liuing
creatures the ignorance of them-
selues is nature, but in men it is vice.
And how farre doeth this errore of
yours extend, who thinke , that ⁱ any
can bee adorned with the orna-
ments of another? Which can in no
wise be. For if any adioyned thing
seeme

seeme precious, it is that , which is praised , but that which is couered and enwrapped in it , remaineth notwithstanding with the foule basenesse , which it hath of it selfe. Moreover , I denie that to be good , which hurteth the possessor. Am I deceiuued in this ? I am sure thou wilt say , no. But ^k riches haue often hurt their possessours , since euery lewdest companion , who are consequently most desirous of that , which is not their owne , thinke themselues most worthy to possesse alone all the Gold , and Iewels in the world. Wherefore thou , who with much perturbation fearest now to be assayled and slaine , if thou hadst entred the path of this life , like a poore passenger , neededst not be afraid , but mightest reioyce and sing euen in the g̃ght of most rauenous

^k Riches do often hurt their possessours.

rauenous thieues . O excellent hap-
pinesse of mortall riches , which
when thou hast gotten , thou hast
lost thy safetie.

T H E V. V E R S E .

Philosophy commendeth the formier age ,
which was free from couetousnesse .

To much the former age was blest ,
When fields their pleased owners failed not ,
Who with no solumbfull lust opprest .
Broke their long feasts with a korne eas'ly got .
No wine with home mixed was ,
Nor did they silke in purple colours steepe ,
They slepte upon the wholesome grasse ,
And their coole drink did fetch from riner's deepe .
The Pines did hide them with their shade ,
No Merchants through the dang'rous billomes went ,
Nor with desire of gain : full trade
Their traffike into forraigne Countreyes sent .
Then no shrill Trumpets did amate
The minds of Souldiers with their daunting sounds ,
Nor weapons were through deadly hate
Dy'd with the dreadful bloud of gaping wounds .
For how could any furrie draw
The mind of man to stirre up warres in vaine ,

Wken

When nothing, but fierce wounds he saw,
And for his blood no recompence should gaine.

O that the ancient maners would
In these our latter happelesse times retурne.

Now the desire of hauing gold
Doth like the flaming fires of ^a Etna burnie.

Ah who was he, that first did shew
The heapes of treasure, which the earth did hide,
And jewells whish lay close below,
By whish he costly dangers did prouide.

^a A hill in Sicily.

THE VI. PROSE.

Of dignitie and power.

Ow why should I discourse
of dignities & power, which
you not knowing, what
true dignitie and power me aneth,
extoll to the skies? And if they light
vpon wicked men, what fire, though
the very flames of *Aetna* should
breake foorth, or what diluge can
cause so great harmes? I suppose
thou remembrest, how your ance-
stours by reason of the Consuls ar-

G rogan-

rogancie, desired to abolish that gouernement, which had beene the beginning of their freedome, who before for the same cause had remooued the gouernment of Kings from their citie. And if sometime, which is very seldome, good men bee preferred to Honours, what other thing can giue contentment in them, but the honesty of those, which haue them? So that vertues are not honoured by dignities, but dignities by virtue. But what is this your soe-steemed and excellent power? Consider you not O earthly wights, whom you seeme to excell? For if among Mise thou shouldest see one claime iurisdiction and power to himselfe ouer the rest, to what a laughter would it moue thee? And what, if thou respectest the body, canst thou find more weake then man

man, whom euен the biting of little Flies, or the entring of creeping wormes doth often kill? Now, how can any man exercise iurisdiction vpon any other, except onely vpon their bodies, and that, which is inferiour to their bodies, I meane their fortunes? Canst thou euer imperiously impose any thing vpon a free ^a mind? Canst thou remoue a soule settled in firme reason from the quiet state, which it pōssesseth? When a ^b tyrant thought to compell a certaine free man by tormentes, to bewray his confederates of a conspiracie attempted against him, hee bit off his tongue and spit it out vpon the tyrants face, by that meanes wisely making those tortures, which the tyrant thought matter of crueltie, to bee to him occasion of vertue: Now, ^c what is

^a The mind
free.

^b Nearchus
or Diomedon. Zeno
Eleata. See
Eu[cl].lib.10
de prepar.
Euang. &
Suidas.

^c Whatso-
euer one
can doe to
another, an-
other may
doe to him.

^d King of
Egypt.

^e Marcus
Atilius Re-
gulus a
Consul of
Rome.

^f Dignities
and power
often be-
stowed on
the worst
men.

there, that any can enforce vpon another, which he may not bee enforced to sustaine by another? We read, that ^d Busirides wont to kill his guestes, was himselfe slaine by his guest Hercules. ^e Regulus had layed fetters vpon many *Affricanes* taken in warre, but ere long hee found his owne hands inuironed with his Conquerours chaines. Wherfore thinkest thou the power of that man to bee any thing worth, who cannot hinder another from doing that to him, which hee can doe to another? Moreouer, if ^f dignities and power had any naturall and proper good in them, they would neuer bee bestowed vpon the worst men, for one opposite vseth not to accompanie another. Nature refuseth to haue contraries ioyned. So that, since there is no doubt, but that

that men of the worst sort often enjoy dignities, it is also manifest, that they are not naturally good, which follow most naughtie men. Which may worthily bee thought of all fortunes gifts, which are more plentifullly bestowed vpon euery lewde companion. Concerning which, I take that also to bee worthy consideration, that no man doubteth him to bee a valiaunt man, in whome hee seeth valour; and it is manifest, that hee, which hath swiftnesse is swift. So likewise, Musick maketh Musitians, Phisicke Phisitians, and Rethoricke Rhetoricians. For the nature of euery thing doth that, which is proper vnto it, and is not mixed with contrary effectes, but repelleth all opposites. But neither can riches extinguish vnsatiable auarice, nor

power make him master of himselfe , whome vicious lustes keepe
chained in strongest fetters. And dignitie bestowed vpon wicked
men , doeth not onely not make them worthy , but rather bewrayeth
and discoureth their vnworthiness. How commeth this to passe?
Because you take a pleasure in mis-
calling things , which is easily refu-
ted by the effecte of the things
themselues . Wherefore by right,
thesethings are not to bee called ri-
ches, power or dignitie. Lastly, we
may conclude the same of all for-
tunes, in which it is manifest, there
is nothing to bee desired , nothing
naturally good , which neither are
alway bestowed vpon good men,
nor doe make them good, whome
they are bestowed vpon.

THE

THE VI. VERSE.

Philosophy declareth by the example of Nero, that dignities or power, doe not make men better.

VV E know what stirres he made,
 Who did the^a Senate slay, and ^b Rome with
 Who did his^c brother kill, (fire made,
 And with his^d mothers blood his moistned haā did fill,
 Who could without a reare
 Behold her nak't and dead, whose body him did beare.
 Yet his dread power controll'd
 Those people whom the Sun doth in the East behold,
 And those, who doe remaine
 In Westerne lands, or dwell under Bootes waine,
 And those, whose skinnes are tann'd
 With Southerne winds, which rost and burne the par-
 What? could this gloriouſ might (ched sand.
 Restraine the furious rage of wicked Neroes ſight?
 But oh misshape most badde,
 Which doth the wicked, sword to cruel poſon adde!

^a The ſeven Starres in Ursa maior, which represent a waine, with ſeven Oxen, which in old time were called Triones, for which cauſe theſe Stars are by Boetius called, Septem gelidi triones, from whence commeth Septentrio, to ſignifie the North.

^b Nero killed many of the Senatours without any caute.

^c He caused Rome to burne for a weeke, that he might conceiue the ouerthrow of Troy.

^d Britannicus, to reign alone.

^e Agrippina.

THE VII. PROSE.

Of glory.

HEN I sayde : thou thy selfe knowest, that the ambition of mortall things hath borne as little sway with me as with any, but I desired matter of action, least old age should come ypon me ere I had done any thing. To which shee answered : This is the only thing, which is able to entice such minds as being excellently quallified by nature, are not yet fully brought to the pérfection of vertues, I meane desire of glorie, and faime of best deserts towards their common wealth, which how slender it is, and voide of all weight, consider this, Thou hast learned by astronomicall demonstrations, that the

² The danger of the most excellent minds.

the compasse of the whole earth compared to the scope of heauen is no bigger then a pinnes point, which is as much to say, as that it hath no bignesse at all. And of this so small a region onely the fourth part is knowne to be inhabited, as *Ptolomæus* proueth.^b From which fourth part, if thou takest away the seas, and marish grounds, and all other desert places, there will skarcely be left any roome at all for men to inhabit. Wherefore enclosed and shutte vp in this ^bsmallest point of that other point, doe you thinke of extending your fame, and enlarging your name? But what great or heroiical matter can that glory haue, which is pend vp in so small and narrow bounds? Besides that the little compasse of this small habitation is inhabited by many nations, diffe-

^b The smallnesse of glory.

different in language, fashions, and conuersation, to which by reason of the difficulties in trauelling, the diuersitie of speach, and the scarcitie of trafficke, not onely the fame of particular men, but euen of cities can hardly come. Finally in the age of *Marcus Tullius*, as he himselfe writeth, the fame of the *Romane* commonwealth had not passed the mountaine ^d *Caucasus*, and yet it was then in the most flourishing estate, fearful euen to the ^e *Parthyans*, and to the rest of the nations about. Seest thou how streight and narrow that glorie is, which you labour to enlarge & encrease? where the fame of the *Romane* name could not passe, can the glory of a *Romane* man penetrate? Moreouer, the customes and lawes of diuers nations, doe so much differ the one from the other,
that

* In somnis
Scipionis.

^d A mountaine be-
twixt Scy-
thia and
India.

^e People of
Asia maior.

that the same thing , which some commend as laudable, others condene as deseruing punishment. So that, if a man be delighted with the praise of fame, it is no way conuenient for him to be named in many countreys. Wherefore euery man must be content with that glorie, which he may haue at home, & that noble immortalitie of fame must be comprehended within the compasse of one nation. Now, how many most famous while they liued, are altogether forgotten, for want of writers! Though what doe writings auaille, which perish as well as their authors by continuance and obscuritie of time?.. But you imagine, that you make your selues immortall, when you cast your eyes vpon future fame. Whereas, if thou weighest attentiuely the infinite

f Glory la-
steth not
long.

infinite spaces of eternitie, what cause hast thou to rejoyce at the prolonging of thy name? For if we compare the stay of one moment with ten thousand yeres, since both be limited, they haue some proportion, though it be but very small. But this number of yeares, how oft soeuer it bee multiplied, is no way comparable to endlesse æternitie. For limited things may in some sort bee compared among them-selues, but that, which is infinite, admitteth no comparison at all. So that the same of neuer so long time, if it be compared with euer-lasting æternitie seemeth not little, but none at all. But without popular blasts, and vaine rumours you know not how to doe well, and rejecting the excellencie of a good conscience and of vertue, you chuse to

to be rewarded with others tatling.
Heare how pleasantly one iested at
this vaine & contemptible arrogan-
cie. For hauing assaulted with re-
prochfull speeches a certaine fel-
low, who had falsely taken vpon
him the name of a Philosopher, not
for the vse of vertue, but for vaine
glorie, and hauing added, that now
he would know whether hee were
a Philosopher or no, by his gentle
& patient bearing of iniurie. The
other tooke al patiently for awhile,
and hauing borne his contumely as
it were triumphing sayed: Doest
thou now at length thinke mee a
Philosopher? To which he biting-
ly replied, I would haue thought
thee one, if thou haddest holden
thy peace. But what haue excellent
men (for of these I speake) who seeke
for glorie by vertue, what haue wee
(I say)

The vanitie of glory, euen in the opinion of Atheists, and much more of Christians.

(I say) to expect by fame after death. For if contrarie to our beleefe, men g wholy perish, there is no glorie at all, since he, to whom it is layed to belong, is no where extant. But if a guiltlesse minde freed from earthly imprisonment, goeth forthwith to heauen, will shee not despise all earthly traffike who enjoying heauen, rejoiceth to see her selfe exempted from earthly affayres,

THE VII. VERSE.

Of the smalnesse and shortnesse of fame.

HE that to honour only seekes to mount,
And that his chiefest end doth counse,
Let him behold the largenesse of the skyes,
And on the streight earth cast his eyes,
He will despise the glorie of his name,
Which cannot fill so small a frame:
Why do proud men scorne, that their necks should beare
That yoke, which every man must weare?
Though fame through many nations flie along,
And should be blaz'd by eu'ry tongue,

And

And houses shine with our forefathers stories,
 Yet death contemnes these stately glories,
 And summoning both rich and poore to die,
 Makes the low equall with the high. (prest,
 VWho knows, where^a faithfull Fabrice lones are
 Where^b Brutus and^c strict Cato rest?
 A slender fame now cause their titles vaine
 In some few letters to remaine,
 Because their famous names in bookees we reade,
 Come wee by them to know the dead:
 You dying then remembred are by none,
 Nor any fame can make you knowne.
 But if you thinke you live euuen after death,
 Your names borne vp with mortall breath:
 VWhen length of time takes this away likewise,
 A second death shall you surprize.

Consull of Rome, who reuenged Lucrecias rape. c A noble Ro
 mane, whome nothing could corrupt, Lucan. *Vixtrix causa diis placuit,*
sed & sta Catoni, meaning of Casar, and Pompey.

THE VIII. PROSE.

Aduersitie more profitable then prosperite.

BY T least thou shouldest
 thinke, that I am at vnpla-
 cable warre with fortune,
 there

^a A Consull
 of Rome,
 who made
 warre with
 Pirrhos
 King of the
 Epirotas,
 by whom
 hee could
 not be cor-
 rupted by
 bribes, and
 to whome
 he sent one
 that offered
 to kill him.

^b The first

there is a time , when this thy de-
ceitfull Goddesse deserueth some-
what well of men,to wit,when she
declarereth her selfe,when shhee disco-
uerereth her face, and sheweth her
selfe in her owne colours. Per-
haps thou vnderstandest not yet,
what I say. I would vtter awon-
derfull thing, insomuch as I can
skarcely explicate my minde in
words. For I thinke, that ^afortune
when shhee is opposite is more pro-
fitable to men,then when shhee is fa-
vourable. For in prosperitie shhee
falsely counterfeiteh a shew of
happinesse, but in aduersitie ^bshhee
sheweth herselfe truely vnconstant
by changing. In that shhee decei-
ueth,in this shhee instructeth,in that
shhee imprisoneth the mindes of
men with falsely seeming goods,
which they enjoy : In this shhee set-
teth

^a The vti-
lities of ad-
uersitie.

^b Fortune is
truely
knowee.

teth them at libertie by discouering the ^c vncertaintie of them. Wherfore in that, thou shalt alway see men puffed vp, and wauering, and blinded with a selfe conceit of themselues : in this thou shalt find them ^d sober, settled, and with the very exercise of aduersitie, wise. Finally, prosperitie with her flattrings withdraweth men from true goodnesse, aduersitie ^e recalleth and reclaymeth them many times by force, to true happinesse. Doest thou esteem it a small benefit, that this rough and harsh fortune hath made knowne vnto thee the minds of thy faughtfull ^f friends? Shee hath severed thy assured from thy doubtfull friends ; prosperitie at her departure tooke away with her those, which were hers, and left thee thine. How dearely woul-

^c The vncertainetie
of worldly
thing; is
discouered.

^d Men be-
come so-
ber, settled,
wise.

^e They are
drawen by
force to true
happinesse.

^f Faithfull
friends are
discerned.

H dest

by manib blitazl 1612


dest thou haue bought this before
thy fal, and when thou seemedst to
thy selfe fortunate? Desist from seek-
ing to recover thy lost riches; since
thou hast found friends, the most
precious treasure in the world.

THE VIII. VERSE.

Philosophy praiseth true loue and friendship.

That this faire world in settled course her severall formes shoul'd carry,
That a perpetuall Law should tame the fighting seedes of things,
That Phæbus shoul'd the rosie day in his bright chariot carry,
That Phæbe shoul'd governe the nights, which Hesperus forth brings,
That to the flouds of greedy seas are certaine boounds assign'd,
Which them least they surpe too much vpon the earth, debarre,
Loue ruling heau'n, and earth, and seas, them in this course doeth bind,
And if it once let loose these raines, their friendshipp turns to warre,
Tearing the world whose ordred forme their quiet motions bear.
Byt all holy Lawes are male, and mariage rites are ti'd,
Byt it is faithful! friendshipp sciid. How happy mortalls were,
If that pure loue did guid their minds, which beau'ly Spheares dost guid?

THE




THE
THIRD BOOKE
OF BOETIUS.

In which Philosophy begin-
neth to apply more forcible re-
medies, and treateth of
true felicitie.

THE PROSE.
Philosophy promiseth to explicate
true felicitie.

Hough shes had en-
ded her verse, yet the
sweetnesse of it made
mee remaine astoni-



shed , attentiuе , and desirous to
heare her longer . Wherefore after
a while , I saide . O most effectuall
refreshment of wearied minds , how
much haue I beeне comforted with
thy weightie sentences , and plea-
sing Musick ! Insomuch that I be-
gin to thinke my selfe not vnable to
encounter the assaults of fortune .
Wherefore I am not now afraid ,
but rather earnestly desire to know
those remedies , which before thou
toldest mee were too sharpe . To
which shée answered , I perceiued as
much , as thou sayest , when I sawe
thee hearken to my speeches with so
great silence and attention , and I
expected this disposition of thy
mind , or rather more truely caused
it my selfe . For the remedies which
remaine are of that sort , that they
are bitter to the taste , but being in-
wardly

wardly receiued waxe sweete. And whereas thou sayest that thou art desirous to heare; how much would this desire encrease, if thou knewest, whether we goe about to bring thee! Whether (quoth I.) To true felicitie (quoth she) which thy mind also dreameth of; but thy sight is so dimmed with phantasies, that thou canst not behold it as it is. Then I beseeched her to explicate without delay, wherein true happiness consisteth. To which she answered, I will willingly doe So for thy sake, but a first I will endeavour to declare that, which is better knownne vnto thee, that having throughly vnderstood it, by reflecting of the contrary thou maiest discouer a glimpse of perfect blessednesse.

True happiness the better discerned, if the contrary be first explicated.

THE I. VERSE.

False felicitie must bee forsaken, that
true happinesse may be embraced.

HE that a fruitful field will sow,
Doth first the ground from bushes free.
All Fearne and Bryers likewise mow,
That he his Harvest great may see.
Hone seemes saceter to our tast,
If cloy'd with noysome foode it bee.
Starres clearer shine, when Noitis blast
Hath ceast the rainie stormes to breed.
When Lucifer hath night defac't,
The dayes bright horses then succeede.
So thou, whom seeming goods doe feede,
First shake off yokes, which so thee presse.
That trueth may then thy mind posseſſe.

THE II. PROSE.

How all men desire happinesse, but ma-
ny mistake it.

 Hen for a while looking
stedfastly vpon the ground,
and as it were retiring her
selfe to the most secret seate of her
soule,

soule, shee beganne in this maner:
^a All mens thoughts, which are tur-
moyled with manifold cares, take
indeede diuers courses, but yet en-
deuour to attaine the same end of
happinesse, which is that good,
which being once obtained, no-
thing can be further desired. Which
is the chiefest of al goods, & contai-
neth in it self, whatsoeuer is good, &
if it wanted any thing, it could not
be the chiefest, because there would
something remaine besides it,
which might be wished for. Wher-
fore it is manifest, that ^b blessednesse
is an estate replenished with all
that is good. This (as we said) all
men endeuour to obteine by diuers
wayes. For there is naturally in-
grafted in mens minds an earnest
desire of that, which is truely good;
but deceitfull errour withdraweth

^a All men
seeke for
happinesse.

^b What it
is.

it to that, which falsely seemeth such. So that some esteeming it their greatest good to want nothing, labour by all meanes to abound with ^criches : others making more account of ^dhonours, hunt after preferments, to be respected by their inferiours. Others think it the greatest felicitie, to ^ehaue great power and authoritie, and these will either raigne themselves, or at least procure to be great with Princes. But they who thinke ^ffame better then all these, make all speed possible to spread their names farre and neere, by atchieuing some worthy enterprise either in warre or peace. Many measure happinesse by ^gjoy and mirth, and their chiefeest care is, howthey may abound with pleasure. Some subordinate one of these to the other, as richesto

^c Riches.

^d Honours.

^e Power.

^f Fame.

^g Pleasure.

power

power and pleasure, or power to wealth & fame. At these and such other doe mens actions and desires aime, as nobilitie and popularity, which make men esteemed, wife and children, which bring pleasure and delight. For holy friendship is rather to be attibuted to vertue, then to fortune. Other things for the most part are desired either for power or pleasure. And it is an easie matter to reduce all corporall goods to the former heades. For strength and greatness giue habilitie, beautie and swiftnesse, fame, and health yeeldeth pleasure. By all which wee manifelly seeke for nothing else but happiness. For that, which euery man seeketh most after, is by him esteemed his greatest good. Which is all one with happiness. Wherfore he esteemeth
that

that estate happy, which hee preferreth before al other. And thus thou hast in a maner seene the forme of humane felicitie, riches, honour, power, glorie, pleasure. Which the Epicure onely considering; consequently tooke pleasure for his chiefest good, because all the rest seeme to delight the mind. But I returne to the carefull thoughts of men, whose minds though obscured, yet^b seeke after the greatest good, but like a drunken man, know not the way home. For, seeme they to erre, who endeavour to want nothing? But nothing can cause happiness so much, as the plentiful possession of all that is good, needing the helpe of none, but is sufficient of it selfe. Or doe they erre, whotake that which is best to bee likewise most worthy of respect?

^bAll agree
in chusing
that which
is good.

No.

No. For it is no vile or contemptible thing, which almost all men labour to obtaine. Or is not power to bee esteemed good? Why then, is that to be accounted feeble and of no force, which manifestly surpasseth all other things? Or is fame to be contemned? But these two cannot be seperated, that the most excellent seeme also most famous. For to what purpose should I say, that happiness is not sadde or melancholy, or subiect to grieve and trouble, when euен in smallest matters we desire that, which wee delight to haue and enjoy? And these be the things, which men desire to obtaine, and to this end procure riches, dignities, kingdomes, glory and pleasures, because by them they thinke to haue sufficiencie, respect, power, fame, delight
and

and ioy. Wherefore that is good, which men seeke after by diuers desires, in which the force of nature is easily descried, since though there be many and different opinions, yet they agree in chusing for their end that which is good.

THE II. VERSE.

How nature cannot bee wholly
changed.

How the straet raines of all things guided are
By powerfull nature, as the chiefest cause,
And how shee keepes with a foreseeing care
The spacious world in order by her lawes,
And to sure knots, which nothing can untie,
By her strong hand all earthly motions drawes :
To shew all this we purpose now to trie
Our pleasing Verses, and our Musickē sound.
Although the Lybian Lyons often lie
Gentle and tame in willing fetteres bound,
And fearing their incensed masters wrath
With patient lookes endure each blow and wound :
Yet if their iames they once in blood doe bathe,
They gaining courage with fierce noyse awake

The force, which nature in them seated hath,
And from their neckes the broken chaimes doe shake;
Then he, that tam'd them first doeth feele their rage,
And torne in pieces doth their furie shake.
The birashut up in an unpleasing cage,
Whiche on the loftie trees did lately sing,
Though men her want of freedome to asswage,
Should unto her with carefull labour bring
The sweetest meates, which they can best devise:
Yet when on topes of houses fluttering
The pleasing shadowes of the groues shee spies,
Her hated foode shee scatters with her feete,
And discontented to the woods shee flies,
And their delights to tune her accents sweete.
When some streng hand doth tender plant constraine
With his debased top the ground to meeke,
If it let goe the crooked twigge againe
Uptoward heauen it selfe it streight doth raise.
Phæbus doeth fall into the Westerne maine,
Yet doeth he backe returne by secret wayes,
And to the East doeth guide his chariots race,
Each thing a certaine course and lawes obeyes,
Striving to turne backe to his proper place;
Nor any settled order can be found,
But that, which doth within it selfe embrace
The birthes and ends of all things in around.

THE

THE III. PROSE.

*That true happiness consisteth not
in riches.*

 Ou also (O earthly creatures) though slightly & as it were in a dreame acknowledge your beginning, and though not perspicuously yet in some sort behold that true end of happiness, so that the intention of nature leadeth you to the true good, and manifold errour withdraweth you from it. For consider, whether those things by which men thinke to obtaine happiness, can bring them to their desired end. For if either money, or honour, or any of the rest be of that qualitie, that they want nothing which is good, we will also confess, that they are able to make men happy. But if they neither

ther be able to performe that they promise, and want many things which are good, are they not manifestly discouered to haue a false appearance of happiness? First then, I aske thee thy selfe, who not long since diddest abound with wealth; In that plenty of riches, was thy minde neuer troubled with any injuries? I cannot remember (quoth I.) that euer my mind was so free from trouble, but that something or other still vexed me. Was it not because thou either wantedst somthing, which thou wouldest haue had, or else haddest somthing which thou wouldest haue wanted? It is true (quoth I.) Then thou desiredst the presence of that, and the absence of this, I confess I did (quoth I.) And doth not a man want that (quoth shee) which hee desi-

desireth. He doth (quoth I.) But he
that wanteth anything, is not alto-
gether sufficient of himselfe. He is
not (quoth I.) So that thou felt'st
this insufficiencie, euen in the
height of thy wealth. Why not
(quoth I.) Then ^a riches cannot
make a man wanting nothing nor
sufficient of himselfe, and this was
that they seemed to promise. But
this is most of all to be considered,
^b that mony hath nothing of it self,
which can keepe it from being ta-
ken from them, which possesse it;
against their will. I grant (quoth
I.) why shouldest thou not grant
it, since that euery day those, which
are more potent, take it from o-
thers perforce? For from whence
proceede so many complaints in
Law, but that mony gotten either
by violence, or deceit is sought to
be

^a Riches ta-
keth not a-
way want.

^b Money
cannot de-
fend it selfe,
and there-
fore nee-
deth some-
thing to de-
fend it.

be recovered by that meanes? It is so indeed (quoth I.) So that euery man needeth some other helpe to defend his mony. Who denies that? (quoth I.) But hee shoulde not neede that helpe, vnalesse he had mony, which he might loose. There is no doubt of that (quoth I.) Now then the matter is fallen out quite contrary, for riches whiche are thought to suffise of themselfes, rather make men stand in need of other helpes. And after what maner doe riches expell penury? For are not rich men hungry? are they not thirsty? Or doeth much money make the owners senseles of cold in winter? But thou wilt say, wealthy men haue where-withal to satisfie their hunger, slake their thirst, and defend themselfes from cold. But in this sort, though wants may be somewhat reliued

by wealth, yet it cannot altogether
be taken away. For if euer gaping
and craving, it bee satiated by riches,
there must needes alway remaine
something to be satiated. I omitte,
that to nature very little, to conne-
tousnesse nothing is sufficient.
VWherefore if riches can neither re-
move wants, and cause some them-
selues, why imagine you, that they
can cause sufficiency.

THE III. VERSE.

*How riches afflict their possessours in
life, and forsake them in death.*

A Lthough the rich man from his mines of gold,
Digge treasure, which his mind can never fill,
And lofie necke with precious Pearles enfold
And his fatte fields with many Oxen till:
Yet biting cares will never leaue his head,
Nor will his wealth attend him being dead.

THE

THE III. PROSE.

That true happinesse consisteth not
in dignities.

But dignities make him honourable and Reuerend, on whome they light. Haue offices that force to plant vertues and expell vices; in the minds of those who haue them? But they are not wont to banish, but rather to vphold wickednesse. So that we many times complaine, because most wicked men obtaine them. Whereupon^b Catullus called^c Nonius a scabbe or impostume though he satte in his chaire of estate. Seest thou, what great ignominie dignities heape vpon euill men! For their vnworthinesse would lesse appeare, if they were neuer aduaunced to any honours. Could so ma-

^a Dignities
vphold wick-
kednesse.

^b A famous
Poet of
Verona.

^c A wicked
Romane ful
of vices,
whole fir-
name was
Struma,
appeareth
in Plin. lib.
37. nat. Hist.

^d Boetius
refused him

^e Dignities
make not
men re-
spected.

ny dangers euer make thee beare office with ^d *Decoratus* hauing discouered him to be a very varlet and spie? For ^e wee cannot for their honours account them worthy of respect, whomewe iudge vnworthy of the honours themselues. But if thou seest any man endewed with wisedome, canst thou esteeme him vnworthy of that respect or wisedome, which he hath? No truly. For vertue hath a proper dignitie of her owne, which she presently endeweth her possessours withall. Which since popular preferments cannot doe, it is manifest that they haue not the beauty, which is proper to true dignitie. In which wee are farther to consider, that if to be contemned of many, make men abiect, whom dignities cannot make respected, they rather

rather make wicked, by laying their defects and ignominy open to the view of the world. But the dignities goe not scot-free, for^f wicked men do as much for them, defiling them with their infectious diseases.

And that thou maist plainly see, that true respect cannot be gotten by these painted dignities, inferre it thus, let^g one, that hath beene often Consul goe among barbarous nations, will that honour make those barbarous people respect him? And yet, if this were naturall to dignities, they would neuer forsake their function in any nation whatsoeuer; as fire, wheresoeuer it bee, alway remaineth hoate. But because not their owne nature, but the deceitfull opinion of men attributeth that to them, they forthwith come to nothing, being brought to

^f Wicked
men defile
dignities.

^g Diuersitie
of nations
make Digni-
ties con-
temptible.

^h Their
worth de-
cayes by
change of
times.

them, who esteeme them not to be dignities. And this for forraine nations. But doe they^h alway last among them, where they had their beginning? The Præfect-shippe a great dignitie in time past, is now an idle name, and an heauy burthen of the Senates Censure. If heretofore one had care of the peoples prouision, he was accounted a great man; Now what is more abiect then that office? For as wee saied before, that which hath no proper dignitie belonging vnto it, sometime receiveth, and sometime loseth his value at the vsels discretion. VVherefore if dignities cannot make ys respected, if they be easily defiled with the infection of the wicked, if their worth decaies by change of times, if diuersitie of nations make them

con-

contemptible, what beautie haue
they in themselues, or can they af-
ford to others worth the desiring?

THE IIII. VERSE.

How Nero being most wicked, was in
greatest dignitie.

T Hough fierce and lustfull Nero did adorne
Himself with purple robes, which gems did grace
He did but gaine a generall hate and scorne:
Yet by his power he Officers most base,
Over the Ren'rend Senators did place.
Who would esteeme of fading honours then,
Whiche may begin' nthus by the wickedst men?

THE V. PROSE.

Of Kings and their favorites.

B Vt can kingdomes and the
familiaritie of kings make
a man mighty? VVhy not,
when their felicity¹ lasteth alwaies?

But both former and present times
are full of examples, that many
kings haue changed their happi-
nesse with misery. O excellent
power, which is not sufficient to
vphold it selfe. And if this strength
of kingdomes bee the author of
blessednesse, doeth it not diminish
happinesse and bring misery, when
it is any way defectiue? But
though ^b some Empires extend
themselues farre, there will still re-
maine many nations out of their
dominions. Now, where their
power endeth, which maketh
them happy, there entereth the con-
trary, which maketh them misera-
ble, so that all kings must needes
haue lesse happiness then misery.

That ^c tyrant knowing by experi-
ence the dangers of his estate, signi-
fied the ^d feares incident to a king-
dome,

^b King-
domes are
limited.

^c Dyonisius
king of
Sicily.

^d King-
domes full
offearcs.

dome, by the hanging of a drawne
sword ouera mans head. VVhat
power is this then, which cannot
expell nor avoid biting cares and
pricking feares? They would wil-
lingly haue liued securely, but could
not, and yet they brag of their pow-
er. Thinkest thou him mighty,
whom thou seest desire that, which
he cannot doe? Thinkest thou him
mighty who dareth not goe with-
out his guard, who feareth others
more then they feare him, who can-
not seeme mighty, except his ser-
uaunts please? For what should I
speake of kings followers, since I
shew, that kingdomes themselues
are so full of weakenesse? Whome
the power of kings often standing,
and many times falling, doth ouer-
throw. Nero compelled *Seneca* his
familiar friend and Master, to make
choice

¹⁰
• Aurelius
Antonius
Bassianus,
Caracalla
Slew Papini-
anus a fa-
mous Law-
yer, and the
chiefe man
in his Court
to whome
Seuerus
chiefly com-
mended his
two sonnes.
the cause of
his death,
was for that
he would
not excuse
the mur-
ther of Geta,
the Emper-
ours bro-
ther, and of
other No-
ble men.
• Kings fa-
uourites
cannot with-
draw them-
selues, when
they would.

Boetius his

choice of his owne death. • Antonius caused Papinianus, who had bee long a gallant courtier, to be cutte in pieces with his souldiers sword. And they would both haue renounced their power, yea Seneca endeououred to deliuer vp his riches also to Nero, and to giue himselfe to a contemplatiue life. But their very greatnessse drawing them to their distruktion, neither of them could compasse that, which they desired. Wherefore what power is this, that the possessors feare, which when thou wilt haue, thou art not secure, and when thou ^f wilt leaue, thou canst not avoid. Are wee the better for those friends, which loue vs not for our vertue, but for our prosperity? But whome prosperitie maketh our friend, aduersitie will make our enemy. And what plague
is

is able to hurt vs more, then a familiar enemie?

THE V. VERSE.

True power consisteth in conquering our owne passions.

VHo would be powerfull, must
His owne affections checke,
Nor let foule raynes of lust
Subdue his conquer'd necke.
For though the Indian land
Should tremble at thy becke,
And though thy dread command
The farthest parts obey,
Unlesse thou canst withstand.
And boldly drive away
Blacke care and wretched meane
Thy might is small or none.

THE VI. PROSE.

That true happiness consisteth not in glorie.

Sfor^a glory, how deceitfull is it oftentimes, and dishonest? For which cause

^a glory often false.

O gloria,
gloria, infi-
nitissimam
mortali bus
nullus presiu m
Estiam tuam
fecisti mag-
nara.

^b The vani-
tie of true
glorie.

^c The small-
nesse of it.

cause the Tragicall Poe: deseruedly
exclameth: ὡδόξα διοξα μυπίσταις ον Εργάνει,
γεγώσι βιοτον ωγκωσίς μεγάν for many haue
bin much spoken of by the false opi-
nions of the common people. Then
which what can bee imagined
more vile? For those who are falsely
commended must needes blush at
their owne praises. Which though
they be gotten ^b by deserts, yet what
adde they to a wise mans con-
science; who measureth his owne
good, not by popular rumours, but
by his owne certaine knowledge.
And if it seemeth a faire thing to
haue dilated our fame, consequent-
ly wee must iudge it a foule thing
not to haue it extended. But since
as I shewed a little before, there must
needes be many ^c nations, to which
the fame of one man cannot arriue,
it commeth to passe, that he, whom
thou

thou esteemest glorious, in the next Countrey seemeth to haue no glory at all. And here now I thinke^d popular glory not worth the speaking of, which neither proceedeth from iudgment, noreuer hath any firme-nesse. Likewise, who seeth^e not, what a vaine and idle thing it is to be called noble? Which, for as much as belongeth to fame, is not our owne. For^c Nobilitie seemeth to be a certaine praise proceeding from our parents deserts. And if praising causeth fame; they must necessarily be famous, who are praised. Wherfore the fame of others, if thou hast none of thine own, maketh not thee renowmed. And if there bee any thing good in nobility, I iudge it on-ly to be this, that it imposeth a neces-sitic vpon those, which are Noble, not to degenerate from the vertue of their ancestors.

^d Popular
glorie.

^e Nobilitie.

T H E

THE VI. VERSE.

How all, but wicked men, are noble.

THe gen'rall race of men from alike birth is borne,
All things one father haue, who doth them all adorne,
Who gaue the Sunne his rayes, and the pale Moone her horne
The loftie heauen fer Starres, low earth for mortals chose;
He soules ^a fetcht downe from heigh in bodies did enclose;
And thus from noble birth all men did first compose.
Why bragge you of your stocke? since none is counted base,
If you consider God the authour of your race,
But he, that with foule Vice doeth his owne birth deface.

^a Here Boetius speake-
keth according to the
opinion of
Platonists,
who thought, that the soules were created in heauen, but the trueth is
that they are created in the bodies, so soone as they are ready for life.

THE VII. PROSE.

That true happinesse consisteth not
in pleasure.

NO W what should I speake
of bodily pleasure, the de-
sire of which is full of anxi-
etie, & the enjoying of them breeds
repentance? How many diseases,
how intollerable grieves bring they
forth in the bodies of their posse-
sors,

sors, as it were the fruites of their wickednesse? I know not what sweetnesse their motions haue, but whosoeuer will remember his lusts, shall vnderstand, that the end of pleasure is sadnessse. Which if it be able to cause happinesse, there is no reason, why beasts should not be thought blessed, whose whole intention is bent to supply their corporall wants. That pleasure, which proceedeth from wife and children is most honest; but it was too naturally spoken, that (I knowe not whome) found his children his tormentors, whose condicion, whatsoeuer it be, how biting it is, I neede not tell thee, who hast had experience heeretofore, and art not now free from care. In which I approue the opinion of *Euripides*, who said that they, which haue no children

children, are happy by being vnforn-
tunate.

THE VII. VERSE.

That there is no pleasure without paine.

A pleasure baththi property,
Shee woundeth those, who have her most:
And like vnto the angrie Bee,
Who hath her pleasant honie lost.
Shee flies away with nimble wing;
And in our hearts doeth leave her sting.

THE VIII. PROSE.

How all temporal goods are mixed with
euill, and are small in themselues.

VHerefore there is no doubt,
but that these waies to
happinesse, are onely cer-
taine by-pathes, which can neuer
bring any man thereto, whether
they promise to leade him. And
with

how great euills they are besette,
I will briefly shew. For what
wilt thou endeavour to gather ^a mo-
ney? but thou shalt take it away
from him, who hath it. Wilt thou
exell in ^b dignities? Thou shalt
crouche to the giuer, and thou,
who desirest to surpass others in
honour, shalt become vile by thy
basenesse in begging. Wishest thou
for ^c power? Thou shalt be in dan-
ger of thy subiects treacheries. See-
kest thou for ^d glory? But drawne
into many difficulties, thou shalt
loose thy safety. Wilt thou liue a
^e voluptuous life? But who would
not despise and neglect the seruice
of so vile and base a thing, as his
body? Now they, who boast of
the ^f habillities of their body, vpon
how vnstedfast a possession doe
they ground themselues? For can

^a Money.^b Dignities.^c Power.^d Glory.^e Pleasure.^f Habilli-
ties of the
body.

you bee bigger then Elephants, or
stronger then Buls? Or swifter then
Tygers? looke vpon the space, firm-
nesse and speedy motion of the heau-
uens, and cease at length to haue in
admiration these base things.
Which heauens are not more to be
admired for these quallities, then
for the maner of their gouerne-
ment. As for the glittering of ^gbeau-
tie, how soone and swiftly doeth
it vanish away? As suddenly decay-
ing and changing as the traile flow-
ers in the spring. And if, as Aristotle
sayeth, men had ^h Lynces eyes,
that they could see through stone
walles, would they not iudge that
body of ⁱ Alcibiades seeming out-
wardly most faire, to be most foule
and vgly by discouering his en-
trailes? VVherefore not thy nature,
but the weaknesse of the beholders
eyes

^g Beautie.

^h The beast
Lynx hath
the quickest
sight of any
beast. Plin.
lib 32. Hist.
nat. cap. 8.

There was
also a man
caled Lynce-
us, who did
see through
wals &c.

Apollonius in
Argonautis-
eis, &c.

ⁱ A noble
Captaine of
Athens.

eyes maketh thee seeme faire. But
esteeme the goods of the body as
much as you will, so that you ac-
knowledge this, that whatsoeuer
you admire, may be dissoluued with
the burning of an Ague of three
dayes. Out of all which, wee may
briefely collect this summe; that
these goods, which can neither
performe that they promise, nor
are perfect by hauing all that is
good, doe neyther, as so many
pathes, leade men to happinesse,
nor make men happy of them-
selues.

THE VIII. VERSE.

How men are wise in seeking for things
of little value, and foolish in finding
out their soueraigne good.

A Las, how ignorance makes wretches stray
out of the way!

Boetius his

Tou from greene trees expect no golden mines,
nor pearles from vines.
Nor vse you on mountaines to lay your net,
fishes to get.
Nor, if the pleasant sport of hunting please,
runne you to seas.
Men will be skilfull in the hidden caues
of th' Ocean waves.
And in what coasts the orient pearles are bred,
or purple red.
Also, what diff'rent sorts of fishes store
each severall shore.
But when they come their chiefest good to find,
then are they blind.
And search for that under the earth, which lies
above the skies.
How should I curse these fooles? Let thirst them hold
of fame and gold,
That hauing got false goods with payne, they learne
True to discerne.

THE IX. PROSE.

Why true felicitie cannot consist in tem-
porall things.



Et it suffice, that wee haue
hetherto discouered the
forme of false felicitie,
which

which if thou hast plainly seene, order now requireth, that we shew thee, in what true happinesse consisteth. I see (quoth I) that neither sufficiencie by riches, nor power by kingdomes, nor respect by dignities, nor renowme by glory, nor ioy can be gotten by plesures. Hast thou also vnderstood the causes, why it is so? Me thinke I haue a little glimpse of them, but I had rather thou wouldest declare them more plainly. The reason is manifest, for that, which is simple and vndeuided of it selfe, is deuided by mens errour, and is translated from true and perfect to false and vnperfect. Thinkest thou, that, which needeth nothing, to stand in need of power. No (quoth I.) Thou sayest well, for if any power in any respect bee weake, in this it must necessarily

stand in need of the helpe of others. It is true (quoth I.) Wherefore sufficiencie and power haue one and the same nature. So it seemeth. Now thinkest thou, hat, which is of this sort ought to bee despised, or rather that it is worthy to be respected aboue all other things? There can bee no doubt of this (quoth I.) Let vs adde respect then to sufficiencie and power, so that wee judge these three to bee one. We must adde it, if we will confess the truth! What now (quoth she) thinkest thou this to be obscure and base, or rather most excellent and famous? Consider whether, that, which thou hast granted to want nothing, to bee most potent, and most worthy of Honour, may seeme to want fame, which it cannot yeeld it selfe, and for that cause
be

be in some respect more abiect. I must needs confess (quoth I.) That it is also most famions. Consequently then wee must acknowledge, that fame differeth nothing from the former three. WWe must so (quoth I.) WWherefore that which wanteth nothing, which can performe al things by his owne power, which is famous and respected, is it not manifest that it is also most pleasant? To which I answe-
red, how such a man should fall in-
to any griefe, I can by no meanes imagine. Wherefore if that, which wee haue said hitherto be true, wee must needs confess, that he is most ioyfull and content. And by the same reason it followeth that^a suffi-
ciencie, power, fame, respect, plea-
sure haue indeede diuers names, but
differ not in substance. It follow-

^a Sufficien-
cie, power,
fame, re-
spect and
pleasure are
all but one
and the
same thing

eth indeed (quoth I.) This then, which is one and simple by nature, mans wickednesse deuideth, and while he endeiuoureth to obtaine part of that, which hath no partes, he neither ^b getteth a part, which is none, nor the wholé, which he seeketh not after. How is this? (quoth I.) Hee who seeketh after riches (quoth she) to avoid want, taketh no thought for power, hee had rather be base and obscure, he depriueith himselfe euen of many naturall pleasures, that he may not loose the money, which he hath gotten. But by this meanes he attaineth not to sufficiencie, whom power forsaketh, whom trouble molesteth, whom basenesse maketh abiect, whom obscuritie ouerwhelmeth. Againe, he that onely desirereth power, consumeth wealth, des-

^b He that
diuideth
them, bath
none of
them.

p seth

piseth pleasures, and setteth light by honour or glory, which is not potent. But thou seest how many things are wanting to this man also. For sometimes he wanteth necessaries, and is perplexed with anxieties, and being not able to ridde himselfe, ceaseth to be powerfull, which was the thing he onely aymed at. The like discourse may be made of honours, glory, pleasures. For since euery one of these things is the same with the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest, obtaineth not that, which hee desireth. VVhat then? (quoth I) If one should desire to haue them altogether, he should wish for the summe of happinesse, but shall hee find it in these things, which wee haue shewed cannot performe what they promise? No (quoth I) where-

wherfore we must by no meanes
seeke for happinesse in these things,
which are thought to afford the se-
uerall portions of that, which is to
be desired. I confesse it (quoth I)
and nothing can be more true then
this. Now then (quoth she) thou
hast both the forme and causes of
false felicitie, cast but the eyes of thy
minde on the contrary, and thou
shalt presently espie the true happy-
nesse, which we promised to shew
thee. This (quoth I) is euident, e-
uen to him that is blind, and thou
shewedst it a little before, while
thou endeououredst to lay open the
causes of the false. For, if I bee not
deceiuied, ^c that is true and perfect
happinesse, which maketh a man
sufficient, potent, respected, famous,
joyfull. And that thou maist know
that I vnderstood thee aright, that
which

Wherein
true hap-
piness con-
sisteth.

which can truely performe any one
of these because they are all one, I
acknowledge without all doubt
to be full and perfect happiness.
O my scholler, I thinke thee happy
by hauing this opinion, if thou ad-
dest this also. What? (quoth I.)
Doest thou imagine that there is
^d any mortall or fraile thing, which
can cause this happy estate? I doe
not (quoth I) and that hath beene
so proued by thee, that more can-
not be desyred. Wherefore these
things seeme to afford men the i-
mages of the true good, or certaine
vnperfect goods, but they cannot
giue them the true and perfect
good it selfe. I am of the same
mind (quoth I.) Now then since
thou knowest, wherein true happi-
ness consisteth, and what haue
only a false shew of it, it remai-
neth

^d No mor-
tall thing
can cause
true happi-
ness.

neth that thou shouldest learne,
where thou maiest seeke for this
which is true. This is that (quoth
I) which I haue long earnestly ex-
pected. But since as *Plato* teacheth
(in *Timæo*) we must implore Gods
assistance euен in our least affaires,
what thinkest thou, must wee doe
now, that we may deserue to find
the seat of that Soueraigne good?
we must (quoth I) inuocate the fa-
ther of all things, without whose
remembrance no beginning hath a
good foundation. Thou sayest
rightly (quoth shee) and withall
sung in this sort.

THE IX. VERSE,
*Phylosophy craueth Gods assistance for
the discouery of true happiness.*

O Thou, that doest the world in lasting order guide,
Father of heauen & earth, who mak'st time swiftly
And stading stil thy selfe yet fram'st all moving laws. (slide,
VPphoto to thy worke wert mou'd by no exterrall cause:

But by a sweete desire, where enuse hath no place,
 Thy goodnesse moving thee to giue each thing his grace.
 Thou doest all creature, formes from highest patterne stake,
 From thy faire mind, the world faire like thy selfe dost make.
 Thusthou perfect the whole, perfect each part dost frame.
 Thou temp'rest elements, making cold mixe with flame,
 And drie things stoyne with moist, least fire away should flic,
 Or earth opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.
 Thou in ^a consenting parts fiely disposed hast
 Thy all moving ^b soule in ^c midst of threefold nature plac't,
 VVhich ^d cut in severall parts, that runne a diff'rent race,
 Intoit ^e selfe returnes, and circling doth embrace
 The ^f highest mind, & heauen with ^g like proportion drives.
 Thou also with like cause ^h doest make the soules, & ⁱ lesser
 And k those in ^l charyots beare, and fiely them inspire
 Issues into the heauen and earth, which with returning ^m fire
 Goe backe againe to thee their anhour and their end.
 Deare Father let my mind thy glorious seat ascend,
 Let me behold the spring of grace and find thy light,
 That I on thee may fixe my soules well cleared sight
 Cast off the earthly weight, wherewith I am opprest,
 Shine as thou art most bright, thou onely calme and rest
 To pious men, whose end is to behold thy ray,
 VVho their beginning are, their guide, their bound, and way.
 I In starres according to the Platonists. ^m Of loue and charity.

^a The diffe-
rent orbes
of heauen.

^b The An-
gell, which
moueth the
heauen.

^c Btwixt
God, and
men.

^d Diuided
into diffe-
rent moti-
ons of di-
uers hea-
uen.

^e Knowing
himselfe.

^f And like-
wise God.

^g Mouing
the heauen
according
to Gods ap-
pointment.

^h Of men.

ⁱ Of beasts, &c.


^k The soules of men.

^l In starres according to the Platonists.

^m Of loue and charity.

THE X. PROSE.

That there is some true happiness, and
where it is to be found.


 Herefore since thou hast
 seene what is the forme of
 perfect & vnperfect good,
 now

now I think we must shew in what this perfection of happiness is placed. And enquire first, whether there can bee any such good, extant in the world, as thou hast defined, least contrary to the truth, wee bee deceipted with an empty shew of knowledge- But it cannot bee denied, that there is some such thing, which is as it were the fountaine of all goodnessse. For all, that is said to be imperfect, is so tearemed for the want, it hath of perfection. Whence it followeth, that if in any kind we find something vnpfect, there must needs be something perfect also in the same kind. For if we take away perfection we cannot devise, how there should be any imperfection. For the nature of things began not from that which is defective and not compleate, but

proceeding from entire & absolute, falleth into that which is extreme and consumed. And if, as wee shewed before, there bee a certaine imperfect felicitei, of fraile goods, it cannot bee doubted, but that there is some solide and perfect happiness also. Thou hast (quoth I) concluded most firmly and most truely. Now where this good dwelleth (quoth shee) consider this. The common conceit of mens minds proueth, that God the Prince of all things is good. For since nothing can be imagined better then God, who doubteth but that is good, then which is nothing better? And reason doeth in such sort demonstrate God to bee good, that it conuinceth him to bee ^a perfectly good. For vnlesse hee were so, hee could not bee the chiefe

^a God is
perfectly
good.

of all things. For there would bee something better then hee, hauing perfect goodnessse, which could seeme to be more auncient and of longer continuance then he. For it is already manifest, that perfect things were before the imperfect. Wherefore, least our reason should haue no end, we must confesse, that the Soueraigne God is most full of Soueraigne and perfect goodnessse. But we haue concluded, that perfect goodnessse is true happinessse, wherefore ^b true happinessse must necessarily be placed in the most high god. I agree (quoth I) neither can this be any way contradicted.

^b True happinessse placed in God.

But I pray thee (quoth shee) see how holily and inuiolably thou approuest that, which we said, that the soueraigne God is most full of soueraigne goodnessse. How ? (quoth

(quoth I.) That thou presumest not , that this Father of all things , hath eyther ^c receyued from others , that soueraigne good , with which he is said to be replenished , or hath it naturally in such sort , that thou shouldest thinke , that the substance of the blessednesse , which is had , and of God who hath it , Were diuers . For if thou thinkest , that hee had it from others , thou mayest also inferre , that hee who gaue it , was better then the receiuer . But wee most worthily confesse , that hee is the most excellent of all things . And if he hath it by nature , but as a diuerse ^d thing , since wee speake of God the Prince of all things , let him that can , inuent , who vnited these diuerse things . Finally , that which is different from any thing , is not that , from which it is

^c God bath
not recei-
ued his
g o d n e s s e
from any
other .

^d Gods
goodnesse
is himself .

vnderstood to differ. VVherefore
that, which is naturally different
from the Soueraigne good , is not
the Soueraigne good it selfe .
VVhich it were impious to thinke
of God, then whom, we know cer-
tainely , nothing is better. For
doubtlesse, the nature of nothing
can be better, then the beginning of
it. VVherefore I may most truely
conclude, that, which is the begin-
ning of all things, to bee also in his
owne substance , the chiefest good.
Most rightly : (quoth I.) But it is
granted , that the chiefest good is
happinesse. It is,(quoth I.) VVher-
fore(quoth she)we must needs con-
fesse, that our happinesse it selfe is
God. I can neither contradict,
(quoth I) thy former propositions,
and I see this illation followeth
from them. Consider(sayeth she)
if

if the same be not more firmly pro-
ued hence, because there ^c cannot be
two chiefe goods the one different
from the other. For it is manifest
that of those goods, which differ,
the one is not the other, wherefore
neither of them can bee perfect,
wanting the other. But manifestly
that which is not perfect, is not the
chiefest, wherefore the chiefe goodes
cannot bee diuers. Now wee haue
proued that both blessednesse and
God are the chiefest good, wherfore
that must needes be the highest hap-
pinesse, which is the highest Diuini-
tie. There can be nothing (quoth
I) concluded, more truely in the
thing it selfe, nor more firmly in
arguynge, nor more worthy God
himselfe. Vpon this then (quoth
she) as the Geometricians are wont,
out of their propositions, which

^c There
cannot bee
two sou-
raigne
goods

they haue demonstrated to inferre something, which they call *ποριουατα* so will I giue thee as it were a *Corollarium*. For since that men are made blessed by the obtaining of blessednesse, and blessednesse is nothing else but Diuinitie, it is manifest that men are made happy by the obtaining of Diuinity. And as men are made iust by the obtaining of iustice, and wise by the obtaining of wisedome, so they who obtaine Diuinitie, must needs in like maner become Gods. Wherefore euery one that is happy is a God, but by nature there is onely one God, but there may bee many by ^f participation. This is (quoth I) an excellent and pretious *ποριουα* or *Corollarium*. But there is nothing more excellent then that, which reason perswaded vs to adde. What (quoth I) since (quoth

^f Men become Gods by participation.

(quoth shee) blessednesse seemeth to containe many things, whether they all concurre as diuers partes to the composition of one entire body of happinesse, or some one of them doeth accomplish the substance of blessednesse, to which the rest are to be referred. I desire (quoth I.) that thou wouldest declare this point, by the enumeration of the particulars. Doe we not thinke (quoth she) that happinesse is good? yea the chiefest good, (quoth I.) Thou maiest (quoth shee) adde this to them all. For happinesse is accounted the chiefest sufficiencie, the chiefest power, respect, fame, and pleasure. What then? are all these, sufficiencie, power and the rest as it were certaine members of blessednesse, or rather are they referred to good as to the head? I vnderstand (quoth I)

what thou proposest, but I desire to
heare what thou concludest. This
is the decision of this matter. If all
these were members of blessednesse,
they shoulde differ one from another.
For this is the nature of parts, that
being diuers they compose one bo-
dy. But wee haue proued, that all
these are one, and the same thing.
Wherefore they are no members, o-
therwise happinesse should be com-
pacted of one member, which can-
not bee. There is no doubt of this
(quoth I) but I expect that which is
behind. It is manifest that the rest
are referred to goodnesse; for suffici-
ency is desired, because it is esteemed
good, and likewise power, because
that likewise is thought to be good;
And we may conjecture the same of
respect, fame and pleasure. Where-
fore ⁸goodnesse is the summe and
cause

⁸ Goodnesse
is the sum
and cause
of all that is
desired.

cause of all that is desired. For that which is neither good indeed, nor beareth any shew of goodnessse, can by no meanes besought after. And contrariwise those things, which are not good of their owne nature, yet if they seeme such, are desired as if they were truely good. So that the summe, origen, and cause of all that is sought after, is rightly thought to be goodnessse. And that seemeth chiefly to be wished for, which is the cause, that other things are desired. As if one would ride for his health, he doth not so much desire the motion of riding, as the effect of health. Wherefore since all things are desired in respect of goodnessse, they are not so much wished for, as goodnessse it selfe. But we graunted that to be happinessse, for which other things are desired, wherefore in

^b goodnesse
and happi-
nesse alone

like manner onely blessednesse is sought after. by which it plainly appeareth, that ^bgoodnesse and happiness haue one and the selfe-same substance. I see not how any man can dissent. But wee haue shewed that God and true blessednesse are one and the selfe-same thing. It is so (quoth I) we may then securely conclude, that the substance of God consisteth in nothing else, but in goodnesse.

ⁱ The sub-
stance of
God consis-
teth in
goodnesse.

THE X. VERSE.

*Phylosophy exhorteth men to embrace
true happiness.*

Come hither all you, that are bound,
Whose base and earthly minds are drown'd
By lust, which doeth them tye in cruell chaynes :
Here is a seat for men opprest,
Here is a port of pleasant rest ;
Here may a wretch haue refuge from his paynes.
No gold, which ^a Tagus sands bestow,

^a A riuier in
Portugal or
Spaine.

Nor which on ^bHermes bankes doth flow,
Nor precious stones, which skorched Indians get,
Can cleare the shapeness of the mind,
But rather make it farre more blind.
And in farther depth of darkenesse set.
For this that sets our soules on worke
Buried in caues of earth doth lurke.
But heauen is guided by another light,
Which causeth vs to shunne the darke,
And who this light doth truely marke,
Must needs deny, that Phœbus beames are bright.

^b A riuier in Lydia.

THE XI. PROSE.

That goodnessse is the end of all things.



Consent (quoth I) for all
is grounded vpon most
firme reasons. But what
account wilt thou make
(quoth she) to know what good-
nessse it selfe is. I will esteeme it in-
finitely, (quoth I) because by this
meanes I shall come to know God
also, who is nothing else but good-
nessse. I will conclude this (quoth
shee)

shee) most certainly , if those things be not denied , which I haue already proued . They shall not (quoth I .) Haue wee not proued (quoth shee) that those things , which are desired of many , are not true and perfect goods , because they differ one from another , and being separated , cannot cause complete , and absolute goodnesse , which is only found , when they are vnited as it were into one forme and causality , that the same may be sufficiencie , power , respect , fame , and pleasure ? And except they be all one and the same thing , that they haue nothing worth the desiring ? It hath bin proued (quoth I) neyther can it be any way doubted of . Those things then , which when they differ , are not good , and when they are one , become good , are they not

not made good by obtayning vni-tie? so me thinke (quoth I.) But doest thou grant that all , that is good, is good by pertaking goodnesse? It is so. Thou mayest graunt then likewise , that ^a vnitie and goodnesse are the same. For those things haue the same substance, which naturally haue not diuers effects. I cannot denie it, (quoth I.) Knowest thou then (quoth shee) that ^b euery thing that is, doth so long remaine and subsist , as it is one, and perisheth and is dissoluued, so soone as it ceaseth to bee one. How ? As in liuing creatures, (quoth she) so long as the body and the soule remaine vnited, the liuing creature remaineth. But when this vnitie is dissoluued by their seperation, it is manifest that it perisheth, and is no longer a liuing creature. The body

^a Vnity and
goodnesse
the same.

^b Euery
thing conti-
nueth onely
so long, as it
is one.

body also it selfe, so long as it remai-
neth in one forme by the coniuncti-
on of the parts there appeareth the
likenesse of a man. But if the mem-
bers of the body being seperated
and sundred, haue lost their v-
nitie, it is no longer the same. And
in like maner it will bee manifest to
him that will descend to other par-
ticulars, that euery thing conti-
nueth so long as it is one, and perish-
eth when it looseth vnitie. Conside-
ring more particulars, I find it to bee
no otherwise. Is there ^c any thing
(quoth she) that in the course of na-
ture, leauing the desire of being, see-
keth to come to destruction & cor-
ruption? If(quoth I) I consider
living creatures, which haue any
nature to will and to nill, I find no-
thing, that without externe compul-
sion, forsake the intention to remain,
and

^c All things
desire to be.

and c^f their owne accord hasten to destruction. For euery liuing creature laboureth to preserue his health, and escheweth death and detriment. But what I should thinke of hearbs, and trees, and of all things without life, I am altogether doubtfull. But there is no cause why thou shouldest doubt of this, if thou considerest first, that hearbs and trees grow in places agreeable to their nature, where so much as their constitution permitteth , they cannot soone wither and perish. For some grow in fields, other vpon hils, some in fennie, other in stonie places , and the barren sands are fertile for some, which if thou wouldest transplant into other places , they dye . But nature giueth euery one that which is fitting, and striveth to keepe them from

from decaying so long as they can
remaine. What should I tell thee, if
all of them, as it were thrusting their
head into the ground, draw nou-
rishment by their rootes, and con-
uey substance and barke by the in-
ward pith? VVhat, that alway the
softest, as the pith is placed within,
and is couered with more firme
wood, and last of all the bark is ex-
posed to the weather, as being best
able to beare it off: And how great
is the diligence of nature, that all
things may continue by the multi-
plication of seede; all which who
knoweth not to bee, as it were cer-
taine engines, not onely to remaine
for a time, but successiuely in a ma-
ner to endure for euer. Those things
also which are without all life, doth
not euery one inlike maner desire
that, which appertaineth to their
owne

owne good? For why doth leuitie lift vp flames, or heauiness weigh downe the earth, but because these places and motions are conuenient for them? And that which is agreeable to euery thing, conserueth it, as that which is opposite, causeth corruption. Likewise those things which are hard, as stones, sticke most firmly to their parts, & make great resistance to any dissolution. And liquid things, as ayer and wa-
ter, are indeed easily deuided, but doe easily also ioyne againe. And fire flyeth all deuision. Neither doe we now treate of the voluntary mo-
tions of the vnderstanding soule, but onely of naturall operations. Of which sort is, to digest that, which wee haue eaten, without thinking of it, to breath in our sleepe not thinking what wee doe.

For

For eu'en in liuing creatures the loue
of life proceedeth not from the wil
of the soule, but from the principles
of nature. For the will many times
embraceth death vpon vrgent occa-
sions, which nature abhorreth; and
contrariwise the act of generation,
by which alone the continuance of
mortal things is maintained, is som-
times bridled by the will, though
nature doth alwyay desire it. So true
it is, that this selfe-loue proceedeth
not from any voluntary motion,
but from naturall intention. For
prouidence gaue to h̄r creatures
this as the greatest cause of continu-
ance, that they naturally desire to
continue so long as they may,
wherefore there is no cause, why
thou shouldest any way doubt,
that al things, which are, desire na-
turally stabilitie of remaining, and
eschue

eschue corruption. I confess (quoth
I) that I now see vndoubtedly that,
which before seemed very doubt-
full. Now that (quoth she) which
desireth to continue and remaine,
seeketh to haue vnity. For if this be
taken away, being it selfe cannot
remaine. It is ^dtrue (quoth I.) All
things then (quoth she) desire vn-
tie. I granted it to be so. But wee
haue shewed that vnity is the same
that goodnesse. You haue indeede.
All ^e things then desire goodnesse,
which thou mayest define thus :
That goodnesse is that, which is
desired of all things. There can be
nothing imagined more true. For
either all things haue reference to
nothing, and being destitute as it
were of one head, shall be in confu-
sion without any ruler: or if there be
any thing, to which al things hastē,

^d All things
desire vnity.

^e All thing
desire goo-
nesse.

that must bee the chieftest of all goods. I reioyce too much Q scholler (quoth shee) for thou hast fixed in thy mind the very marke of veritie. But in this thou hast discouered that , which a little before thou saideſt , thou wert ignorant of. What is that ? (quoth I.) What the end of all things is (quoth she.) For certainly it is that , which is desired of all things , which ſince we haue concluded to bee goodneſſe , wee muſt alſo confeſſe that ^f goodneſſe is the end of all things.

^f Goodnes
is the end
of al thing:

T H E XI. V E R S E.

*How we may attaine to the knowl-
edge of truth.*

HE that would ſeeke the truth with thoughtes profound,
And would not stray in waies which are not right,
He to himſelfe muſt turne his inward ſight,
And gurd his motions in a circled round,
Teaching his mind, what euer ſhe diſigne,

Her selfe in her owne treasures to posseſſe :
 So that, which late lay hidde in cloudineſſe,
 More bright and cleere then Phœbus beames ſhall ſhine.
 Fleſh bath not quenched all the ſpirits light,
 Though this oblivious lump holds her oppreſſe.
 Some ſeede of truſh remaineth in our breſt,
 Which ſkilfull learning eaſily doth excite.
 For being aſk, how can we anſwers be true
 Unleſſe that grace within our hearts diſt dwelleſſe?
 If Platoes beauitly muſe the truſh vs tell,
 We learning things, ^a remember them anew.

^a This was
Platoes o-
pinion, but
the truth is,
that know-
ledge is go-
ten by in-
uenſion, &
inſtruction
ſuppoſing
that one
hath the
light of vnde-
ſtanding
which is ca-
pable of it.

THE XII. PROSE.

How the world is gouerned by God.

Then I ſaid, that I did verie wel like of Platoes doctrin, for ſhe had brought these things to my remembrance now the ſecond time. First, because I lost their memorie by the contagion of my bodie, and after when I was oppreſſed with the burthen of grieſe. If (quoth ſhe) thou reſelecteſt upon that, which heretofore hath beene granted, thou wilt not be farre of from remembring that, which in

the beginning thou confessedst thy
selfe to bee ignorant of. VVhat
(quoth I.) By what gouernment
(quoth she) the world is ruled. I re-
member (quoth I) that I did con-
fesse my ignorance , but though I
foresee what thou wilt say , yet I
desire to heare it more plainly from
thy selfe. Thou thoughtest a little
before, that it was not to be doubt-
ed, that the ^a world is gouerned by
God ; neither doe I thinke now
(quoth I) neither wil I euer thinke,
that is to be doubted of, and I will
briefely explicate the reasons, which
moue me to think so. This world
could neuer haue beene compacted
of so many diuers and contrarie
parts, vnlesse there were one, that
doth vnite these so differēt things;
and this disagreeing diuersity of na-
tures being vntited, would separate
and

^aThe world
is gouerned
by God.

and diuide this concord, vnlesse there were one that holdeth together that, which he vnited. Neither would the course of nature continue so certaine, nor hold so well ordered motions in due places, times, causalitie, spaces and qualities, vnlesse there were one, who himselfe remaining quiet, disposeth and ordereth this varietie of motions. This, whatsoeuer it bee, by which things created continue and are moued, I cal God, a name which all men vse. Since (quoth shee) thou art of this mind, I thinke with litile labour, thou mayest be capable of felicity, and returne to thy countrey in safetie. But let vs consider, what we proposed. Haue we not placed sufficiency in happines, and granted, that God is blessednes it selfe ? Yes truely. VVherefore

(quoth shee) hee needeth no outward helps to gouerne the woild, otherwise, if he needeth any thing, he hath not full sufficiency, That (quoth I) must necessarily bee so.

^b God dis-
poseth all
things by
himselfe,
that is by
goodnesse.

VVherefore ^b he disposeseth al things by himselfe. No doubt hee doeth (quoth I.) But it hath beene proued that God is goodnesse it selfe. I remember it very well (quoth I.) Then hee disposeseth all things by goodnesse: since he gouerneth all things by himselfe, whom we haue granted to be goodnesse.

And this is as it were the stearne and gouernement, by which the frame of the woild is kept stedfast and vncorrupted. I most willingly agree (quoth I) and I foresaw a little before, though onely with a slender guesse, that thou wouldest conclude this. I beleue thee (quoth shee) for

now

now I suppose thou lookest more
watchfully about thee to discerne
the truth, but that which I wil say is
no lesse manifest. What? (quoth I.)
Since that God is deseruedly thought
to gouerne al things with the stearne
of goodnessse, and all these things
likewise, as I haue shewed, hasten to
goodnesse with their naturall inten-
tion, can there be any doubt made,
but that they are gouerned willingly,
and that they frame themselues
of their owne accord to their dis-
posers becke, as agreeable and con-
formable to their ruler? It must
needes bee so (quoth I) neither
would it seeme an happy gouer-
ment, if it were an imposed yoake,
not a desired health. There is ^d no-
thing then which following nature,
endeououreth to resist God. No-
thing (quoth I.) VVhat if any thing

^c All things
are willing-
ly gouerned
by God.

^d Nothing
either will
or can resist
God.

doeth endeuour (quoth she) can any thing preuaile against him, whom we haue granted to be most powerfull by reason of his blessednesse? No doubt (quoth I) nothing could preuaile. Wherefore there is nothing, which either will or can resist this soueraigne goodnesse. I thinke not (quoth I.) It is then the soueraigne goodnesse, which gouerneth all things strongly, and dispaseth them sweetly. When (quoth I) how mch (quoth I) doeth not onely the reason, which thou alleagest, but much more the very words, which thou vsest, delight mee, that folly which bauleth forch great things, may at length bee ashamed of her selfe. Thou hast heard in the Poets Fables how the Gyants prouoked heauen, but this benigne fortitude put the also down, as they de-

1. Quid Lib.
2. Metamor.
& Macrob.
Lib. 1. Sa.
turnat.

deserued. But wilt thou haue me
vrge farther by way of disputati-
on? perhaps by this arguing there
will flie out some beautifull sparke
of truth. As it pleaseeh thee (quoth
I.) No man can doubt (quoth she)
but that God is Almighty. No man
(quoth I) that is well in his wittes.
But (quoth shee) there is nothing,
that he , who is Almighty, cannot
doe. Nothing (quoth I.) Can
God do euil ? No (quoth I.) Wher-
fore (quoth shee) ^f Euill is no-
thing, since hee cannot doe it, who
can doe any thing. Doest thou
mocke mee (quoth I) making
with thy reasons an inextricable
labyrinth, that now thou maist go
in where thou meanest to goe out
againe, and after goe out, where
thou camest in , or doest thou
frame a wonderful circle of the sim-
plicity

^f Euill is no-
thing.

plicity of God ? For a little before
taking thy beginning from blessed-
nesse, thou affirmedst that to be the
chiefest good , which thou saydest
was placed in God , and likewise
thou prouedst, that God himselfe is
the chiefest good, and ful happines,
out of which thou madest mee a
present of that inference , that no
man shall be happy, vnlesse hee bee
also a God. Againe thou toldest me,
that the forme of goodnes is the
substance of God and of blessed-
nes , and that vnyt is the same with
goodnes, because it is desired by the
nature of all things , thou didst al-
so dispute, that God gouerneth the
whole world with the reynes of
goodnes , and that all things obey
willingly, and that there is no na-
ture of euill , and thou didst expli-
cate all these things with no for-
reine

reine or farre fetched proofes , but with those which were proper and drawen from inward principles, the one confirming the other ; We neither play nor mock (quoth she) and wee haue finished the greatest matter, that can be by the assistance of God , whose aide we implored in the beginning . For such is the forme of the diuine substance , that it neither is diuided into outward things , nor receiueth any such into it self , but as Parmenides saith of it : *πάντος ἐν κύκλοις σέρειν εναλίγκον οὐκον*
 And if wee haue vsed no farre fetched reasons , but such as were placed within the compasse of the matter we handled , thou hast no cause to marueile , since thou hast learned in Platoes schoole , that our speeches must be like , and as it were akinne to the things we speake of .

Vndique in
circulis ducis
similem a-
cerum.

THE

g Our spe-
ches must
be like the
things we
speake of.

THE XII. VERSE.

Philosophy exhorteth to perfeuerance
in contemplation and vertue.

² Orpheus.

Happy is he that can behold
The wel-spring, whence all good doth rise,
Happy is he, that can unfold
The bands, with which the earth him tyes.
The ^a Thracian Poet, whose sweete song
Perform'd his wines sad obsequyes,
And forc't the woods to runne along,
When he his mournfull tunes did play,
Whose powerfull musicke was so strong,
That it could make the riuers stay;
The fearefull Hynds not daunted were,
But with the Lions tooke their way,
Nor did the Hare behold with feare
The Dogge, whom these sweete notes appease.
When force of griefe drew yet more neare,
And on his heart did strongly seaze,
Nor tunes, which all in quiet bound
Could any iotte their master ease,
Complayning of his greevous wound,
And Plutoes Pallace visiting,
He mixt sweet verses with the sound
Of his loud harpes delightfull string,
All that he dranke with thirsty draughts
From his high mothers chieffest spring,

All

All that his restlesse griefe him taught,
 And loue, which giveth griefe double aide,
 With this eu'en hell it selfe was caught
 Whether he went, and pardon pray'd
 For his deare spouse, (unheard request)
 The vgly porter was dismayd,
 Rauish't with this unmonted guest,
 The furies, which in tortures keepe
 The guilty soules with paines opprest,
 Mou'd with his song began to weepe.
 Ixions ^b wheele now standing still
 Turnes not his head with motions steepe.
 Though ^c Tant alus might drinke at will,
 To quench his thirst he would forbear.
 The Vulture full with musick shrill
 Doth not poore ^d Titius liner teare.
 We by his verses conquer'd are,
 Saith the great King whom spirits feare.
 Let vs not then from him debarre
 His wife, whom he with songs doth gaine,
 Yet lest our gift should stretch too farre,
 We will it with this law restraine,
 That when from hell he takes his flight,
 He shall from looking backe refraine.
 Who can for louers lawes endite?
 Loue hath no law, but her owne will.
 Orpheus seeing in th' end of night
 Euridice doth loose and kill
 Her and himselfe with foolish loue,
 But you this fained talefull,

^b With
which he is
tormented
in hell for
attempting
to commit
adultery
with Lao.

^c Who kil-
led his own
sonne to en-
tertaine the
Gods, and
therefore is
tormented
with hun-
ger & thirst.

^d Who
would have
committed
adultery
with La-
o-na Apolloes
mother, or
with Dians.

Who

Boetius his

Who thinke unto the day abone
To bring with speede your darke some mind.
For if your eyes (conquerd) you mone
Backward to Pluto left behind,
All the rich pray, which thence you tooke,
You loose, while backe to hell you looke.

THE






THE
FOVRTH BOOKE
OF BOETIVS.

Conteining the reasons, why
God permitteth euill.

THE I. PROSE.

*Boetius merueileth at the impunitie and
prosperitie of euill men.*



Hen Philosophy had
sung these verses with
a soft & sweete voice,
obseruing due digni-
tie and grauitie in her
coun-

countenance and gesture, I not ha-
uing altogether forgotten my in-
ward griefe, interrupted her speach,
which shee was about to continue,
and sayed, O thou, who bringest vs
to see true light, those things, which
hetherto thou hast treated of, haue
manifestly appeared to bee Diuine
in their owne knowledge, and in-
vincible by thy reasons, and thou
hast said, that though the force of
griefe had made me forget them of
late, yet heretofore I was not alto-
gether ignorant of them. But this
is the chiefest cause of my sorrow,
that, since the gouernour of all
things is so good, there can either
be any euill at all, or passe vnpunish-
ed. Which alone I beseech thee con-
sider, how much admiration it de-
serueth. But there is another grea-
ter then this, for wickednesse bea-
ring

ring rule and sway , vertue is not
onely without reward ; but lieth
also troden vnder the wickeds feer,
and is punished in stead of vice.
That which things should be done
in the kingdome of God, who kno-
weth all things , can doe all things,
but will doe onely that , which is
good , no man can sufficiently ad-
mire nor complaine. To which
she answered , It were indeede infi-
nitly strange , and surpassing all
monsters , it , as thou conceiuest , in
the best ordered house of so great
an houſholder , the vileſt vſeſels
were made account of , and the
preſious neglected , but it is not ſo.
For if those things which were a lit-
tle before concluded , be kept vnu-
olated , thou ſhalt by his helpe , of
whofe kingdome we ſpeake , know ,
that the good are alway powerfull ,

N. and

and the euill alway abiect and
weake, & that vices are neuer with-
out punishment, nor vertue with-
out reward, and that the good are
alway prosperous, and the euil vn-
fortunate, and many things of
that sort, which will take away all
cause of complaint, and giue thee
firme and sollide strength. And
since by my meanes thou hast al-
ready seene the forme of true bles-
sednesse, and knownen where it is
placed, running ouer all those
things, which I thinke necessary to
let passe, I will shew thee the way,
which will carry thee home. And
I will also fasten wings vpon thy
mind, with which shee may rouse
herselfe, that al perturbation being
driuen away, thou mayest re-
turne safely into thy countrey by
my direction, by my path, and
with my wings.

THE

THE I. VERSE.

How Phylosophy bringeth men to the contemplation of God.

For I haue swift and nimble wings, which will ascend the lofty skyes,
With which when thy quick mind is clad it wil the louathed earth dispise
And goe beyond the airy g'lobe, and wety cloudes behind it leue
Passing the fire, which skorching heat deth from the heauens swift courseré
Vntill it reach the starry house, and get to tredae bright Phabus wases(ceuse),
loyning it selfe in company with aged Saturnes lightsome rates,
And trace the cricles of the starres, which in the night to vs appeare,
And hausing staid there long enough goe on beyond the farthest sphere.
Sitting vpon the highest urbe partaker of the glorious light,
VWhere highest King his Scepter holds, and the werlās raines deth guide a-
And in his Charsot standing firme, deth euery thing in order set. (right.)
Unto this seat when thou art brought, ely countrey, which thou didst forget,
Thou then wist challenge to thy selfe, saying this is the glorious land.
VViere I was borne and in this soile my feet for euermore shall stand.
VVlience if thou pleasest to beholde the earthly might, which thou hast left,
Those Tyrannys, which the people feare, will see me of their true home bereft.

THE II. PROSE.

That good men are powerfull, and euill men weake.



H (quoth I.) How great things doest thou promise?
And I doubt not but thou

^a Good
men are
powerfull,
and euill
men weake

canst performe them , wherefore
stay me not now , that thou hast
stirred vp my desire . First then
(quoth she) that^a good men are al-
way powerfull , and euill men of
no strength , thou mayest easily
knowe , and the one is proued by
the other . For since that good and
euill are contraries , if it be conuin-
ced , that goodnessse is potent , the
weakenesse of euil will be also ma-
nifest ; and contrariwise if we dis-
cerne the frailty of euill , wee must
needes acknowledge the firmenes
of goodnessse . But that our opini-
on may be more certainlye embrac-
ed , I will take both waies , confir-
ming my propositions , sometime
from one part , sometime from an-
other . There bee two things , by
which all humane actions are ef-
fected , will and power , of which
if

if either be wanting, there can nothing be performed. For if there want will¹, no man taketh any thing in hand against his will, and if there be not power, the will is in vaine. So that, if thou seest anie willing to obtaine that, which he doth not obtaine, thou canst not doubt, but that he wanted power to obtaine, what he would. It is manifest (quoth I.) and can by no meanes be denied. And wilt thou doubt, that he could, whō thou seest bring to passe, what he desired? No. But euery man is mighty in that which he can doe, & weake in that, which he cannot doe. I confessē it (quoth I.) Doest thou remember then (quoth she) that it was inferred by our former discourses, that all the intention of mans will doth hasten to happiness, though their courses

be diuers? I remember (quoth I)
that that also was proued. Re-
membrist thou also that blessed-
nesse is goodnesse it selfe, and con-
sequently when blessednesse is
sought after , goodnesse must of
force be desired ? I haue that also
fixt in my memory. Wherefore all
men both good and bad , without
difference of intentions endeuour
to obtaine goodnesse. It followeth
(quoth I.) But it is certaine, that
men are made good by the obtay-
ning of goodnesse. It is so. Where-
fore good men obtaine what they
desire. So it seemeth. And if euill
men did obtaine the goodnes they
desire, they could not be euill. It is
true. VWherefore since they both
desire goodnesse , but the one ob-
teineth it , and the other not , there is
no doubt but that good men are
power-

powerfull, and the euill weake. Whosoever doubteth of this (quoth I) hee neither considereth the nature of things, nor the cone-quence of thy reasons. Againe (quoth shee) if there bee two, to whom the same thing is proposed according to nature, and the one of them, bringeth it perfectly to passe with his naturall function; but the other cannot exercise that natural function, but after another manner, then is agreeable to nature, & doth not perform that, which he had proposed, but imitateth the other who performeth it: Which of these two wilt thou judge to bee more powerfull? Though I conjecture (quoth I) at thy meaning, yet I desire to heare it more plaine-ly. VVilt thou denie (quoth shee) that the motion of walking is a-

greeable to the nature of men ? No (quoth I.) And makest thou any doubt, that the function of it doth naturally belong to the feet? There is no doubt of this neither (quoth I.) Wherfore if one, that can go vpon his feete, doeth walke, and another , who hath not this naturall function of his feete, endeuoureth to walke by creeping vpon his hands : which of these two is deseruedly to bee esteemed the stronger. Inferre the rest (quoth I) for no man doubteth , but that hee which can vse that naturall function is stronger then he which cannot. But (quoth she) the good seeke to obtaine the chieffest good, which is equally proposed to badde and good , by the naturall function of vertues , but the euill endeuour to obtaine the same by diuers concupiscenses,

piscenses, which are not the natural function of obtaining goodnesse. Thinkest thou otherwise ? No (quoth I) for it is manifest , what followeth. For by force of that which I haue already granted, it is necessary, that good men are powerfull, and euil men weake. Thou runnest rightly (quoth she) and it is (as Physitions are wont to hope) a token of an erected and resisting nature. VVherefore, since I see thee most apt and willing to comprehend , I will therefore heape vp manie reasons together. For consider the great weakenesse of vicious men , who cannot come so farre , as their naturall intention leadeth, and almost compelleth the. And what ? If they were destitute of this so great and almost invincible helpe of the direction
of

of nature? Ponder likewise the immense impotency of wicked men. For they are no light or trifling rewards, which they desire, and cannot obtaine: but they faile in the very summe and toppe of things: neither can the poore wretches compasse that, which they onely labour for nights and daies: in which thing the forces of the good eminently appeare. For as thou wouldest iudge him to be most able to walke, who going on foote could come as farre, as there were any place to goe in: so must thou of force iudge him most powerful, who obtaineth the end of all, that can be desired, beyond which there is nothing. Hence that which is opposite also followeth, that the same men are wicked, and destitute of all forces. For why doe they sol-
low

low vices, forsaking vertues? By ignorance of that which is good? But what is more deuicide of strength then blind ignorance? Or do they know what they should embrace, but passion driueth them headlong the contrary way? So also intemperance make them fraile, since they cannot stiue against vice. Or doe they wittingly and willingly forsake goodnessse, and decline to vices? But in this sort they leaue not onely to be powerfull, but euen to be at all. For they which leaue the common end of all things which are, leaue also being. Which may perhaps seeme strange to some, that we should say, that euill men are not at all, who are the greatest part of men: but yet it is so. For I denie not, that euill men are euill, but withall I say that^b purely and simply

^b Euill men
simply have
no being a
all.

plie they are not.

For as thou mayest call a carcasse a dead man, but not simply a man, so I confesse, that the vicious are euill, but I cannot grant that absolutely they are. For that is, which retaineth order, and keepeth nature, but that, which faileth from this, leaueth also to be that, which it is in his owne nature. But thou wilt say, that euill men can do many things, neither will I deny it, but this their power proceedeth not from forces, but from weaknesse. For they can doe euill, which they could not doe, if they could haue remained in the performance of that, which is good. Which possibilitie declareth more evidently that they can do nothing. For if, as wee concluded a little before, euill is nothing, since ^c they can onely doe euill, it is manifest, that

^c Euill men
can doe no-
thing.

that they can doe nothing. It is plaine. And that thou maist vnderstand, what the force of this power is; we determined a little before, that there is nothing more powerful then the Soueraigne goodnesse. It is true (quoth I.) But he cannot doe euill. No. Is there any then (quoth she) that thinke that men can doe all things? No man, except he be mad, thinketh so. But yet men can doe euill. I would to God, they could not (quoth I.) Since therefore hee that can onely doe good, can doe all things, and they who can doe euill, cannot doe all things, it is manifest, that they which can doe euill, are the lesse potent. Moreouer, wee haue prouied that all power is to bee accounted among those things, which are to be wished for, and that all such things haue

refe-

reference to goodnesse, as to the ver-
y heighth of their nature. But the
possibilitie of committing wicked-
nesse cannot haue reference to
goodnesse. Wherfore it is not to be
wished for, & consequently it is ma-
nifest, possibility of euil is no power.
By all which the power of the good,
and the vndoubted infirmitie of the
euill appeareth. And it is manifest,
that that sentence of^d *Plato* is true;
that onely wise men can doe that,
which they desire, and that wicked
men practise indeed what they list,
but cannot performe what they
would. For they doe what they list
thinking to obtaine the good which
they desire, by those things which
cause them delight, but they obtain
it not, because shamefull actions
cannot arriue to happiness.

^d In Gorgia

THE

THE II. VERSE.

Kings are not potent, if they
be passionate.

The Kings, whom we behold
In highest glory plac't
And with rich purple grac't
Compaſt with ſoldiers bold.
Whose count'naunce ſhewes fierce threats,
Who with rash fury chide,
If any curbe the pride
Of their vaine glorious ſeates.
Yet inwardly oppreſt
They are with captives chaines,
For filthy luſt there raignes
And poijoneth their brest,
Wrath often them perplex,
Raising their minds like waues
Oft ſorrow makes them ſlaues
And ſliding hopes them vex.
So many Tyrants ſtill
Dwelling in one poore heart
Except they firſt depart
Shee cannot haue her will.

THE

THE III. PROSE.

*That good men are not without reward,
nor euill without punishments.*



Eest thou then, in what
myre wickednesse wallows,
and how clearely honesty
shineth? By which it is manifest,
that the good are neuer without re-
wards, nor the euill without pu-
nishments. For that, for which a-
ny thing is done, may deseruedly
seeime the reward of that action, as
to him that runneth a race, the
crown for which hee runneth, is
proposed as a reward. But we haue
shewed, that blessednesse is the selfe
same goodnes, for which all things
are done. Wherefore this ² good-
nesse is proposed as a common re-
ward for all humane actions, and
this

² Goodnes
the reward
of all hu-
mane acti-
ons.

this cannot be separated from those, who are good. For hee shall not rightly be any longer called good, who wanteth goodnessse : wherefore vertuous actions are not left without their due rewards. And how much soeuer the euill doe rage, yet the wise mans crowne wil not fade nor wither. For others wickedenesse depriueth not vertuous minds of their proper glory. But if hee should reioyce at any thing which hee hath from others , either he, who gaue it, or any other might take it away. But because euery mans vertue is the cause of it , then only he shall want his reward , when he leaueth to be vertuous. Lastly , since euery reward is therfore desired, because it is thought to be good, who can iudge him to bee deuoyd of reward, which hath goodnessse for his

possession ? But what reward hath
hee ? The most beautifull and the
greatest that can be. For remember
that *Corollarium*, which I presented
thee with a little before, as with a
rare and pretious iewell , and inferre
thus : since that goodnesse it selfe is
happinesse , it is manifest that all
good men euen by being good , are
made happy. But we agreed , that
blessed men are Gods. Wherfore
the reward of ^b good men , which
no time can waft , no mans power
diminish , no mans wickednesse ob-
scure , is to become Gods. Which
things being so , no wise man can
any way doubt of the inseparabile
punishment of the euill. For since
goodnesse and euill , punishment
and reward are opposite the one to
the other : those things , which wee
see fall out in the reward of good-
nesse ,

^a Good
men are
Gods.

nesse, must needs be answerable in a contrary maner, in the punishment of euill. Wherfore as to honest men, honesty it selfe is a reward, so to the wicked their very wickednesse is a punishment. And hee that is punished, doubteth not, but that he is afflicted with euill. Wherefore if they would truely consider their owne estate, can they thinke themselues free from punishment, whom wickednesse the worst of all euils; doth not onely touch, but strongly infect? But weigh the punishment, which accompanieth the wicked, by comparing it to the reward of the vertuous. For thou learnedst not long before, that whatsoever is at all, is one, and that vnyt is goodnesse, by which it followeth, that whatsoever is, must also bee good. And in this manner, whatsoever falleth

^c Wicked-
nesse the
punishment
of euill men

^d Euill men
ceale to be
that which
they were.

from goodnesse , ceaseth to be , by
which it followeth , that ^d euil men
leuae to be that , which they were .
But the shape of men , which they
they still retaine , sheweth them to
haue beene men , wherefore by em-
bracing wickenesse , they haue lost
the nature of men . But since vertue
alone can exalt vs aboue men , wic-
kednesse must needes cast those vn-
der the desert of men , which it hath
bereaued of that condition . Where-
fore thou canst not account him a
man , whom thou seest transformed
by vices . Is the violent extortour of
other mens goods carried away
with his couetous desire ? Thou
mayest liken him to a wolfe . Is the
angrie and vnquiet man alway
contending and brauling ? Thou
mayest compare him to a dogge .
Doeth the trecherous fel'ow reioyce
that

that hee hath deceiued others with his hidden fraudes? Let him be accounted no better then a fox. Doth the outragious fret and fume? Let him bee thought to haue a Lions mind. Is the feareful & timorous afraid without cause? Let him be esteemed like to Hares and Deares. Is the slow and stupide alway idle? He liueth an asses life. Doeth the light and vncertaine change his courses? Hee is nothing different from the birds. Is he diowned in filthy and vncleane lusts? He is entangled in the pleasure of stinking sinne. So that hee, ^e who leauing vertue, ceaseth to be a man, since he cannot be partaker of the Diuine condition, is turned into a beast.

^e Wicked
men are
beasts.

THE III. VERSE.

That vices are of greater force, then
enchauintments.

a The Isle b Mercurius. With

THe sailes, which wise Ulysses bore,
And shippes, which in the seas long time did stray,
The Easterne wind draue to that ^a shore,
Where the faire Goddessse Lady Circe lay
Daughter by birth to Phabus bright,
Who with enchanted cups and charmes did stay
Her guests, deceiu'd with their delight,
And into sundry figures them did change,
Being most skylfull in the night,
And secrete force of herbes and simplis strange,
Some like to savage bores and some
Like Lyons fierce, which daile use to range
Upon the Libyan plaines, become.
Others are charged to the shape and guise
Of rauious Wolues, and waxing dumbe
Fse honlirg in the stead of manly cries.
Others like to the Tigre rone,
Whick in the scorched Indian desert lies.
And though the ^bwinged sonne of Ioue
From these bewitched cups delightfull taſt
To keepe the famous Captaine stroke,
Yet them the greedy mariners imbrac't

With much desire till turn'd to swine
In stead of bread they fed on oken mast.
Now in their outward shape no sgre,
Nor shew remanes of any humane grace,
Only their minds unchaung'd repine
To see their bodies in such ugly case.
O feeble hand, and idle art,
Whiche though it could the outward lims deface
Yet had no force to change the heart.
For all the force of men giu is by Gods arme
Lyes hidden in their inmost part.
The poysons therefore, whith wthin them swarme
More deeplie pierce, and with more myght,
Fer to the body, though they doe no harme:
Yet on the soule they worke their spight.

THE IIII. PROSE.

Of the misery of wicked men.

Then said I, I confesse, and perceiue that thou affirmest not without cause, that the vicious, though they keepe the outward shape of men are in their

their inward state of mind changed into bruite beastes, But I would haue had them, whose cruell and wicked heart regeth to the harme of the good, restrained from executing this their malice. They are restrained (quoth shee) as shall bee proued in conuenient place. But yet if this ^a liberty, which they seeme to haue, be taken away, their punishment also is in great part releas'd. For, (which perhaps to some may seeme incredible) euill men must necessarily be more vnhappy, when they haue brought to passe their purposes, then if they could not obtaine what they desire. For if it bee a miserable thing to desire that, which is euill, it is more miserable to be able to performe it, without which the miserable will could not haue any effect. Wherfore since every one

^a The misery of the wicked encreaseth with their power.

one of these hath their peculiar misery, they must of force bee oppressed with a threefold wretchednesse, whom thou seest desire, be able, and performe wickednesse . I grant it (quoth I) but I earnestly wish, that they may soone be deliuered from this miserie hauing lost the power to performe their malice. They will loose it (quoth shee) sooner then perhaps either thou wouldest, or they themselues suppose. For in the short compasse of this life there is nothing so late, which the immortall soule thinketh to expect long, so that the great hope and highest attempts of the wicked are many times made frustrate with a suddaine and vnexpected ende, which in trueth maketh their miserie to bee in some measure.

For

^b The longer a man
is wicked,
the more miserable
he is.

For if wickednes make men miserable, the
^b longer one is wicked, the more miserable
he must needes be; And I should iudge him
the most vnhappy man, that may be, if death
at least did not end their malice. For if wee
haue concluded truely of the misery of wic-
kednesse, it is manifest, that the wretched-
nesse, which is euerlasting, must of force bee
infinite. A strange illation (quoth I) and
hard to bee granted: but I see, that those
things, which were granted before, agree
very well with these. Thou thinkest aright
(quoth she) but he that findeth difficultie to
yeeld to the conclusion, must either shew,
that somthing which is presupposid is false,
or that the combination of the proposi-
tions make not a necessary conclusion, other-
wise granting that, which went before, hee
hath no reason to doubt of the inference.
For this also, which I will conclude now,
will seeme no lesse strange, and yet follow-
eth as necessarily out of those things, which
are already assumed. What? (quoth I.)

^c Wicked
men more
happy, whe-
they are
punished,
then when
they escape.

^c That wicked men (quoth he) are more hap-
py being punished, then if they escaped the
hands of justice. Neither doe I now goe
about to shew that, which may come into
euery mans minde, that euill customes are
corrected

corrected by chastisement, and are reduced to vertue by the terroure of punishment, and that others may take example to auoid euill, but in another manner also I thinke vitiuous men, that goe vnpunished to be more miserable, although we haue no relation, nor respect to correction or example. And what other manner shall this be (quoth I.) besides these? Haue we not graunted (quoth shee) that the good are happy, and the euil miserable? We haue (quoth I.) If then (quoth she) somthing that is good be added to ones misery, is not hee happier then another, whose misery is desolate and solitary, without any participation of goodnessse? So it seemeth (quoth I.) What if there be some other euill annexed to this miserable man, who is deprivued of all goodnessse, besides, those,

those, which make him miserable, is hee not to bee accounted much more vnhappy then he, whose miserie is lightned by pertaking of goodnesse? Why not? (quoth I.) Then the wicked haue some good annexed when they are punished, to witte, the punishment it selfe, which by reason of iustice is good, and when they are not punished, they haue a farther euill, the very impunitie, which thou hast deseruedly graunted to bee an euill to wickednesse. I cannot deny it. Wherefore the vicious are farre more vnhappy, by escaping punishment vniustly, then by being iustly punished. But it is manifest, that it is iust, that the wicked be punished, and vniust that they should goe unpunished. VVho can deny that? But neither will any man deny this

this (quoth shee) that whatsoeuer is iust, is good, and contrariwise, that whatsoeuer is vniust, is euill. This followeth (quoth I) out of that, which hath beene concluded before. But I pray thee, leauest thou no punishments for the soules after the death of the body? And those great too (quoth shee.) Some of which I thinke to bee executed as sharpe punishments , and other as mercifull purgations. But I purpose not now to treate of those. But wee haue hetherto laboured, that thou shouldest perceiue the power of the wicked, which to thee seemed intollerable, to bee none at all, and that thou shouldest see, that those, whome thou complainedst went vnpunished, doe neuer escape without punishment for their wic-

wickednesse. And that thou shouldest learne , that the licence , which thou wishedst might soone end, is neither long, and the longer, the more miserable, and most vnhappy if it were euerlasting. Besides , that the wicked are more wretched being permitted to escape with iniust impunity, then being punished with iust seuerity. Out of which it followeth , that they are then more greeuously punished, when they are thought to goe scot-free. When I consider thy reasons (quoth I) I thinke nothing can bee said more truely. But if I returne to ^d the iudgements of men , who is there, that will thinke them worthy to be beleeuued, or so much as heard ? It is true (quoth shee) for they cannot lift vp their eyes accustomed to darkenesse , to behold the light of mani-

^a The blind
iudgments
of men.

manifest truth , and they are like those birds; whose sight is quickned by the night , and dimmed by the day. For while they looke vpon, not the order of things , but their owne affections, they thinke that licence and impunity to sinne, is happy. But see, what the eternall law establisheth. If thou appliest thy mind to the better , thou needest no iudgement to reward thee : thou hast ioyned thy selfe to the more excellent things. If thou declinest to that which is worse , neuer expect any other to punish thee , thou hast put thy selfe in a miserable estate ; as if by turnes thou lookest downe to the myerie ground ; and vp to heauen, all outward things ceasing , by thy very sight thou seemest sometime to be in the durt, and sometime present to the starres. But the common

men sort considereth not these things. VVhat then? Shall wee ioyne our selues to them, whom we haue proued to be like beasts? VVhat if one hauing altogether lost his sight, should likewise forget, that hee ever had any, and should thinke, that hee wanted nothing which belongeth to humane perfection; should we therefore thinke them blind, that see his folly? For they will not graunt that neither, which may be proued by as forcible reasons, ^cthat they are more vnhappy, than they which doe iniury, then they which suffer it. I would (quoth I) heare these reasons. Deniest thou (quoth she) that euery wicked man deserueth punishment? No. And it is many wayes cleare, that the vicious are miserable. It is true (quoth I.) If then (quoth shee) thou

^c They
which doe
iniury are
more vnhappy,
than
they which
suffer it.

thou wert to examine this cause, whom wouldest thou appoint to be punished , him that did , or that suffred wrong ? I doubt not (quoth I) but that I woulde satisfie him that suffred ; with the sorrow of him that did it ! The offerer of the iniury then would seeme to thee more miserable , then the receiuier . It followeth (quoth I.) Hence therefore , and for other causes groundedvpon that principle , that dishonesty of it selfe maketh men miserable , it appeareth , that the iniury which is offered any man , is not the receiuers , but the doers misery . But now a dayes (quoth she) orators take the contrary course . For they endeavour to draw the judges to commiseration of them , who haue suffred any greeuous afflictions , whereas pitty is more iustly due to the causers there .

of, who should be brought not by angry, but rather by fauourable and compassionate accusers to iudgement, as it were sicke men to a Phy-sition, that their diseases and faults might bee taken away by punishments, by which meanes the defenders labour, would either wholly cease, or if they had rather profit in some sort, they would change their defence into accusations. And the wicked themselues, if they could behold the least part of vertue at some little rift, and perceiue that they might be deliuered from the filth of sinne by the affliction of punishments, in respect of obtaining vertue, they would not esteeme of torments, and would refuse the assistance of their defenders, and wholly resigne themselues to their accusers and judges. By which meanes

meanes it commeth to passe , that
f in wise men there is no place at all
for hatred . For , who but a verie
foole would hate the good ? And to
hate the wicked were against rea-
son . For as faintnesse is a disease of
the bodie , so is vice a sickenesse of
the mind . VVherefore , since wee
judge those , that haue corporall in-
firmities , to bee rather worthy of
compasslion , then of hatred , much
more are they to be pitied , and not
abhorred , whose minds are oppres-
sed with wickednesse the greatest
malady that may be .

^f A wise
man hateth
none .

THE III. VERSE .

No man is to be hated , the good are to be
loued , and the euill to be pittied .

VVhy should we strive to die so many waies ,
And slay ourselues with our own hands ,

Boetius his

If we seeke death, shee ready stands,
She willing comes, her passage never stayes.
Those against whome the wild beasts armed be,
Are arm'd against themselves with rage.
Doe they such warres uniuistly wage,
Because their lynes, and manners disagree,
And so themselves with mutual weapons kill.
Alas, but this reuenge is small.
Wouldest thou give due desert to all?
Love then the good, and pity thou the ill.

THE V. PROSE.

Boetius complaineth, that prosperity and
aduersity are common both to good
and badde.

 See (quoth I) what felicity, or mi-
sery is placed in the deserts of ho-
nest, and dishonest men. But I
consider that there is somewhat
good, or euill cuen in this popular fortune.
For no wise man had rather liue in banish-
ment, pouerty and ignominie, then prosper
in his owne countrey, being rich, respected,
and powerfull. For in this manner is the
office of wisedome performed with more
credite and renowne, when the gouernours
happinesse is participated by their people;

so

so chiefly because prisons, chaines, and other torments of legall punishments are rather due to pernitious subiects, for whom they were also ordained. Wherefore I much marueile, why these things are thus turned vpside downe, and the punishments of wickednesse oppresse the good, while euill men obtaine the rewards of the good. And I desire to know of thee, what may seeme to be the reason of so vnjust confuson. For I would marueile lesse, if I thought that all things were disordered by casuall euent. Now God being the gouernour, my astonishment is encreased, because since that hee distributeth oftentimes that which is pleasanter to the good, and that which is distastfull to the badd, and contrariwise aduersity to the good, and prosperity to the euill, vnlesse we find out the cause hereof; what difference may there seeme to bee betwixt this, and accidentall chances? It is no marueile (quoth she) if any thing be thought temerarious and confused, when wee knowe not the order it hath. But although thou beest ignorant of the causes why things be so disposed, yet because ^a the world hath a good gouernour, doubt not, but all things are well done.

^a We must
thinke that
God doth
all things
wel, though
we under-
stand not
the reason
of his do-
ings.

Boetius his

THE V. VERSE.

Admiration ceaseth, when the causes of
things are knowne.

a Steffchorus
and Pindar
rus the ought
that the
moone was
eclipsed by
longe, and
therfore to
hinder it,
they caused
the belles to
be rung out
of order. See
Iuu. nall.
S. tyt. 6.

Vho knows not how the stars neare to the poles doe
and how doores his stellare waine doth guide, (slide
And why he sets so late, and doth so early rise,
May wonder at the courses of the skyes.
If when the moone is full, her hornes seeming pale to sight,
Infested with the darkenesse of the night
And Stars from which all grace she with her brightnes tooke,
Now shew them selues while she doth dimly looke.
A publicke errour straight through vulgar minds doth passe,
And they with many breakes beate upon brasse.
None wonders, why the winds upon the waters blew,
Nor why loate Phatus leavis dissolueit eynow.
These easie are to know, the other hidde[n] be,
And therfore more our hearts they terrifie.
The strange events, which come to light more seldome bringes,
And the vaine people count as sudden things,
If we our clouded minds from ignorance coul'd free,
No longer would by vs admired be.

THE VI. PROSE.

Of prouidence and Fate, and why pro-
peritie and aduersitie are common both
to good and bad.

Tis true (quoth I) but
since it is thy profession to
explicate the caules of hid-
den

den things, & to vnsfold the reasons, which are couered with darkenesse, I beseech thee vouchsafe to declare this miracle, which troubleth me aboue all others. Then she smiling a little saide: thou invitest me to a matter, which is most ^a hardly found out, and can scarcely be sufficiently declared, for it is such, that one doubt being taken away, innumerable other, like the heads of ^b Hydra, succeed, neither will they haue any end, valesse a man repreesse them with the most liuely fire of his minde: for in this matter are wont to be handled these questions, Of the simplicitie of prouidence, of the course of fate, of sudden chaunces, of Gods knowledge and prædestination, and of free will, which, how weighty they are, thou thy selfe discernest.

^a How hard it is to find out the reason of gods prouidence

^b Which had 70. or 90. heads, and if one were cut off arose in the place.

But because it is a part of thy cure,
to know these things also, though
the time be short, yet wee will ende-
avour to touch them briefly. But
if the sweetnesse of verse delight
thee, thou must forbear this plea-
sure for a while, vntill I propose vnto
thee some fewe arguments. As
it pleaseth thee (quoth I.) Then tak-
ing as it were a new beginning, she
discoursed in this maner. The ge-
neration of all things, and all the
proceedings of mutable natures,
and whatsoeuer is moued in any
sort, take their causes, order, and
formes from the stabilitie of the
Divine mind. This placed in the
Castle of his owne simplicitie,
prefixeth manifolde wayes for
all that is to bee wrought or done;
which wayes being considered in
the purtie of Gods vnderstanding,
are

are named prouidence, but beeing referred to those things, which hee moueth and disposeth, they were by the ancients called Fate. The diuersitic of which will easily appeare, if we weigh the force of both. For ^c prouidence is the very Diuine reason it selfe, seated in the highest Prince, which disposeth all things; But ^d Fate is a disposition inhererent in changeable things, by which prouidence connecteth all things in their due order. For prouidence embraceth all things together, though diuers, though infinite; but Fate putteth euery particular thing into motion, beeing distributed by places, formes, & times: so that this vnfolding of temporall order being vnit in the foresight of Gods mind, is prouidence & the same vnit, being digested & vnfolded by times,

^c Proui-
dence

^d Fate.

Boetius his

times, is called fate. Which although they be diuers, yet the one dependeth on the other. For fatall order proceedeth from the simplicitie of prouidence. For as a workeman conceiuing the forme of any thing in his mind, taketh his worke in hand, and executeth by order of time, that which he had simply and presently foreseeene: So God by his prouidence disposeth whatsoeuer is to be done with simplicitie and stabilitie: And by fate effecteth by manifold and temporal waies those very things which he disposeth. Wherefore, ^e whether fate bee exercised by the subordination of certaine Divine spirits to prouidence, or this fatall webbe be wouen by the seruice of the soule; of all nature, or of the heauenly motions of the Starres; off angelicall vertue, or of diabolical

^e Diuers o
pinions of
ancient
philoso
phers.

^f This is
distinguis
hed from di
uine spiri
ts mentioned
in the first
place, by
their missi
on or out
ward admi
nistration,
from which
the former
are free.

cal industry; or of some or all of these; that certainly is manifest , that prouidence is an vnmoveable and simple forme of those things, which are to be done ; & fate a mouable connexion and temporall order of those things , which the diuine simplicit y hath disposed to be done . So that all , that is vnder fate , is also subiect to prouidence , to which also fate it self obeyeth .^s But somethings which are placed vnder prouidence , are aboue the course of fate . And they are those things , which nigh to the first diuinity being stable & fixe , exceede the order of fatal mobility . For as of Orbis which turne about the same Centre , the inmost draweth nigh to the simplicity of the middest , and is as it were the hinge of the rest , which are placed without it , about which they are turned : and

^s Some
things a-
bove the
course of
Fate.

and the cutmost wheeled with a greater compasse, by how much it departeth from the middle indiuisibility of the Centre, is so much the more extended into larger spaces: but that which is ioyned & coupled to that middle, approacheth to simplicity, and ceaseth to spread & flow abroad. In like maner that, which departeth farthest from the first mind, is perplexed with greater conexions offate, and euery thing is so much the freer from fate, by how much it draweth nigh to that hinge of all things. And if it sticketh to the stability of the soueraign mind, free from motion, it surpasseth also the necessity of fate. VVherefore in what sort discourse is compared to vnderstanding; that, which is produced to that which is, time to eternity, a circle to the Centre. Such is the

the course of moueable fate , to the
stable simplicity of prouidence.
That course moueth the heauen
and starres, temper eth the elements
one with another , and transfor-
meth them by mutuall changing.
The same reneweth all rising
and dying things by like procee-
ding of fruites and seedes. This
comprehendeth also the actions
and fortunes of men by an vnloof-
able connection of causes, which
since they proceede from the prin-
ciples of vnmoueable prouide-
nace , must needs also be ^b immutable.
For in this manner
things are best governed , if
the simplicity which remayneth
in the Diuine minde , produ-
ceth an inflexible order of cau-
ses , and this order restrayneth
with his owne immutabilitie ,
things

^b Fate and
those thing
which are
vnder it, are
immutable
as they are
referred to
prouidence

things otherwile mutable & which
would haue a confused course.
VWhereof it ensueth , that though
all things seeme confused and dis-
ordered to you , who are not able to
consider this order: notwithstanding
all things are disposed by their
owne measure directing them to
good. For there is nothing, which
is done for the loue of euill, euen by
the wicked themselues , whom as
hath beeene abundantly prooued,
lewd errour carrieth away , while
they are seeking after that , which is
good, so farre is it , that order procee-
ding from the king of the soueraign
goodnesse , should auert any from
his first beginning: But thou wilt
say ; what more vnjust confusion
can there be , then that both aduer-
sity and prosperity should happen
to the good; and in like maner both
desired

ⁱ Nothing is
done for
the loue of
euill.

desired and hatefull things to the wicked. But are men so completely wise, that whosoeuer they ^k iudge wicked or honest, must needes be so? How then are their censures contrary one to another, so that to diuers the same men seeme worthy of reward and punishment. But let vs graunt, that some are able to discerne the good from the euill. Can they therefore behold that inward complexion as it were of soules? For he that knoweth not the cause, may marueile in like maner, why some sound bodies agree better with sweete things, and other with tart. And why some sick men are healed with gentle, and some with sharper physicke. But to a Physitian who knoweth the manner and temper both of health and sickenesse, this is nothing strange.

^k The iudgments of
men vncer-
taine.

Now,

Now, what is the health of soules,
but vertue? What sickenesse haue
they, but vices? And who either
conserueth goodnesse, or expelleth
euils, but God the ruler and gouernour
of mens minds? Who¹ beholding
what is fitting for euery
man, and dispositeth
accordingly

¹ God seeth
what is
most fitting
for euery
man, and
disposeth
accordingly

Hence proceedeth that strange
wonder of fatal order, when he that
knoweth what is best, doth that,
which the ignorant admire. For to
touch briefly some few things of
the divine depth; which humane
reason is able to attaine, whome
thou thinkest most iust, and most
obseruant of equity, seemeth other-
wise in the eies of prouidence which
knoweth all. And our friend ^m Lu-
can noteth, that the cause of the con-
querours

querours pleased the Gods, and that
of the conquered, Cato. Wherefore
whatsoever thou seest done heere
against thy expectation, is right or-
der in the things themselues, but
a peruerse confusion in thy opinion.
But let there be one so wel condition-
ed, that God and men approue and
praise him; yet perhaps he is so weake
a minded man, that if he falleth in-
to aduersity, he wil forsake his inno-
cency, which was not able to keepe
him in prosperity. Wherefore Gods
wile dispensation spareth him that
aduersity might make worse, least
he should suffer, to whom difficulties
are dangerous. There is another
complete in al vertues, a Saint and
nigh to God, prouidentie iudgeth it a
sacrilege to lay any afflictions on
him, insomuch, that she permit-
teth him not to be troubled so much

ⁿ This is a
saying of a
Christian
divine, whō
Philology
acknow-
ledgedeth to
excell her.
*Viris aere
corpus circu-
tes adifica-
ueret.*

as with corporall sickenesse. For as
one, ⁿthat excelleth me, saith: *Aīdēs
iēsū sūpā dūrā pēsō i nōdō pēsō.* It hapneth ofte
also, that the chiefe comand is giuen
to good me, that wickednes, which
otherwise would overflow all, may
be kept downe. She mixeth for o-
thers sower with sweete according
to the disposition of their soules,
she checketh some, lest they should
fall to dissolution by long prosperi-
ty, others she suffereth to be tossed
with many stormes, that they may
confirme the forces of their minde
with the vse and exercise of patience.
Some are too much afayde of that,
which they are able to beare. Other
make lesse account then there is
cause of that, which they cannot
endure, these shee assayeth with af-
flictions that they may make triall
of themselves. Many haue bought
the

the renowne of this world with a glorious death. Some ouercoming all torments, haue shewed by their example, that vertues cannot be conquered by miseries, which things how well and orderly they are done, and how much to their good, to whom they happen, there can bee no doubt. For that sometimes greeuous, sometime pleasant things befall in like maner the wicked, proceedeth from the same causes. And as for aduersitie, no man merueileth, because all thinke that they deserue ill, whose punishments doe both terrifie others from the like courses, and moue them to amend themselves: And their prosperitie is a great argument to the good, what they ought to judge of this happinessle, which they see oftentimes bestowed vpon the wic-

Q 2 ked.

ked. In which this also is to bee
considered, that peraduenture some
haue so headlong and vntoward a
disposition, that pouertie would ra-
ther make him worse, whose dis-
ease is cured by prouidence, with gi-
uing him store of money; Another
knowing his owne guilty consci-
ence, and reflecting vpon his owne
estate, is afraid least the losse of that
should be greeuous vnto him, the
use of which is pleasant. Wherefote
he resolueth to chang his customes,
and whiles he feareth to loose his
prosperitie, he forsaketh wickednes.
The increase of honor vndeserued-
ly obtained, hath throwne some
headlong into their deserued de-
struction. Others are permitted to
haue authoritie to punish others,
that they may exercise the good,
and punish the bad. For as there is

no league betweene vertuous & wicked men, so neither can the wicked agree among themselues. Why not? Since they disagree within them selues, by reason of their vices which teare their conscience, so that they many times doe that, which afterward they wish vndon. Frō whence that highest prouidence, often worketh that wonderfull miracle, that euill men make those, which are euill, good. For some considering the iniustice done the, by most wicked men, out of their hatred to their enemies, haue embraced vertue, procuring to be contrary to them, whom they hate. For it is onely a Diuine strength, to which eu'en euill things are good, when by vsing them in due sort, it draweth some good effect out of them. For a certaine order embraceth al things, so that eu'en

*Difficile
autem est
me sermone
explicare.
quem ad
modum De
us omniscire
gas et pro
videntia
disponat.*

that, which departeth from the order appointed to it, though it falleth into another, yet that is order also, least confused ratnes shold beare any sway in the kingdome of prouidence.
Aργαλεον δ' επε ταυτα θεον ας παντας ασφενειν. For it is impossible for any man either to comprehend by his witt, or to explicate in spech al the frames of Gods work. It is sufficient, that we haue seene thus much, that God the authour of all natures, directeth and disposeth also all things to goodnessse, and while hee endeouourereth to reduce those things which he hath produced to his owne likenesse, hee banisheth all euill from the boundes of his common wealth, by the course of fatall necessitie. So that, if thou considerest the disposition of prouidence, thou wilt perceiue that euill, which is thought so to abound

bound vpon earth, hath no place
left for it at all. But I see that long
since burthened with so weighty a
question, and wearied with my long
discourse, thou expectest the delight
of verses; wherfore take a draught,
that being refreshed, thou maiest
be able to goe forward.

THE VI. VERSE.

Philosophy praiseth Gods prouidence.

If thou woudest see
Gods lawes with purest mind,
Tby sight on heau'n must fixed be,
Whose settled course the Starres in peace doth bind.
The Sunnes bright fire
Stops not his sistersteame
Nor doth the Northerne beare desire
Washin the Oceans wave to bide her beame.
Though she behid
Th' other Starres their ceuching:
Yet stee uncessantly is rowld
About the heau'n the Ocean never touching.
The Eu'ning light
With certaine course doth shone
The comming of the shady night,
And Lucifer before the day doth goe.

Boetius his

This mutuall loue
Courses aternall makes,
And from the starry spheres aboue
All cause of warre, and dang'rous discord takes.

This sweet consent
In a quall bands doth iye
The nature of each Element;
So that the moist thinges yeeld unto the dry.

The piercing cold
With flames doth friendship keepe
The fire the highest place doth hold,
And the grosse earth sinkes downe into the deepe.

The flowry yeare
Breathes odours in the spring
The scorching summer eare doth beare
The Autumne fruit from loaden trees doth bryng.

The falling raine
Doth winters moisture giae
These rules thus nourish and maintaine
All creatures, which we see on earth to live.

And when they dye,
These bring them to their end,
While their Creator sittes on high,
Whose hand the raines of the whole world doth bend.

He as their King
Rules them with Lordly might,
From him they rise, flourishe and spring,
He as their law and iudge deuides their rights.

Those things, whose course
Most swifly slides away,
His mighte doth often backward force,

And

And suddenly their wandring motion stay.

Unless his strength

Their violence should bound,

And them which else would runne at length,

Should bring within sbe compasse of around;

That firme deince

Whch note doth all adorne,

Would soone destroi'd and broken bee,

Things being farre from their beginning borne.

This powerfull loue

Is common unto al

Whch for desire of good doe moue

Backe to the springs from whence they first did fall.

No wordly thing

Can a continuance haue

Unless loue backe againe it bring,

Unto the cause, which first the essence gaue.

THE VII. PROSE.

All fortune is good.

Perceiuest thou now, what followeth of al, that we hau hehereto said? what? (quoth I.) That (quoth she) all maner of fortune is good: How can that bee? (quoth I.) Be attentive (quoth she) since that al fortune, be it pleasing or vnplea-

vnpleasing, is directed to the reward or exercise of the good , and to the punishment and direction of the wicked; it is manifest, it is all good, since it is all iust, or profitable. Thy reason is very true (quoth I) and if I consider prouidence & fate, which thou diddest explicate a little before, thy opinion is well grounded. But if thou pleaseſt let vs account it among those , which thou not long ſince ſuppoſedſt incrediblē. What? (quoth ſhe) Because men common- ly vſe to ſay, and repeat, that ſome haue ill fortune: Shall wee (quoth ſhee) frame our ſpeech to the vulgar phrase, leaſt we ſeeme to haue as it were forsaken the vle of humane conuerſation ? As it pleafeth thee (quoth I.) Doest thou not thinke then, that that is good, which is pro- fitable ? Yes (quoth I.) But that, which

which either exerciseth, or correcteth, is profitable. It is true (quoth I.) It is good then: VVhy not? But this is the estate of them, who being either vertuous striue with aduersity, or forsaking vices; betake themselves to the way of vertue. I cannot denie it (quorh I.) Now, what sayest thou to that pleasing fortune, which is giuen in reward to the good, doth the common people account it badde? No, but iudgeth it exceeding good, as it is indeed. And what of the other, which being vnpleasing, restraineth the euill with iust punishment, doeth not the people thinke it good? Yea (quoth I.) they thinke it the most miserable that can be. Looke then (quoth shee) how following the peoples opinion, we haue concluded a very incredible matter. What? (quoth I.) For it follow-

followeth (quoth shee) out of that, which is granted, that all their fortune, whatsoeuer it be, who are either in the possession, or encrease or entrance of vertue, is gody: and theirs, which remaine in vices, the worst that may be. This (quoth I) is true, though none dare say so. VVherefore (quoth she) a wise man must be no more troubled, when he is assaulted with aduersitie: then a valiant Captaine dismayd at the sound of an alarum. For difficulties are the matter, by which the one must encrease his glory, and the other confirme his wisedome. For which cause vertue is so called, because it hath sufficient strength to ouercome aduersitie. For you, that are proficients in vertue, are not come to bee dissolute with dainties, nor to languish in pleasures,

sures, but you skirmish fiercely with any fortune, least either affliction oppresse you, or prosperitie corrupt you, and so procure to stay your selues strongly in the meane. For whatsoeuer commeth either short, or goeth beyond, may well contemne felicity, but will never obtaine any reward of labour. For it is placed in your power, to frame to your selues, what fortune you please. For all that seemeth vnsauory, either exerciseth, or correcteth, or punisheth.

THE VII. VERSE.

Phylosophy exhorteth to labours.

REuengfull ^a Atreus sonne did ten whole yeares employ
In wars, till he his ^b brothers losse repar'd with rancks
He setting forth the Fleete of Greece vpon the seas (Troy,
And knowing well, that onely bloud the angry winds would
Forget a fathers part and wish his cruel kusfe (please,
Unto the Gods did sacrifice his dearest ^c daughters life.

Vlisses wait'd the losse of his most faishfull men
Whom ^d Poliphemus did devoure inclosed in his den
in Sicily, hauing but one eye iahis fore-head, which Vlisses did put out.

^a Agamemnon.

^b Menelau whose wife Helena, Paris tooke away.

^c Iphigenia.

^d A Gyant.

Boetius his

e Halt iaea
and halfe
horses

f Huge
birde in the
sea called
Stymphalus
in Arcadia.

g The dog
Cerberus
who had 3.
heads.

h Diome-
des King of
Thracia,
who fedde
his horses
with mans
flesh.

i Who had turned himselfe into the forme of a bull. k The sonne of
Neptune, who by touching the earth recovered strength; and theretore
Hercules held him vp, and so slew him. l Vulcans son, who did cast ou
of his mouth fire and smoke. m King of Arcadia. n In stead of
Atlas.

But when his hand by sleight had madet he Cyclops blind,
Most pleasant soy in stead of former teares posset his mind.
Hercules famous is for his labors toyle, (spoyle
VVho tam'd the Cen'aurs, and did take the dreadful Lions
He thef Stymphalian birds with piercing arrowes strooke,
And from the watchful Dragon's care the golden apples rook
He in a threefold charme the hellish, orter ledde,
And with their cruell masters flesh the sauge horses fedde
He did th'encreasing heads of poy'l nous Hydras burne,
And breaking i Achelous hornes did make him back return
He on the Libyans sands did proud ⁱⁱ Antaeus kill,
And with the mighty ⁱⁱ Cacus blood ⁱⁱⁱ Quanders wrath fulfil.
He with the dreadfull Bore, encount'red, and him slew,
Renayning prest, if he were foy'd his labours to renew.
To beare ⁱⁱ Heau'n of histyles the last was, and most hard,
And for this last & greatest toyle the beau' n was his reward.
You valiant men pursue this way of high renownt, (crown.

THE



THE
FIFT BOOKE OF
Boetivs.

Of chance and freewill, and
how they stand with Prouidence

THE I. PROSE.

Of chance.



Auing sayd thus,
she began to turne
her speech to cer-
taine other questi-
ons; when I inter-
rupted her, saying:

Thy

Thy exhortation is very good, and well beseeming thy authority. But I find it true by experience, as thou affirmedest, that the question of prudence, is entangled with many other. For I desire to know, whether thou thinkest chance to be anything at al, & what it is. I make hast (quoth shee) to performe my promise, and to shew thee the way, by which thou mayest returne to thy country. And these other questions, though they be very profitable, yet they are somewhat from our purpose, and it is to be feared, least being wearied with digressions, thou beest not able to finish thy direct journey. There is no feare of that (quoth I) for it will be a great ease to me, to vnderstand those things, in which I take great delight, & withall when thy disputation is fenced in

in on every side; there can bee no
doubt made of any thing thou shalt
inferre. I will (quoth Shée) doe, as
thou wouldest haue me, and withall
beganne in this maner: If any shall
define chance to be, an event produc-
ed by a confused motion, & with-
out connexion of causes, I affirme
that there is no such thing, and that
chance is only an empty voyce with-
out any real signification. For
what place can confusion haue,
since God disposeth all things in
due order? For it is a true sentence,
that of nothing commeth nothing,
which none of the ancients denied;
though they held not that principle
of the efficient cause, but of the ma-
teriall subject; that is of the nature
of all formes. But if any thing pro-
ceedeth from no causes, that will
seeme to haue come from nothing,

which if it cannot bee, neither is it
possible there should be any such
chance, as is defined a little before.
What then (quoth I,) is there no-
thing that can rightly bee called
chance, or fortune? Or is there som-
thing, though vndeclared to the
common sort, to which these names
agree? My Aristotle (quoth shee) in
his booke of nature declared this
point briefly and truely. How?
(quoth I.) When (quoth shee) any
thing is done for some certain cause,
and some other thing hapneth, for
some reasons, then that, which was
intended, this is called chance: as if
one digging his ground with inten-
tion to till it, findeth an hidden trea-
sure. This is thought to haue fallen
thus out by fortune, but it is not of
nothing, for it hath peculiar causes,
whose vnderstanding & not foreseen
concourse

concourse seemeth to haue brought
forth a chance. For vnlesse the
Husbandman had digged vp his
groundes, and vnlesse the other had
hidden his money in that place, the
treasure had not beeene found. These
are therefore the causes of this for-
tunate accident, which proceedeth
from the meeting and concourse of
causes, and not from the intention
of the doer. For neither he that hid
the golde, nor hee that tilled his
ground, had any intention that the
money should be found, but, as I
said, it followed and concurred, that
this man should dig vp that, which
the other hidde. VVherefore wee
may define ² chance thus : that it is
an vnexpected euent of concurring
causes, in those things, which are
done to some end and purpose. Now
the cause, why causes concurre and

² What
Chance is.

meete so together, is that order proceeding, with inevitable connexion, which descending from the fountaine of prouidence, disposeth all things in their places and times.

~~shift, hazard and fortune, and chance.~~
TH E E L I C V I E R S E S
 How casuall events are guided unto shew nobly prouidence.

IN th' Achaemenian rockes, where Partians with their darke
 In their dissembled flights do wound their enemies, whose bounde
 Tigris from the same head doth with Euphrates rise
 And forthwith they themselves divide in sea & land parts.
 But if they ioyne againe, and themong channell boundes, bannering
 Bringing together all that both their waues doe beare,
 The ships andirees whose rootes they from the bankes doe reare,
 Will meete, and they their stads will mingle and confounde,
 Yet runnes this wandering course in places which are low
 And in these sliding stremes a settled law remaines.
 So fortune though it seemes to runne with carelesse rales,
 Yet hath her certaine rule, and doth in order flow.

~~continuo to ensue before him
 in this world against flocks in these
 worldes flowing by as by a motion of nob
 bly chance, as chance is. **T**H E~~

THE II. PROSE.

Offreewill.

Obserue it (quoth I) and I acknowledge it to bee as thou sayest. But in this ranke of coherent causes, haue wee any free will, or doth the fatall chaine fasten also the motions of mens minds? We haue (quoth he) for there can be no resonable nature, vnlesse it bee endewed with freewill. For that which naturally hath the vse of reason, hath also iudgement, by which he can discerne of euery thing by it selfe, wherfore he putteth a difference betwixt those things, which are to bee auoide, and those which are to bee desired. Now euery one seeketh for that, which he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his iudgement

is to be auoyded. Wherefore they which haue reason , haue freedome to will and nill. But yet I make not this equal in al. For the supreme and diuine substances haue both a perspicuous iudgment, & an incorrupted wil, & an effectual power to obtaine their desires. But ^a the minds cf men must needes be more free, when they conserue themselues in the contemplation of God , & lesse, when they come ^b to their bodies, and yet lesse when they are bound with earthly setters. But their greatest bondage is, when giuing themselues to vices, they loose the possession of their owne reason. For hauing cast their eyes from the light of the soueraigne truth to inferiour obscuties, forthwith they are blinded with the cloud of ignorance , molested with hurtfull affections, by yeelding and consen-

^a This is spoken according to the opinion of the Platonists.

^b Before they en- forme them

consenting to which , they increase
the bondage, which they layd vpon
themselues, and are after a certaine
manner captiues by their own free-
dome. Which notwithstanding that
foresight of prouidence, which be-
holdeth all things from eternity ,
foreseeth, and by predestination dis-
poseth of euery thing by their mer-
rits. *ταῦτα ποπά καὶ ταῦτα επάντας*

*Omnia vides
et omnia
audis.*

THE II. VERSE.

How God knoweth all things.

Sweete Homer singes the praise
Of Phabus cleare and bright,
And yet his strongest rages
Cannot with feeble light
Cast through the secret waies
Of earth and seas his sight :
But he, that did the world devise,
Looketh from high with clearer eyes.
The earths vast depths unseene
From his sight are not free ,
No clouds can stand betweene,
He at one issue dash see

What are, and what haue bee,
 And what shall after bee.
 Whom (since he onely vieweth all.)
 You rightly the true Sunne may call.

THE III. PROSE.

Boetius proposeth the difficulty of con-
 cording Gods prouidence with mens
 free-will.

Hen I complayned, that I
 was now in a greater confu-
 sion, & more doubtful dif-
 ficultie then before. What is that?
 (quoth she) for I already conjecture
 what it is that troubleth thee. It
 seemeth (quoth I) to bee altogether
 impossible and repugnant, that God
 foreseeth all things, and that there
 should be any free-will. For if God
 beholdeth all things, and cannot be
 deceipted, that must of necessity fol-
 low, which his prouidence foreseeth
 to be to come. VVherefore if from
 eternity he doth not only, foreknow
 the

the deeds of men, but also their coun-
sels & wils, there can be no freewill;
for there is not any other deede or
wil, but thole, which the diuine pro-
vidence that cannot bee deceiued,
hath foreseen. For if things can be
drawnto any other course, then was
foreknowne, there will not be any
firm knowldg of that, which is to
come, but rather an vncertaine opi-
nion, which in my opinion were
impious to beleue of God. Neither
do I allow of that reasō, with which
some suppose that they can dissolute
the difficulty of this question. For
they say, that nothing is therfore
to come to passe, because prouide-
nce did foresee it, but rather
contrarywise, because it shall bee,
it could not be vnown to prouide-
nce, and in like maner it is necessa-
ry, that the other should be true.

For it is not necessarie that those things shoul happen, which are foreseen, but it is necessarie that those things shoul be foreseen, that are to come. As though our question were, which of them is the other's cause, the foreknowledge of the necessitie of things to come, or the necessitie of things to come of the foreknowledge. But let vs endeavour to proue, that howsoeuer these causes be ordered, the event of the things, which are foreknownne, is necessary, although the foreknowledge seemeth not to inferre necessitie of being vpon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth, the opinion which thinketh so, must needes be true, and againe on the other side, if the opinion that one sitteth be true, hee must needes sitte. Wherefore there is necessitie in both
in

in the one of sitting, and in the other of truthr. But one sitteth not , because the opinion is true , but rather this is true, because one sitteth. So that though the cause of truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both. And the like is to be inferred of prouidence, & future things. For althogh they be foreseen, because they shall be, and they doe not come to passe, because they are foreseen: notwithstanding it is necessary , that things to come be foreseen, or that things foreseen doe fall out ; which alone is sufficient to ouerthrow freewill. Besides how preposterous is it , that the euent of temporall things should be said to be the cause of the euerlasting foreknowledge: And what els is it to thinke , that God doth therefore foresee future things , because they

they are to happen, then to affirme
that those things which happened
long since, are the cause of that sou-
raigne prouidence? Furthermore, as
whē I know any thing to be, it must
needs be: so wheā I know, that any
thing shall be, it must needs be to
come. And so it followeth, that the
euent of a thing foreknowen can-
not bee auoyded. Finally if any
man thinketh otherwise, then the
thing is, that is not onely no know-
ledge, but it is a deceitfull opinion,
farre from the truth of knowledge;
wherefore if any thing is to bee in
such sort, that the euent of it is not
certaine or necessary, how can that
be foreknowen that it shal happen?
for as the knowledge is without
mixture of falsity, so that, which is
conceiued by it, cannot be otherwise
then it is conceiued. For this is the
cause

cause, why knowldg is without de-
ceit, because euery thing must needs
be so, as the knowledge apprehend-
eth it to be. What then? How doth
God foreknow, that these vncer-
taine things shall bee? For if hee
iudgeth that those things shall hap-
pen ineuitably, whichit is possible
shall not happen, hee is deceiued,
which is not onely impious to
thinke, but also to speake. But if he
supposeth that they shall happen in
such sort as they are, so that hee
knoweth, that they may equally be
done and not be done, what sorte
knowledge is this, which compre-
hendeth no certaine or stable thing?
Or in what is this better then that fi-
diculous prophecy of Tiresia? What-
soever I say shal either be, or not be,
or in what shall the diuine prou-
idence exceede humane opinion,
if,

if, as men, God iudgeth thole things
to be vncertaine, the euent of which
is doubtfull? But if nothing can bee
vncertaine to that most certaine
fountaine of all things, the euent
of those things is certaine, which
he doth certainly know shall be.
Wherefore there is no freedome in
humane counsels & actions, which
the diuine mind foreseeing al things
without errore or falsehood, tyeth
and bindeth to one euent. Which
once admitted, it is evident, what
ruine of humane affayres wil ensue.
For in vain are rewards and punish-
ments proposed to good and euill,
which no free and voluntary moti-
on of their minds hath deserued.
And that will seeme most vniust,
which is now iudged most iust, that
either the wicked should be punish-
ed, or the good rewarded, since their
owne

owne will leadeth them to neither, but they are compelled by the certaine necessity of that , which is to come. By which meanes vertues and vices shall be nothing , but rather there will follow a mixt confusione of all deserts. And , then which there can be nothing inuented more impious , since that al order of things proceedeth from prouidence , and humane counsels can do nothing , it followeth , that our vices also shal be referred to the author of goodness . Wherfore there is no meanes left to hope or pray for any thing . For what can any man either hope or pray for , since an vnflexible course connecteth all things that can bee desired ? VVherefore that onely traficke betwixt God and men of hope and prayer shall bee taken away . For by the price of iust humili-

humility, we deserue the vnestima-
ble benefite of Gods grace; which is
the onely manner, by which it seem-
eth that men may talkewith God
and by the very manner of supplica-
tion be ioyned to that inaccessible
light, before they obtaine any thing?
which if by the admitting the ne-
cessity of future things , they bee
thought to haue no force, by what
shall we be vnlited and cleave to that
soveraigne Prince of all things?

VVherefore mankind must needes,
(as thou saydest in thy ve se a little
before) being separated and seuered
from his fountain, faile & fall away.

THE LITERARY GAZETTE

How we come to know the truth.

VWhat cause of discord breakes the bandes of loue? to whom
What God betwene two truths such wars doth moue?
That things which seeme well settled be,

Yet is y'd in one will neuer friendly proue?
Or in true things can we no discord see,
Because all certainties doe still agree?
But our dull soule, couer'd with members blind,
Knowes not the secret lawes, which things doe bind,
By the drown'd light of her oppressed fire.
Why then, the hiddennotes of things to find,
Doth shee with such a lone of truth desire?
If shee knowes that, which shee doth so require.
Why wisheth shee knownne things to know againe?
If shee knowes not why striues shee with blinde paine?
Who after things unkownne will strive to goe?
Or will such ignorant pursuite maintaine?
How shall shee find them out? or having so,
How shall shee then their formes and natures knoone?
Because this soule the highest mind did view,
Must wee needes say, that it all natures knew?
Now shee though cloudes of flesh doe her debarre,
Forgets not all, that was her ancient due.
But in her mind some gen'rall motions are,
Thongh not the skill of things particular.
He that seekes truth, in neither course doth fall,
Not knowing all nor ignorant of all.
He rearketh gen'rall things which he retaines,
And matters seene on high doth backe recall.
And things forgotten to his mind regaines,
And roynes them to that part, which there remains.

THE IIII. PROSE.

*Phylosophy beginneth to solue the diffi-
culties, which Boetius proposed.*

 His (quoth shee) is an ancient complaint of prouidence, vehemently pursued by *Marcus Tullius*, in his distribution of diuination, and a thing which thou thy selfe hast made great and long search after; But hetherto none of you haue vsed sufficient diligence and vigour in the explication thereof. The cause of which obscurity is, for that the motion of humane discourse cannot attaine to the simplicity of the divine knowledge, which if by any meanes wee could conceiue there would not remaine any doubt at all, which I will endeavour

our to make manifest and plaine,
when I haue first explicated that,
which moueth thee. For I demand,
why thou thinkest their solution
vntufficient, who thinke that free-
will is no hindered by foreknow-
ledge, because they suppose that fore
knowledge is not the cause of any
necessity in things to come. For
fetchest thou any proose for the ne-
cessity of future things from any o-
ther principle, but onely from this,
that those things which are fore-
knowne,cannot chuse but happen?
wherefore if foreknowledge impos-
seth no necessitie vpon future e-
uent, which thou diddest grant not
long before, why should voluntary
actions be tyed to any certaine suc-
cess? For examples sake, that thou
maiest see what will follow, let
vs suppose that there were no proui-

dence or foresight at all. Would those things which proceede from freewill, be compelled to any necessity by this meanes? No. Againe let vs grant it to be, but that it imposeth no necessity vpon any thing, no doubt the same freedome of will, will remaine whole and absolute. But thou wilt say, though foreknowledge be not a necessity for things to happen, yet it is a signe, that they shal necessarily come to passe. VVherefore now, though there had bin no foreknowledge, the events of future things would haue beeene necessary. For all signes only shew somthing, that is, but cause not that which they designe. And consequently it must first be proued, that all things fal out by necesity, that it may appeare that foreknowledge is a signe of this necessity. For otherwise if there be no necessity,

necessitie, neither can foreknowledge be the signe of that, which is not. Besides it is manifest that euer firme proofe must bee drawne from intrinsecall and necessary causes, and not from signes and other farrefetched arguments. But how is it possible, those things should not happen, which are foreseen to be to come? As though we did beleue that those things will not be, which prouidence hath foreknowne, and doe not rather iudge, that although they happen, yet by their owne nature they had no necessity of being, which thou maiest easily gather hence. For we see many things with our eyes, while they are in doing, as those things which the Coach-men do while they driue and turne their Coaches, and in like manner other things.

Now doth necessity compell any of these things to be done in this sort? No. For in vain should Art labour, if all things were moued by compulsion. VVherefore as these things are without necessity, when they are in doing, so likewise they are to come without necessity, before they bee done. And consequently there are some things to come, whose event is free from all necessity. For I suppose no man will say, that those things, which are done now, were not to come, before they were done. VVherefore these things being foreseen, come freely to effect. For as the knowledge of things present causeth no necessity in things which are in doing, so neither the foreknowledg in things to come. But thou wilt say, This is the question, whether there can bee any

any foreknowledg of those things, whose euent are not necessary. For these things seeme opposite, and thou thinkest , that if future things be foreseene, there followeth necessity, if there bee no necessity , that they are not foreknownen , and that nothing can be perfectly knowne, vnlesse it be certaine- And if vncertaine euent be foreseen as certain, it is manifest that this is the obscurity of opinion and not the truth of knowledge. For thou thinkest it to be farre from the integrity of knowledge , to iudge otherwise then the thing is. The cause of which errour is, because thou thinkest that all that is knownen , is knownen onely by the force and nature of the things themselues , which is altogether otherwise. For all that is knowne, is not comprehended according to

the force which it hath in it selfe,
but rather according to the fa-
cultie of them which know it. For
to explicate it with a briefe exam-
ple: the sight, and the feeling doe
diuersly discerne the roundnesse
of a dye. The sight standing a-
loofe, beholdeth it altogether by
his beames; but the feeling vni-
ted and ioyned to the orbe, being mo-
ued about the compasse of it, com-
prehendeth the roundnes by parts.
Likewise sense, imagination, reason
and vnderstanding doe diuersly
behold a man. For sense looketh
vpon his forme as it is placed in
matter or subiect, the imagina-
tion discerneth it alone without
matter. Reason passeth beyond
this also, and considereth vniuersal-
ly the species or kind, which is in
particulars. The eye of the vnder-

desstanding is higher yet. For surpassing the compasse of the whole world, it beholdeth with the cleare sight of the mind, that simple forme in it selfe.

In which that is chiefly to bee considered, that the superiour force of comprehending embraceth the inferiour; but the inferiour can by no meanes attaine to the superiour: for the sense hath no force out of matter, neither doth the imagination conceiue vniversall Species, nor reason is capable of the simple forme, but the vnderstanding, as it were, looking downward, hauing conceyued that forme, discerneth of all thinges which are vnder it, but in that sorte, in which it apprehendeth that forme, which can bee knowne by none
of

of the other. For it knoweth the vniuersality of reason, and the figure of imagination, and the materiality of sense, neither vsing reason, nor imagination, nor senses, but as it were formally beholding all things, with that one twinkling of the mind. Likewise reason, when it considereth any vniuersallity; comprehendeth both imaginable and sensible things without the vse of either imagination or senses. For she desiueth the vniuersallity of her conceit thus : man is a reasonable two-footed liuing creature, which being an vniuersall knowledge, no man is ignorant that it is an imaginable and sensible thing, which she considereth by a reasonable conceiuing, and not by imagination or sense. Imagination also, although it began by the senses of seeing and forming

forming figures , yet when sense is absent, it beholdeth sensible things, not after a sensible, but after an imaginary manner of knowledge. Seest thou now how al these in knowing, doe rather vse their owne force and faculty , then the force of those things , which are knownen ? Nor vndeseruedly , for since all iudgement is the act of him , who iudgeth , it is necessary that every one should perfect his operation by his owne power , and not by the force of any other.

THE IIII. VERSE.

*That our knowledge is not wholly taken
from the outward obiect.*

*A*ncients in schooles once too obscurely taught,
That sense and shape presented to the thought,
From outward objects their impression take.

As

Boetius his

As when upon a paper smooth and plaine,
On whi h as yet nu markes of inke haue layne,
We with a nimble pen doe letters make.
But if our mind st o nothing can apply
Their proper motions, but doe patient lie
Subject to formes, which doe from bodies flow,
Like to a glasse, rendering the shapes of things,
Who then can shew, from whence that motion springs,
By force of which the mind all things doth know?
Or by what skill are sev'rall things espide?
And being knowne, what power doth them deside?
And thus denied, doth againe unite?
And with a vairous iourney, oft aspires
To highest things, and oft againe retires
To basest, nothing being out of sight?
And when she backe unto her selfe doth moue,
Doth all the falsehoods by the truth reproue,
This vigour needes must be an actiu cause,
And with more powersfull forces must be deckt,
Then that, which from those formes, that do reflect
From outward matter, all her vertue drawes.
And yet in living bodies passions might
Doth goe before, whose office is i'encue,
And the first motions in the mind to make.
As when the light unto our eyes appeares,
Or some louyd voyce is sounded in our eares.
Then doth the strength of the dull mind awake
Those phantasses, which she retaynes within,
She stirreth up such motionst o begin,
Whose object s with their natures best agree.
And thus applying them to outward things,

She ioyes th'externall shapes, which thence she bringes,
With formes, which in her selfe included bee.

THE V. PROSE.

That reason must yeeld to the simplicity
of Gods knowledge.

 And if in the discerning of bodies by sense, although the qualities which are objected do moue the organs of sense, and the passion of the body goeth before the vigor of the active mind, prouoking her action to it selfe, and exciting the inward formes, which before lay quiet; if (I say) in perceiving these corporal objects, the mind taketh not her impression from passion, but by her own force iudgeth of the passion it self, which is objected to the body; how much more do those powers exercile the action of their mind,

minde, and not onely follow the outward obiects in their iudgement, which are free from all affections of the body? Wherfore in this sort haue diuers and different substances, knowledges of many kinds. For onely sense destitute of all other, is in those liuing creatures, which are vnmoueable, as some shell-fish, and other which sticke to stones and so are nourished. And imagination in moueable beasts, who seeme to haue some power to couet, and flic. Reason belongeth onely to mankind, as vnderstanding to things Diuine; So that, that knowledge is most exellent, which of it selfe doth not onely know her owne obiect, but also those which belong to others. What then, if sense and imagination repugne to discourse and reason, affirming that vniversallity

sallity to be nothing , which reason thinketh her selfe to see ? For that cannot be vniuersal, which is either sensible or imaginable. Wherefore either the iudgment of reason must be true, and nothing at all sensible, or because they know that many things are subiect to the senses and imagination , the conceit of reason is vaine , which considereth that which is sensible and singular , as if it were vniuersall. And if reason should answere , that she beholdeth in her vniuersallity , al that which is sensible or imaginable, but they can-
not aspire to the knowledge of vni-
uersallity , because their knowledge
cannot surpassee corporall figures
and shapes. And that wee must
giue more credite to the firmer and
more perfect iudgement, about the
knowledge of things. In this con-
tentio[n],

tention, should not wee, who haue
the power of discoursing, as well as
of imagination and sense, rather
take reasons part? The very like
happeneth, when humane reason
doth not thinke, that the diuine vnder-
standing doeth beholde future
things, otherwised then she her selfe
doth. For thus thou arguest, if any
things seeme not to haue certaine
and necessary events, they cannot be
certainely foreknowne to bee to
come. Wherefore there is no fore-
knowledge of these things, and if we
thinke that there is any, there shall
be nothing, which happeneth not
of necessity. If therefore, as we are
endewed with reason, wee could
likewise haue the iudgement pro-
perto the diuine mind, as we haue
judged that imagination and sense
must yeeld to reason, so likewise we
would

would thinke it most reasonable
and iust, that humane reason
should submitte her selfe to the Di-
vine mind. Wherefore let vs bee
lifted vp, as much as wee can to that
height of the highest mind; for there
reason shall see that, which she can-
not behold in herselfe. And that is
how a certaine and definite fore-
knowledge seeth those things,
which haue no certaine issue, and
that this is no opinion, but rather
the simplicitie of the highest know-
ledge, inclosed with no bounds.

T H E V. V E R S E.

*Mans body declareth, that his mind was
mide to contemplate heauenly things.*

*What sev'rall figures things that liue upon the earth do keepe?
Some haue their bodies stretcht in length, by which the dust
they sweepē*

Boetius his

And do continuall furrowes make, while on their brefts they creape.
Some lightly soaring up on high, with wings the wind doth smite,
And through the longest ayery space, passe with an easie flight.
Some by their paces to imprint the ground with steps delight,
Which through the pleasant fieldes doe passe, or to the woods do goe,
Whose sev'rall formes though to our eyes they do a difference shew,
Yet by their looks cast downe on earth their senses heauy grow.
Men onely with more stately shape to higher obiects rise,
~~Who with ereeted bo dyes stand, and doe the earth dispise.~~
These figures warne (if baser thoughts blind not thine earthly eyes)
That thou, who wish an v[r]ight face dost looke upon the skie,
Shouldest also raise thy mind aloft, least while thou bearest high
Thy earthly head thy soule opprest beneath thy body lye.

THE VI. PROSE.

The concord of Gods prouidence with
freewill is fully explicated.

eeing therefore, as hath been shewed, all that is knowne, is not comprehended by his owne nature, but by the power of him, which comprehendeth it, let vs see now, as much as we may, what is the state of the diuine substance, that

that wee may also know, what his knowledge is. Wherfore it is the common iudgement of all that liue by reason, that God is euerlasting, and therefore let vs consider what ^a eternity is. For this will declare vnto vs both the Diuine nature and knowledge. Eternitie is a perfect possession all together of an endlesse life, which is more manifest by the comparison of temporall things, for whatsoeuer liueth in time, that being present proceedeth from times past, to times to come, and there is nothing placed in time, which can embrace all the space of his life at once. But he hath not yet attained to morrow, and hath lost yesterday. And you liue no more in this daies life, then in that moueable and transitory moment. wherefore whatsoeuer suffereth the

^a Eternity
what it is.

dition of time, although as Aristotle thought of the world) it neuer began, nor were euer to end, and his life did endure with infinite time, yet it is not such, that it ought to be called euerlasting. For it doth not comprehend and embrace all the space of his life together, though it be infinite, but it hath not the future time which is yet to come. That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fullnesse of an endlesse life together, to which neither any part to come is absent, nor of that which is past, hath escaped, is worthely to bee accounted euerlasting, and this is necessary, that being no possession in it selfe, it may alway be present to it selfe, and haue an infinity of moueable time present to it. Wherefore they are deceiued, who hearing that Plato thought, that

that this world had neither beginning of time, nor should euer have any end, thinke that by this meanes the created world shoule be coeternal with the creator. For it is one thing, to bee carried through an endless life, which *Plato* attributed to the world, another thing to embrace the whole presence of an endless life together, which is manifestly proper to the Diuine mind. Neither ought God to seeme more ancient then things created by the quantity of time, but rather by the simplicity of his Diuine nature. For that infinite motio of temporal things imitateth the present state of the unmoveable life, and since it cannot attaine nor equal it, it falleth from immobilitie to motion, & frō the simplicity of presence, it decreaseth to an infinite quātity offuture & past

and since it cannot posseſſe together
all the fulnesſe of his life, by neuer
leauing to be in ſome ſort, it ſeemeth
to exmulate in part that, which it can-
not fully obtaine & expreſſe, tying it
ſelue to this ſmall preſence of this
ſhort & ſwift moment, which be-
cause it carrieth a certayne iMage of
that abiding preſence, whοſoeuer
hath it, ſeemeth to be. But because it
could not ſtay, it vndertooke an in-
finite iourney of time, and ſo it came
to paſſe, that it con tinued that life
by going, whicke plenitude it could
not comprehend by ſtaying. Whe-
fore if wee will giue things their
right names, following *Plato*, let vs
ſay that God is euerlaſting, and the
world perpetuall. Wherefore ſince
euery judgement comprehendeth
thoſe things which are ſubiect vnto
it, according to his owne nature,
and

and God hath alway an euerlasting
and present state, his knowledge al-
so surpassing all motion of time, re-
mayneth in the simplicity of his pre-
sence, and comprehending the infi-
nite spaces of that, which is past and
to come, considereth al things in his
simple knowledge , as though they
were now in doing. So that, if thou
wilt weigh his foreknowledge, with
which he discerneth all things, thou
wilt more rightly esteeme it to bee
the knowledge of a neuer fading
instant, then a foreknowledge as of
a thing to come. For which cause
it is not called prævidence or fore-
sight, but rather prouidence, because
placed farre from inferiour things,
it beholdeþ all things as it were
from the highest toppe of things.
Why therefore wilt thou haue those
things necessary , which are illustra-

ted by the Diuine light , since that
men make not those things necessary, which they see. For doth thy sight
impose any necessity vpon those
things, which thou seest present ?
No. But the present instant of men
may well bee compared to that of
God in this ; that as you see some
things in your temporall instant, so
he beholdeth all things in his eter-
nall presence. VVherefore this di-
uine foreknowledge doth not
change the nature and propriety of
things, and it beholdeth them such
in his presence , as they will after
come to bee , neyther doth hee con-
found the iudgement of things, and
with one sight of his mind he discer-
neth as well those things which shal
happen necessarily , as otherwise. As
you when at one time you see a man
walking vpon earth , and the Sun ri-
sing

sing in heauen, although they be both
seene at once, yet you discerne , and
iudge that the one is voluntary, and
the other necessary. So likewise the
Diuine sight beholding all things,
disturbeth not the quality of things,
which to him are present, but in
respect of time are yet to come.
And so this is not an opinion , but
rather a knowledge grounded vp-
on truth, whē he knoweth that such
a thing shalbe, which likewise he is
not ignorāt, that it hath no necessi-
ty of being. Here if thou sayest , that
cannot chuse but happé, which God
seeth shal happen, & that, which can
not chuse but happen, must be of ne-
cessity, and so tyest me to this name
of necessity : I will graunt , that
it is a most solide trueth , but
whereof scarce any but a con-
templator of Diuinity is capable.

For

For I will answeare , that the same thing is necessary, when it is referred to the diuine knowledge; but when it is weighed in his owne nature, that it seemeth altogether free and absolute. For there be two necessities ; the one simple , as that it is necessary for all men to be mortall. The other conditionall , as if thou knowest, that any man walketh, he must needs walke. For what a man knoweth , cannot bee otherwise , then it is knowne. But this conditionall draweth not with it that simple or absolute necessity. For this is not caused by the nature of the thing , but by the adding a condition. For no necessity maketh him to goe, that goeth of his owne accord , although it bee necessary that he goeth , while he goeth. In like manner if prouidence seeth any

ny thing present , that must needes
be, although it hath no necessity of
nature. But God beholdeth those
future things, which proceed from
freewill, present. These things ther-
fore beeing referred to the Diuine
sight are necessary by the condition
of the diuine knowledg , and consi-
dered by themselues , they loose not
the absolute freedom e of their own
nature. Wherefore doubtlesse all
those things come to passe , which
God forcknoweth shall come , but
some of them proceede from free-
will , which though they come to
passe by being , yet they loose not
their owne nature , because before
they came to passe , they might also
not haue happened. But what im-
porteth it, that they are not necessa-
ry, since that by reason of the condi-
tion of the diuine knowledge , they
come

come to passe in all respects , as if they were necessary. It importeth this , that those things , which I proposed a little before , the Sunne rising , and the man going , while they are in doing , cannot chuse but bee in doing ; yet one of them was necessarily to bee , before it was , and the other not . Likewise those things , which God hath present , haue doubtlesse a beeing , but some of them proceede from the necessity of things , other from the power of the doers . And therefore wee said not without cause , that these , if they bee referred to Gods knowledge , are necessary ; and if they bee considered by themselues , they are free from the bonds of necessity . As whatsoeuer is manifest to senses , if thou referrest it to reason , is vniuersall , if thou considerest

itin it self, singular or particular. But thou wilt say, it is in my power to change my purpose, shall I frustrate prouidence, if I chance to alter those things, which sheforeknoweth? I answere, that thou mayest indeede chaunge thy purpose, but beecause the trueth of prouidence beeing present seeth, that thou canst doe so, and whether thou wilt doe so or no, and what thou purposest anew, thou canst not auoyde the Divine foreknowledge; euen as thou canst not avoyde the sight of an eye, which is present, although thou turnest thy selfe to diuers actions by thy freewill.

But yet thou wilt enquire, whether Gods knowledge shall bee chaunged by thy disposition, so that when thou wilt now one thing, and now another, it should also


also seeme to haue diuers knowledges. No. For Gods sight preuenteth all that is to come, and recalleth and draweth it to the presence of his owne knowledge; neither doth he vary, as thou imaginest, now knowing one thing and now another, but in one instant without moving preuenteth and comprehendeth thy mutations. Which presence of comprehending, and seeing all things God hath not by the euent of future things, but by his owne simplicity. By which that doubt is also resolued, which thou diddest put a litle before, that it is an vnworthy thing, that our future actions should be said to cause the knowledge of God. For this force of the diuine knowledge, comprehending all things with a present notion, appointeth to euery thing his measure,


sure, and receiueth nothing from ensuing accidents. All which being so , the freewill of mortall men remayneth vniolated, neither are the lawes vniust, which propose punishments and rewards to our wils, which are free from all necessity. There remayneth also a beholder of all things , which is God, who foreseeth all things , and the eternity of his vision , which is alway present, concurreth with the future quality of our actions, distributing rewards to the good , and punishments to the euill. Neyther doe we in vaine put our hope in God , or pray to him, for if wee doe this well and as we ought, wee shall not loose our labour , or bee without effect. Wherefore flye vices , embrace vertues , possesse your mindes with worthy hopes, offer vp humble prayers


Boetius his

prayers to your highest Prince.
There is, if you will not dissemble,
a great necessity of doing wel im-
posed vpon you, since you liue
in the sight of your iudge,
who beholdeth all
things.

F I N I S.







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